BREAKING INDIA'S PSI LOGJAM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 007421

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PHSA KNNP IN UK PSI
SUBJECT: BREAKING INDIA'S PSI LOGJAM

REF: NEW DELHI 6848

Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (U) This is an action request for Department L/LEI. See
para 7.


2. (C) Summary: To gain GOI support for the Proliferation
Security Initiative (PSI) we should quickly respond to GOI
concerns about the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the
Safety of Maritime Navigation (SUA) Convention, while
reiterating A/S Rademaker's argument that SUA and PSI are
complementary in their objectives, but independent in their
operations. Further, we should promote support for PSI as an
immediate opportunity for the GOI to demonstrate to Congress
its commitment to nonproliferation and thereby help to repair
the damages from India's unwillingness to date to support
referral of Iran to the UNSC. End Summary.


3. (C) Following the September 15 DVC between A/S Rademaker
and his MEA counterpart Joint Secretary for Disarmament and
International Security Hamid Ali Rao to address India's
concerns about SUA and PSI, PolCouns met with MEA Acting
Joint Secretary Sanjay Bhattacharya on Sept 21 to underline
that we should not let disagreement on SUA amendments become
an excuse for delay on PSI. Bhattacharya said the GOI was
pleased with the opportunity to raise its concerns about SUA
directly with A/S Rademaker and expressed hope that the GOI
would soon receive a formal response to their demarche on SUA
(Retel). He noted that A/S Rademaker seemed to reject the
discriminatory "NPT-like" nature of SUA transport provisions,
but added that he thought the safety clause may afford some
flexibility. Finally, Bhattacharya mentioned that MEA
Additional Secretary for International Security Meera Shankar
was currently in New York, implying that any decision on PSI
lay with Shankar.


4. (C) Eager to have Indian participation in the UK-hosted
PSI Indian Ocean exercises Nov 14-19, colleagues at the UK
High Commission have also asked about the status of US
dialogue with the GOI on PSI. BHC Second Secretary told
PolMilOff on Sept 22 that the GOI gave the BHC the same
non-paper outlining GOI concerns about SUA, but did not link
SUA to PSI, possibly because PSI is perceived to be a US
initiative. Martinek also shared UK legal experts' response
to the GOI non-paper (e-mailed to NP and SA/RA),which would
be given to the GOI on September 23.


5. (C) Meanwhile, in New Delhi's strategic circles, debate
continues among those who believe that GOI participation in
PSI would be good for India regardless of what the US thinks
about it. In his article, "Maritime Non-Proliferation
Initiative India's Bulwarks Against Nuclear Terrorism,"
Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses Research Fellow
Cdr. Gurpreet Khurana makes a case for GOI participation in
PSI and the Container Security Initiative (CSI) based on
India's real and immediate security concerns. Khurana argues
that if the GOI continues its doctrinaire rejection of all
global efforts linked to the NPT, it would compromise its own
security. Under Manmohan Singh, Khurana has detected subtle
indicators that India's leadership may be willing to consider
practical approaches to counter the global threat of nuclear
terrorism such as PSI and CSI, but this would require a
political decision to move beyond traditional objections to
the NPT treaty and concentrate instead on practical
nonproliferation measures.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) Comment: As A/S Rademaker stated during the Sept 15
DVC, we do not believe GOI concerns about the SUA treaty have
any practical bearing on PSI. However, a rapid response to
issues in the GOI non-paper with additional points discussing
the complementary but separate operations of SUA as a treaty
on the one hand, and PSI as an informal, ad hoc initiative on
the other, may de-link these initiatives and break the
logjam. MEA's Bhattacharya offered a hopeful interpretation
of the DVC, welcoming A/S Rademaker's answers on some of the
GOI's practical questions about PSI implementation. Further,
leveraging Indian equities in the July 18 civil nuclear
agreement, we may present PSI as an immediate -- albeit less
high-profile -- opportunity for the GOI to demonstrate to the
US Congress its commitment to nonproliferation in the absence
of India's outward support for referring Iran to the UNSC.
End Comment.


7. (U) Post seeks guidance on the GOI demarche (reftel) as
soon as possible.


8. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/sa/newdelhi/)
BLAKE