FIRST INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE MODEST BUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 000719

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KDEM IN CH
SUBJECT: FIRST INDIA-CHINA STRATEGIC DIALOGUE MODEST BUT
SIGNIFICANT

REF: A. NEW DELHI 4145


B. NEW DELHI 6787

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: The January 24 strategic dialogue between
China and India "did not accomplish much," but did provide
insight into China's view of the world, Indian Foreign
Secretary Shyam Saran told the DCM on January 27. From New

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Delhi's perspective, the dialogue illustrated China's
willingness to engage with India as a global power, including
on issues that traditionally fall into Beijing's orbit, such
as North Korea, and underlined China's view (as conveyed to
New Delhi) that India is not a rival in Asia. It also
contributed to the overall positive atmosphere of the
bilateral relationship, which FM Natwar Singh's January 27
speech at a conference on Asian Security reinforced. Despite
this goodwill, India remains concerned by the PLA military
buildup on the Tibetan Plateau and growing Chinese influence
in Burma. End Summary.


2. (U) During the first-ever strategic talks between India
and China, held in New Delhi on January 24, the two sides
discussed globalization, democratization of international
relations, UNSC reform, energy security, non-proliferation,
terrorism and "the situation in the Korean Peninsula,"
according to an MEA press release. The dialogue, led by
Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran and Chinese Vice Foreign
Minister Wu Dawei, also included discussions on the March
visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to New Delhi, an event
the MEA predicted would be a "major milestone in bilateral
relations."

An Emphasis on Multilateralism
--------------


3. (C) Offering a readout of the strategic dialogue, Foreign
Secretary Shyam Saran told the DCM that although the

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discussions "did not accomplish much," they provided insight
into China's view of the world. The dialogue also
illustrated Beijing's perspective on India-China relations in
the context of the "emerging Asian architecture." According
to Saran, Wu emphasized multipolarity and multilateralism as
the only legitimate means of addressing regional and global
challenges and said that China does "not, underline not" see
India as a rival in Asia. They agreed that Asia was large
enough to allow both countries to play significant,
multilateral roles.

Enough Space for Both
--------------


4. (C) FM Natwar Singh continued to promote the feeling of
goodwill generated by the strategic dialogue in a January 27
speech at a New Delhi conference on Asian Security. With
comments reminiscent of the June 2004 Panchsheel celebration
(Ref A),Natwar emphasized the two countries' shared
interests, noting that "while there are differences between
us, there is also an increasingly greater realization that
there is enough space and opportunity in the region for both
India and China to prosper." However, Natwar also sought to
demonstrate India's vested interests in China's neighborhood,
emphasizing that "developments in East Asia are of direct
consequence to India's security and development."

Focus on Terrorism
--------------


5. (C) Although Beijing had not been willing to discuss
counterterrorism in the past, during the strategic dialogue
Wu displayed a much higher level of concern about the issue,
Saran said, remarking that Wu was even willing to exchange
information. Saran speculated that the PRC's changed
demeanor resulted from the feeling that global terrorism
posed an increasing threat to China, and said he was
impressed by Beijing's heightened focus on the subject.

No Direct Endorsement on UNSC Seat
--------------


6. (C) Although Beijing continued to avoid directly
supporting India's bid for a permanent Security Council seat
(Ref B),Saran cited "strong indications" and "allusions"
that the PRC would ultimately support a seat for India. Both
countries agreed that India should play a more important role
in international affairs, he stated.

Saran Committed to Boundary Talks
--------------


7. (C) Saran said that the two sides had not specifically
addressed the boundary question during the strategic
dialogue. He emphasized, however, the GOI's belief that the
boundary dispute should be resolved in the context of larger
Indo-Chinese strategic and political concerns, and remarked
that India was prepared to work with China to find solutions.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The accomplishments of this first-ever strategic
dialogue between the two countries were modest but
significant. Conversing with China about problems in the
PRC's immediate neighborhood, such as North Korea, reflected
India's ever broadening strategic horizon and its desire to
project influence in areas in which it has not been active in
the past. It also allowed India to showcase itself as an
equal to China, able to engage on issues of global
importance, including those in East Asia. The talks also
demonstrated New Delhi's growing comfort level with Beijing.
Despite the outward expressions of goodwill, serious
reservations remain, including an on-going lack of trust
fueled by the PLA's military buildup on the Tibetan Plateau
and concern about Chinese influence in Burma. Such issues
will ultimately need to be addressed in order for genuine
long-term cooperation between New Delhi and Beijing to occur.
MULFORD