BHUTAN FEARS MAOISTS IN REFUGEE CAMPS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 006903

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/31/2015
TAGS: PREF PREL PGOV PHUM IN NP BT
SUBJECT: BHUTAN FEARS MAOISTS IN REFUGEE CAMPS

REF: A. NEW DELHI 5480

B. KATHMANDU 1638

C. KATHMANDU 1755

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Bhutanese MFA officials expressed concern
over Maoist intrusions into refugee camps in Nepal and
indicated the government's main priority is keeping radical
elements out of Bhutan during August 24-25 meetings with
Poloff and Econoff in Thimphu. The MFA reiterated the Royal
Government of Bhutan's (RGOB) commitment to the Joint
Verification Process, however they also signaled that it
would be impossible to screen out refugees with Maoist
sympathies. Government and UN interlocutors unanimously
agreed that under no circumstances would the RGOB repeat the
type of expulsions that occurred in the early 1990s,
regardless of the results of the May 2005 census. The RGOB
is issuing new identification cards to ethnic Nepalese, but
No Objection Certificates (NOCs),needed for government jobs
and higher education, are still being denied. Poloff
informed the MFA that Nepalese Foreign Minister Ramesh Nath
Pandey is open to meeting Foreign Minister Wangchuk to
discuss the refugee issue, if requested. The MFA responded
that they had not heard this and would forward the request to
the Foreign Minister. (Note: Polcouns delivered this message
to Bhutanese Ambassador Tshering in New Delhi on July 13 (Ref
A) and it appears the message did not make it to the official
to whom we spoke to in Thimphu. End Note.) The RGOB
suggests that the two Kings meet at the next SAARC summit
scheduled for November to discuss the refugee issue. End
Summary.

The Red Scare
--------------


2. (C) During four separate meetings with MFA officials over
two days, the RGOB repeatedly expressed concern over Maoist
infiltration into the refugee camps in Nepal and underlined
the need to keep such ideology out of Bhutan. MFA Policy and
Planning Under Secretary Karma Rinchenn stated that the RGOB
could not allow refugees who had been influenced by the
Maoists to return. He reiterated Bhutanese fears that
radical elements in the refugee population, if repatriated,
would cause havoc and incite the type of violence that
proceeded the expulsions of the early 1990s. When asked if
there would be a way to screen out refugees involved in the
Maoist insurgency, which the would have RGOB confidence, he
responded, "how can you screen for people's thoughts?"
Rinchenn commented that the recent attempt by refugees to
return to Bhutan (Refs B and C),were organized by the Human
Rights Organization of Bhutan (HUROB) and the Bhutan Gorkha
National Liberation Front (BGNLF). He noted that he had only
recently heard of the BGNLF and questioned whether it had
Maoist ties. There is no Gorkhaland in Bhutan, according to
Rinchenn, and the attempt to associate the Gorkha movement
with "the people in the camps" was troubling.


3. (C) MFA Under Secretary Chitem Tenzin also told us that
the RGOB is worried about Maoist infiltration into Bhutan.
He asserted that the Bhutanese are desperately attempting to
save their heritage and culture, and are worried that the
Maoists would try and destroy this history. He acknowledged
that the refugee situation was most regrettable and the
government was struggling with how to deal with the problem.
He also reiterated RGOB beliefs that the refugee numbers
being quoted in the press are much higher than the actual
number of Bhutanese, and that many of the residents of the
camps are actually Nepali and Indian citizens.

Committed to the Repatriation Process?
--------------


4. (C) MFA's Rinchenn told us the RGOB will abide by its
commitments made under the Bhutan/Nepal Joint Ministerial
meetings and that his government was not backing away from
prior agreements. MFA Under Secretary (Multilateral) Tenzin
Wangchuk also asserted that the RGOB would not back away from
the accords made regarding the refugees, particularly the
agreement to repatriate Category 1 refugees from the
Khudunabari camp. Tenzin reiterated that the RGOB would not
resist taking back Category 1 refugees, but that they were
waiting for the GON to respond to their overtures for
meetings.


5. (C) Resident Representative for UNDP Renata Lok
Dessallien, a senior and knowledgeable resident diplomat,
told us that it is unlikely the RGOB will backtrack on the
agreement to repatriate Category 1 refugees. She said that
the Bhutanese often take a long time to make a decision,
because it must be by consensus, but that once a decision has
been made they carry it through. However, she acknowledged
that the Bhutanese -- the people and the government -- feel
very vulnerable politically at this time and may postpone any
action on the refugees until after the constitution is
adopted and a new government elected. She concluded that in
the end, it is unlikely that large numbers of refugees will
ever return to Bhutan and that the international community
should immediately focus its efforts on third country
resettlement.

Mass Expulsions: Never Again
--------------


6. (C) Government officials, UN contacts and international
aid workers unanimously agreed that the RGOB would not repeat
the expulsions of the early 1990s. Ministry of Information
and Communications Secretary Tashi Phuntsog told us in
confidence that a friend in the census bureau said the new
populations figures would be lower than current estimates,
and could "be in the 600,000 range." However, interlocutors
asserted that lower population figures will not presage a
recurrence of expulsion of "non-Bhutanese." Austrian
Coordination Bureau Program Manager Ramesh Chhetri told
Poloff that there are many positive developments in southern
Bhutan, which point to an acceptance of the ethnic Nepali
populations there. He noted that, starting in February 2005,
the Government began issuing new identity cards to ethnic
Nepalese, giving them status as genuine Bhutanese, which was
a marked change in policy. Chhetri, who is an ethnically
Nepali Hindu and travels to the south often, commented that
"a large majority, likely over 90 percent, of ethnic
Nepalese" meet the citizenship qualifications to be genuine
Bhutanese and will receive the ID cards. He noted that most
of the others would fall into one of the other categories of
citizenship and that the government would not evict them. He
reported he had not heard of any Nepali-origin Bhutanese
being denied cards by the government since February. He
opined that this change in policy was timed to occur before
the implementation of the constitution, ensuring the minority
Hindu population currently living in Bhutan would be included
in the process.


7. (C) Chhetri acknowledged that discrimination against the
ethnic Nepali population in southern Bhutan remains and that
the government continues to withhold No Objection
Certificates (NOCs) from some of these people. NOCs are a
form of security clearance needed to receive government jobs
or education past the 10th grade level. Chhetri said that
"you must be very clean, with no (family) connection to the
camps in Nepal, to get an NOC." When Econoff questioned
MFA's Tenzin about the denial of NOCs, he privately
acknowledged it was an unfortunate circumstance of the
refugee problem, that it was discriminatory, and that the
RGOB would have to work to correct this problem.

RGOB-GON Meeting: Will It Ever Happen?
--------------


8. (C) Poloff informed the MFA that Nepalese Foreign
Minister Ramesh Nath Pandey is open to discussing the refugee
issue with Foreign Minister Wangchuk, possibly on the margins
of SAARC or UNGA, if the RGOB requests the meeting. The MFA
responded that they had not heard this and would forward the
request to the Foreign Minister. (Note: Polcouns delivered
this message to Bhutanese Ambassador Tshering in New Delhi on
July 13 (Ref A) and it appears the message did not make it to
the official to whom we spoke with in Thimphu. End Note.)
Under Secretary Wangchuk expressed doubt that such a meeting
could take place at UNGA, signaling that the RGOB would be
occupied with other "very important items," such as UN
reforms, the Millennium Summit and energy issues. He
indicated that if the GON requests the meeting, and time
permits, it was possible. (Comment: Do not hold your breath.
End Comment.)


9. (C) Tenzin suggested the meeting should not be at the
Foreign Minister level, but between Kings at the next SAARC
summit schedule for November 2005. He noted that the
Nepalese ambassador in India has repeatedly asked for
meetings with the King to discuss the issue, but had been
rebuffed.

Comment: Time to Move On
--------------


10. (C) The Bhutanese Refugee problem has dragged on for
close to 15 years. Although the RGOB has repeatedly stated
its commitment to repatriate bona fide Bhutanese citizens, it
has consistently stalled the process. Political instability
and the lack of security in Nepal have recently compounded
the problem and made the likelihood of a bilateral solution
even more remote.


11. (C) Attempts to use a "carrot and the stick" approach to
resolving this problem will not be successful. The countries
with a financial presence in Bhutan (India, Denmark,
Switzerland and Austria) that could force RGOB action through
withdrawal of aid or cancellations of loans have not shown a
willingness to do so. Although the GOI publicly states it is
pressing the two sides to find a solution, New Delhi will be
wary of anything that could give rise to another neighbor
with a Maoist insurgency, or active terrorist network working
against it. In the Bhutanese mind, there is no incentive
worth risking the importation of large number of possible
dissidents or Maoist sympathizers. The RGOB fear of Maoist
infiltration of the camps, whether real or perceived, has
completely colored their judgment.


12. (C) Bhutan views the refugee issue as an extension of a
much larger issue, that of being a tiny Buddhist country
sandwiched between the giants of China and India. The
Bhutanese have a very real fear of being swallowed up by one
of the two and recent history supports their case. China's
invasion of Tibet and India's annexation of Sikkim weigh
heavily on the Bhutanese conscience. Rinchenn noted there
remains widespread fear in the government and the population
that, without very careful planning, Bhutan will eventually
be seized by one of its neighbors.


13. (C) There is no excuse for the actions that the RGOB
undertook in the early 1990s. Expelling its own citizens was
wrong and that message should be made clear. However, it is
time to admit that it is very unlikely that a large portion
of the refugees will ever return to Bhutan. Even if the
Category 1's from all of the camps are repatriated, the
number would only be about 2,500 (extrapolating the number of
Category 1's from Khudunabari to overall number of
refugees). Even if that number is doubled, it still
represents only a small fraction of refugees, currently
languishing in the camps, that may ever reach Bhutan. It is
time to focus on other solutions. UNDP's Dessallien agreed
that that third country resettlement is the correct option.
The Australian Embassy informed us that they are currently
making plans for a large scale resettlement program for the
Bhutanese refugees, if the political will for such an
endeavor arises. It is time to focus our efforts on third
country resettlement, giving relief to the refugees,
acknowledging Bhutan's security fears and closing the book on
this saga.


14. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi)
MULFORD