Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI6595
2005-08-26 13:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

NEW DELHI NEPAL EXPERTS CALL FOR LONG-TERM STRATEGY

Tags:  PREL MASS KDEM PGOV MOPS PBTS IN NP 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006595 

SIPDIS

KATHMANDU PASS RICHELSOPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS KDEM PGOV MOPS PBTS IN NP
SUBJECT: NEW DELHI NEPAL EXPERTS CALL FOR LONG-TERM STRATEGY

REF: A. NEW DELHI 4131

B. NEW DELHI 6149

Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 006595

SIPDIS

KATHMANDU PASS RICHELSOPH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/25/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS KDEM PGOV MOPS PBTS IN NP
SUBJECT: NEW DELHI NEPAL EXPERTS CALL FOR LONG-TERM STRATEGY

REF: A. NEW DELHI 4131

B. NEW DELHI 6149

Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (SBU) Summary: New Delhi-based Nepal experts representing
a wide spectrum of viewpoints agreed that the international
community must take a longer-term view of the crisis in
Nepal, and argued the US must lead in any recasting of
strategy, as New Delhi is handcuffed by conflicting domestic
interests and strategic perspectives. In an evolution from
previous views, most seem ready to see the King depart the
scene in Kathmandu. End Summary.

Washington Must Lead, Because New Delhi Can't
--------------


2. (C) Although participants at a New Delhi-based
Nepal-watchers lunch hosted by A/DCM in honor of Nepal Desk
Officer David Richelsoph recognized Washington's consistent
signals that New Delhi had the lead on forging a common
policy on Nepal, they insisted that, ultimately, the USG will
have to initiate any re-engineering of the currently
stagnating policy. The lack of consensus on Nepal among
India's strategic, intellectual and political communities
prevents the emergence of fresh GOI policies, they explained,
but New Delhi would support a productive new tack in Nepal if
one were put forth by Washington. Researcher Anil Kamboj of
the government-supported Institute for Defence Studies and
Analysis stated that the Indian military is not backing a
position of its own in the internal GOI debate on Nepal
policy, but would fully support any political decision of the
government. Several journalists and a retired Ambassador
indicated that MEA and others responsible for Nepal might
view a more activist Washington role with relief.

India Might Accept a UN Role
--------------


3. (C) While recognizing New Delhi's historic allergy to UN
involvement in South Asian conflicts, the lunch participants
were surprisingly optimistic that the GOI would acquiesce to

a productive UN role in mediating a solution to the
Palace-parties-Maoists struggle. Even former Ambassador to
Nepal KV Rajan, who maintains close contacts to the MEA,
agreed that India might accept UN involvement if it appeared
that an international community or UN-sponsored solution
would encourage the King to climb down from his current
position and provide a way out of the political stalemate.
However, when pressed by A/DCM, none of the lunch guests were
able to define exactly what a UN-brokered solution might look
like or what role the UN might play.

Maoists: Ready to Compromise, Or Just Tactics?
-------------- -


4. (C) JNU Professor of South Asian Studies SD Muni
reiterated his appeal for governments to give credence to
Maoist assurances that they are willing to join a democratic
government, and even accept a titular monarchy. Alluding to
his close connections to senior Maoist leaders (he responded
to a challenge by asserting that he had met CPN(M) chief
Prachanda "within the past 10 months"),Muni asked us to
trust the Maoists' willingness to participate in a peaceful
political process.


5. (C) In response, MG (ret) Ashok Mehta argued forcefully
that the Maoist statements of willingness to cooperate were
only a tactic aimed at persuading the political parties to
join forces against the King. Once the King was gone, Mehta
implied, the Maoists would then hold all the cards and
dispense with the parties. Moreover, Mehta asserted, Maoist
treatment of the people in areas under their control belied
Muni's assurance that they were true democrats at heart.
Muni responded that the Maoist leadership has come to the
conclusion that it cannot win militarily and is therefore
ready to join a democratic government. Embassy officers
underlined that the Maoists' past practice placed the burden
on them to change behaviors, not just language.

Maoists Are Out-thinking the Rest of Us
--------------


6. (C) Terrorism and insurgency expert Ajai Sahni of the
Institute for Conflict Management complained that India, the
US, and other international actors were unable to assess
accurately both Maoist actions and the proper course to end
the conflict because of short-term thinking. While the
Maoists are content to play out strategies that will advance
their goals over the course of a decade or more, the
international community is so determined to seek a solution
within a timeline of months that it is unable to respond
effectively. Muni disagreed with Sahni's assessment of
Maoist intentions, but he, Rajan and Kamboj concurred that
the international community's emphasis on short-term fixes
was precluding an accurate assessment of how to end the
conflict.


7. (C) Sahni, generally seen as hawkish against Maoist and
naxalite insurgents, argued that India and the US must stop
focusing on the military dimension of the conflict, and
instead adopt a longer-term perspective of how to address
political concerns of all parties to the crisis for a lasting
solution. Rajan, who had earlier advocated increased
military assistance to the RNA (Ref A) as a means to break
the Maoist insurgency, agreed that a military solution is
impossible. All participants agreed that the international
community must seek some path that will bring the Palace, the
parties and the Maoists into a political process, whether it
upholds the traditional "twin pillars" format or not. None
of them, however, gave any detailed proposals for such an
approach.

Comment: Down with the King
--------------


8. (C) We were struck by the widespread acceptance among New
Delhi's Nepal watchers of the idea that King Gyanendra has
made himself dispensable. We have convoked this group
repeatedly since February 1, and on this occasion found a
stark souring of views on the King, which contrasts with the
GOI's continued commitment to the "twin pillars" of
constitutional monarchy and multiparty democracy. While
several of these interlocutors had earlier focused on pushing
the King into an alliance with the parties, they have all but
given up hope that he will do so. Disparaging the "twin
pillars" formula as obsolete, they are now open to finding a
solution without, or in spite of, the Palace. The widespread
agreement among our interlocutors that Washington, instead of
New Delhi, must take the initiative in new steps on Nepal,
combined with MEA's admission that it is searching for more
effective policies (Ref B),underlines the urgency of finding
a way forward and sharing those ideas with India.


9. (U) Visit New Delhi's Classified Website:
(http//www.state.sgov/p/sa/newdelhi)
MULFORD