MISHRA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC TO U/S BURNS ABOUT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 005049

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV KNNP ENRG IN CH US
SUBJECT: MISHRA CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC TO U/S BURNS ABOUT
INDIA-US TIES

Classified By: Charge Bob Blake for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Meeting with U/S Burns and the Charge on
June 25, former NSA Brajesh Mishra was cautiously optimistic
on the US-India relationship. One of the architects of
India's greatly expanded ties with Washington, Mishra
stressed that progress would be incremental and evolutionary,
that both governments should not nurse high expectations, but
remained unconvinced that India and the US have defined them
or devised a framework for their realization. He advised the
Under Secretary not to expect dramatic changes in Indian
voting behavior at the UN. While agreeing that there was a
need for balance in Asia between China and other nations,
Mishra ruled out confrontation with Beijing. He hopes to
meet with Secretary Rice for further discussions when he
visits Washington later in the year. End Summary.

Progress - but not Dramatic Progress
--------------


2. (C) After brief welcoming remarks, the Under Secretary
asked Mishra for his views on US-India ties, noting that
while the two governments are pushing ahead, it would require
opposition BJP support to realise the potential in bilateral
relations.


3. (C) Mishra expressed satisfaction with the intense
dialogue between the two governments in the past six months.
He agreed that the "Indian establishment" sees much promise
in closer ties with the US, but the "substance is not yet
there," which was possibly a result of "old thinking."
Mishra urged both countries to "decide what they want and
require" for the relationship to blossom, commenting that
India and the US have not yet come to such an understanding
and are "proceeding cautiously." He agreed with the Under
Secretary that there is no hostility in India towards the US

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(as exists in Pakistan and other countries),except in the
Communist parties, where such hostility is ideologically
driven.

Need for Consensus on Bilateral Ties
--------------


4. (C) Mishra lamented that there is "no consensus" on the
bilateral relationship in India, "as there is with the
India-Russia relationship," which is "part of history." He
attributed this to both the USG and the GOI, as "we should be
very clear what we expect." It is very well that we have the
"Next Steps in Strategic Partnership," more proposed
cooperation on energy, space, and defense, but these had not
yet attained a "critical mass." Both countries must agree on
the basic nature of the relationship for it to move forward,
he stated.


5. (C) Recalling that a colleague had recently suggested
that the US was ready to enter into a "NATO plus"
relationship with India in defense, Mishra wondered whether
India was willing to enter into one, as it would involve
similar ties as the US and the UK currently enjoy. He hoped
that the many high-level visits would increase the level of
dialogue, but predicted that each side would maintain its own
expectations.

The Need to Remove Obstacles
--------------


6. (C) Commenting that the US and India have a "framework"
for their strategic partnership, the Under Secretary agreed
that it must be filled in with more substance. The
bureaucracies, laws and regulations in both countries impede
progress, which requires both countries to redouble their
efforts to achieve a breakthrough -- another reason why it
was crucial for PM Singh's July 18 visit to the United States
to be a success.


7. (C) The Under Secretary added that during his meetings at
the MEA, it was quickly apparent that India and the US have a
broad relationship and that much can be achieved in the areas
of space, energy, and military cooperation. In addition,
bilateral programs on HIV/AIDS, democracy and education were
set to expand. He had also observed very high public
expectations regarding civil nuclear cooperation and UNSC
expansion, which required quick progress on overcoming US
regulations that inhibit cooperation on nuclear energy.


8. (C) Underlining that he could not speak for the
opposition BJP (because he had resigned from the party in
1998 upon becoming Principal Secretary to former PM
Vajpayee),Mishra pointed out that Vajpayee also wants the
bilateral relationship to move forward, but it was unclear
how it would develop and what would emerge. That is why both
countries need to devise a "framework," he stated.

Expanding the UNSC
--------------


9. (C) On the UNSC, the Under Secretary underlined US
interests in maintaining the Council's effectiveness. The
USG was not opposed to new members, as long as they
strengthen the UN. While the US was now thinking in terms of
"two or so" new permanent members, the large gulf between US
and Indian voting behavior illustrated the different ways of
looking at the UN in the two countries. With this in mind,
the two countries' interests at the UN would take some time
to converge, he predicted.


10. (C) Mishra agreed that it was not clear how an expanded
Council would function and how new members would behave,
although he "couldn't imagine" that India's behavior in the
UN will change markedly in the direction the US would like.
It would take a "major development" to bring about such
change, which was in part a function of the much broader US
agenda at the UN than that of India. Mishra opined that
movement towards expansion was well advanced and could not be
stopped without an enormous amount of controversy.

The Trouble with China
--------------


11. (C) Mishra pointed out that the Chinese Ambassador in
New Delhi has expressed strong support for India's entry into
the UNSC, that the Chinese Premier had provided similar
assurances to PM Singh, and that China will "never agree to
Japan." When Burns responded that China has repeatedly
stated during recent P-5 meetings that it would like to
maintain the status quo in the Council, Mishra replied that
he has had "wide experience" with the Chinese leadership at
senior levels, and knew that they altered their public
statements in different venues, but that their pro-India
position should be taken as a matter of policy, as PM Wen had
given such assurances to PM Manmohan Singh during his recent
visit to New Delhi. Th Under Secretary reiterated that the
US is "more open" to UNSC reform than China is, and has been
careful not to rule out an Indian seat.


12. (C) The Under Secretary pointed out that the US is now
focused more on South Asia, East Asia and the Middle East
than in the past, and that top USG priorities are dealing
with Islamic terrorism and the competitive relationship with
China. The Chinese military buildup demonstrates that the
PRC is spending major sums of money to counter the American
navy. The US did not view India as a "counterweight" to
China, but has concluded that India's strategic interests are
more closely aligned with those of the US than with China.
This is valuable to the US-India relationship, he concluded.


13. (C) Mishra maintained that the bilateral relationship
was "mutually rewarding," but that "contradictions" would
remain, and that diplomats from both countries would have to
overcome them. He was also glad to hear that the US was not
bent on a "confrontation" with China, as that would not work,
especially since India has a vested interest in its
relationship with China and would not be drawn into
confrontation.

The US Role in Asia
--------------

14. (C) The US is providing "balance" in Asia, and India
would like that to continue, Mishra continued. Whether the
US and India increase their military cooperation to
"equalize" the Chinese military is "open for discussion," but
a confrontation would be out of the question. India is also
intent on forging closer ties with the countries of SE Asia
and with ASEAN.


15. (C) Describing briefly the US strategy in Asia of
linking countries to each other and to the US, the Under
Secretary observed that the East Asian Summit sponsored by

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China represents an attempt by Beijing to keep the US out of
Asia and is "not friendly." Mishra agreed, but pointed out
that no countries in SE Asia oppose the US, and that they
work together and pursue mutual interests in the Middle East,
and the Persian Gulf, although differences on Iran remained.

Invitation to Washington
--------------


16. (C) The Under Secretary concluded the meeting by
inviting Mishra to Washington to meet with Secretary Rice,
who had worked closely together while both were National
Security Advisors. Mishra confirmed plans to visit
Washington later in the year and looked forward to seeing the
Secretary.

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17. (C) The Under Secretary cleared this message.
BLAKE