INDIA SUPPORTS SRI LANKA'S JOINT MECHANISM AND AIR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004434

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER MASS ECON CE IN
SUBJECT: INDIA SUPPORTS SRI LANKA'S JOINT MECHANISM AND AIR
CAPABILITIES

REF: A. NEW DELHI 7497


B. CHENNAI 1203

Classified By: CDA Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During Sri Lankan President Chandrika
Kumaratunga's visit to New Delhi on June 2-3, PM Singh gave
GOI conditional support for the Post-Tsunami Operational
Management Structure (P-TOMS),discussed concerns about the
LTTE's air capability, and offered to upgrade Sri Lankan Air
Force capabilities without signing the Defense Cooperation
Agreement. Kumaratunga came to thank India for its help
after the Tsunami, but also hoped to clear up Indian
ambiguity on and gain backing for the P-TOMS in order to
shore up support for the mechanism at home. In an interview
after the meetings, NSA Narayanan complicated the message by
stating that support was conditional upon the inclusion of
non-LTTE Tamil parties, leading to some speculation about GOI
intentions. The message Chandrika took home was of GOI
support for the joint mechanism and Sri Lanka's defenses,
thus furthering the post-Tsunami feel-good relations with
India's most agreeable neighbor. End Summary.

Public Thanks from Chandrika
--------------


2. (U) President Kumaratunga used the occasion of her first
visit to India since the Tsunami to "thank the Government and
people of India for their generous assistance" since
December. PM Singh reiterated that India was committed to
reconstruction, and stated that GOI assistance included a
grant of almost USD 25 million for relief projects, a
moratorium on debt repayments for three years and possible
changes to lines of credit to accommodate post-reconstruction
priorities.

Singh Backs the P-TOMS...
--------------


3. (C) Most Delhi-based analysts speculated that the real
reason for Chandrika's visit was to gain GOI support for the
P-TOMS, also commonly known as the Joint Mechanism (JM). The
P-TOMS is the formal international and multilateral
instrument for coordinating Tsunami aid distribution between
the GOSL, LTTE and Muslim groups throughout the island.
India's silence on the issue had fed rumors that the GOI
disliked the mechanism for, as one expert put it, "needlessly
giving the LTTE a status they didn't deserve in areas they
shouldn't control." Singh addressed the subject by
expressing his "understanding of and support for these
ongoing efforts," which was widely perceived as an
endorsement. MR Narayan Swamy, an editor for the Indo-Asian
News Service and Prabhakaran biographer, noted that India
felt pressure to take a public position "in line with all of
the major countries and aid organizations who support the
P-TOMS."

...But NSA Narayanan Says Support Is Conditional
-------------- ---


4. (C) After the bilaterals, NSA Narayanan clarified GOI
support in a thinly-reported interview with TV news channels,
stating that "We have agreed to the proposal, as long as it
is not with the LTTE alone but with other Tamil parties too."
Dr. Anupam Ray, MEA Deputy Secretary for Sri Lanka stressed
the language of support in the joint statement, but told
Poloff that Indian support was "only theoretical until the JM
is signed." Although the press also focused on GOI support,
one Indian reporter speculated that Narayanan's statement had
"scuttled the proposal." Most Delhi-based experts agreed
that the LTTE would not accept other Tamil party involvement,
but differed on the importance of Narayanan's statement.
Swamy argued that the GOI actually "doesn't want to back the
mechanism, but also doesn't want to sound negative" in light
of international support and the close relationship with
Kumaratunga, leading to intentional vagueness in the official
language.


5. (C) Professor Sahadevan from Jawaharal Nehru University
(JNU) noted to Poloff that Indian policy is to "encourage all
of the Tamil parties to get involved in democracy," so
Narayan's statement was "not a precondition, just a policy
statement." The real question of "how much the GOI stressed
this condition is unknown," but he expects the statement to
play out in the details of India's aid, speculating that the
GOI may not send aid or aid workers directly to
LTTE-controlled areas unless other Tamil parties were
included.


6. (C) N. Manoharan, a Senior Fellow at the Institute of
Peace and Conflict Studies, refuted the importance of
Narayanan's statement, saying that "there is no point to
whether India backs it" because the greatest challenge to the
JM was the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) Party, and GOI
support would not influence their opinion. On the contrary,
Professor Sahadevan argued that India's support has huge
political significance. If the GOI opposed the JM, they
would be the only outside dissenting voice, which the "JVP
would make use of to oppose the mechanism." By dissenting,
India would run the risk of "demonstrably refuting the need
for tsunami reconstruction." According to Sahadevan, the PM
knows that Chandrika's regime is struggling with the JM, and
"doesn't want to make it any harder" and upset the
improvement in relations that has resulted from greater
economic cooperation and India's Tsunami aid (Ref A).

LTTE's Air Tigers
--------------


7. (C) Following press reports about LTTE air capability and
its potential to affect South India, most Delhi-based
analysts say the fear of a suicide attack or bombing is
overblown but that the Air Tigers are nevertheless a cause
for concern. A recent report in the "Asian Age" pointed out
that the two aircraft have a range of 1,000 km-plus and are
capable of flying directly to Chennai and back. In response
to a "possible threat by the LTTE," the "Asian Tribune"
reported on May 30 that intelligence agencies put a red alert
on Cochin International Airport through June 7. Professor
Sahadevan observed that after the backlash from Rajiv
Gandhi's assassination, the LTTE will "never again threaten
India" because they won't want to risk "changing the military
balance by unduly antagonizing New Delhi." IPCS's Manoharan
agreed that a suicide attack was unlikely, and that the LTTE
would be more interested in a threat with either less human
casualties, more economic power or a public figure target.


8. (C) Although there was "no need to worry now," Manoharan
saw this development as one which Delhi will need to closely
monitor as the LTTE builds up the force and accumulates more
powerful technology and more aircraft. The Observer Research
Foundation Chennai-based analyst RS Vasan told Poloff
recently that the Air Tigers are "at the moment not a threat,
but certainly a future worry" because the size of the runway
makes it apparent that the LTTE is "looking toward the
future." Stronger aircraft could strengthen the LTTE by
allowing them to bring in supplies from all over Southeast
Asia. The "Asian Age" reported on June 4 that the PM offered
to "upgrade capabilities of the Lankan Air Force," an offer
FM Natwar Singh emphasized during his June 8-10 visit to Sri
Lanka.

Defense Agreement Buried
--------------


9. (C) The two leaders reportedly did not focus on the
Defense Cooperation Agreement (DCA),which was widely
expected to be signed during Chandrika's last visit in
November 2004 but continues to face opposition from pro-Tamil
parties in South India. In its 2004-2005 annual report
released in May, the Home Ministry described the LTTE as
"extremely potent, and the most lethal and well organized
terrorist force in Sri Lanka" that "has strong liaisons in
Tamil Nadu and certain pockets of Southern India." Without
this formal agreement, New Delhi already assists the GOSL
with military supplies, training, intelligence and naval
cooperation against the LTTE.


10. (C) Although the GOI has strong anti-LTTE leanings, UPA
coalition partners and pro-Tamil parties MDMK and PMK oppose
the DCA, and the PM stalled the agreement to avoid upsetting
them, particularly in advance of Tamil Nadu state elections
expected before May 2006. According to "The Hindu," MDMK
General Secretary Vaiko met with the PM on June 5 to protest
the DCA as direct Indian assistance against the LTTE and an
interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. Since both the
MDMK and the PMK were also coalition partners under the
previous NDA government, IPCS Manoharan told Poloff that "as
long as pro-Tamil parties are in the coalition, the defense
agreement won't be signed." Sahadevan stressed that PM Singh
is less likely than Vajpayee to ignore Tamil politics and
sign the agreement because "his leadership is not strong
enough to withstand the tension in the coalition." Despite
coalition pressures, the Bangalore-based "Deccan Herald"
reported that FM Natwar Singh said on June 10 in Sri Lanka
that the agreement is "in the process of being finalized."
Whether or not the DCA is signed, Manoharan argued that it is
largely a symbolic gesture telling the LTTE that "India is
with us," and defense cooperation has been and will continue
to rise without a formal agreement in place.
Economic Cooperation
--------------


11. (C) Looking forward to FM Natwar Singh's June 8-10 trip
to Sri Lanka to discuss the Joint Economic Commission (JEC),
economics reportedly figured prominently in the PM's
discussions with President Kumaratunga. The two leaders
noted bilateral trade reached USD 1.8 billion in 2004 and set
a deadline for the negotiations on a Comprehensive Economic
Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to conclude by the end of 2005.
The meetings came just days after the Indian parliament
passage of the Sethusamudram channel in between the
countries, which strategists such as C. Raja Mohan saw as a
lost opportunity for economic integration and a bow to Tamil
politics (Ref B). Calling the CEPA the "next stage of
cooperation" after the Free Trade Agreement (covering only
trade in goods) was signed in 1998, Professor Sahadevan told
Poloff that it will focus on cooperation in the service
sector and increase bilateral investment. Manoharan stressed
the importance of this agreement in "institutionalizing
recent increased economic linkages and paving the way for
greater bilateral cooperation."

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Despite NSA Narayanan's statement placing conditions
on Indian support, Chandrika still took home the prize of GOI
backing for the JM. Just as Sri Lanka has chosen not to make
a public spat out of the Sethusamudram channel, the GOI kept
its disagreements with the JM mostly quiet and stressed its
support for Tsunami reconstruction. The stalling of the DCA
is a testament to the small, but still influential, power
that pro-Tamil coalition partners hold in Indian coalition
governments, but will not prevent further Indian assistance
to counter what New Delhi sees as the continuing threat of
the LTTE. PM Singh was careful not to introduce any
dissonance into India's model relationship by giving support
for the JM, and will continue to use tsunami reconstruction
aid, economic cooperation and defense assistance to further
the positive trend in Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
BLAKE