Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI4234
2005-06-07 03:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

GOI WATER ISSUES FLOWING SLOWLY WITH PAKISTAN AND

Tags:  PREL EWWT SENV BG PK IN INDO PAK 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004234 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PREL EWWT SENV BG PK IN INDO PAK
SUBJECT: GOI WATER ISSUES FLOWING SLOWLY WITH PAKISTAN AND
BANGLADESH

Classified By: Charge Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 004234

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015
TAGS: PREL EWWT SENV BG PK IN INDO PAK
SUBJECT: GOI WATER ISSUES FLOWING SLOWLY WITH PAKISTAN AND
BANGLADESH

Classified By: Charge Bob Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: In recent meetings with SA Bureau's S&T
Officer for Pakistan and Bangladesh Marcella Szymanski, the
MEA emphasized GOI commitment to working with Bangladesh to
create water sharing agreements to benefit both countries and
to resolving its water issues with Pakistan consistent with
the Indus Water Treaty (IWT). MEA Bangladesh Desk Officer
Puneet Kundal noted that Bangladeshi opposition has slowed
progress on the controversial river linking projects. India
and Bangladesh share 54 rivers, but have only one water
sharing agreement for the Ganges signed in 1996 and are
working to link more of its rivers to drought-prone areas.


2. (C) MEA Director for Pakistan Monica Mohta noted that
while preferring to negotiate water issues with Pakistan
bilaterally, the GOI would follow the IWT provisions to solve
the Baglihar and Kishenganga dam issues. As India and
Pakistan prepare for the first Baglihar Dam meeting with
World Bank-appointed water expert Raymond Lafitte in Paris on
June 9-10, ongoing talks at the level of Permanent Indus
Commissioner in New Delhi were put on hold. Mohta underlined
New Delhi's resolve not to use water as a weapon as the two
countries work through the disputes during a time of improved
relations. End Summary.

River Linking In Feasibility Stage
--------------


3. (C) Since the last meeting of the Water Minister-level
Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) in September 2003, the only
discernible progress between India and Bangladesh on water
sharing issues is the start of a joint feasibility study on
the project, according to MEA's Puneet Kundal. At that time,
India agreed to involve Bangladesh in future discussions on
its river linking projects, which it began considering in

1986. He explained that the JRC created the Joint Committee
of Experts (JCE),which was entrusted to find water sharing
formulas for seven of the shared rivers. The JCE met last on
September 2004 and decided to prioritize the Tista River, a
tributary of the Brahmaputra River. To explore the Tista
project, the JCE began a feasibility study which is scheduled

to be completed at the end of 2006. According to Kundal, the
idea of the river linking project is to utilize excess
surface water wasted in flood areas by connecting it to
drought areas. Areas of abundant water will be diverted to
scarcer areas through hundreds of canals, reservoirs and
dams.

Bangladesh Opposes Environmental Impacts
--------------


4. (C) Although the JCE is still studying the feasibility of
this project, Indian media continues to report stiff
opposition in Bangladesh to the river linking project, noting
that the GOB MFA is "very much concerned" about the project,
while environmentalists warn that diverting water to India
could damage the country's fish and farming sectors by
turning parts of the country into a desert. In response to
charges that India is "drying out" Bangladesh, MEA's Kundal
remarked that "40 to 50 percent of Bangladesh is under water
at any one time" and that "desertification wouldn't happen
even if we tried our best." He stressed that no investment
decisions will be made until the feasibility study is
complete in 2006. When the governments reach the negotiation
stage, the GOI is committed to ensuring that the agreement
gives Bangladesh certain "minimum command areas" that are
dependent on a certain volume of water. He posited that
these command areas would ensure that Bangladesh does not
face desertification.

No Meeting Date Set
--------------


5. (C) On May 9, the Indian media reported that Bangladesh
Water Resources Minister Hafiz Uddin Ahmed called for the
next meeting of the JRC, protesting that the council is
supposed to meet at least two times each year but has only
met once in the last four years. The GOI agreement to
include Bangladesh in the negotiations at the September 2004
JCE meeting reportedly led Ahmed to comment that "We believe
the Congress government in India has softened on the issue."
MEA's Kundal told Poloff that there was still no date set for
the next JRC or JCE meetings. However, he stressed that
under the bilateral Science and Technology Agreement signed
with Dhaka, the GOI had trained Bangladeshi science teachers,
shared flood forecasting data, and gifted supplies such as
arsenic contamination detection kits and water measurement
tools.

GOI Prepares for Neutral Expert on Baglihar
--------------


6. (C) On Pakistan, MEA Director Monica Mohta praised the
Indus Water Treaty as a "model," adding that with the
exception of Baglihar, there have never been any problems
under the treaty since it was signed in 1960 "in spite of the
ups and downs" in the overall Indo-Pak relationship. This
was a sign that the GOI would never use water as a weapon
against the Pakistani people, she noted. Calling the
Baglihar problem "political and not technical," Mohta said
that Pakistan opposes all projects in J&K. Whenever the GOI
proposes a project there, Pakistan "either says that it will
flood us or deprive us, because Musharraf wants the people to
be alienated from the GOI at the expense of the benefits of
the project." She claimed that when Delhi asks Islamabad to
quantify the objections, they usually come back empty-handed.


7. (C) On the Baglihar hydropower scheme, Mohta confidently
observed that the GOI was "convinced that its designs are
within the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty." After
receiving Pakistan's six objections, the GOI said they had
solved "two and a half and are waiting for concessions from
Pakistan." Pakistan responded by invoking Article Nine,
which allows them to consult an expert. Mohta believed this
was premature, but said the "GOI had no objection to an
expert" and that this process could be positive because it
"sets a precedent for future projects." However, when asked
what the GOI would do if the expert found India in breach of
the treaty, she predicted that "this will not happen."


8. (U) On June 3, "The Hindu's" Gargi Parsai (who has
written extensively on water issues) reported that Pakistan
and India will meet World Bank-appointed water expert Raymond
Lafitte in Paris on June 9-10 to address the Baglihar
dispute. The five-member Indian delegation will include J.
Hari Narayan, GOI Water Resources Secretary, Fali S. Nariman,
the lawyer who will present India's case, and Shankar Das, a
prominent specialist on international law. After the
announcement, Parsai reported that Pakistan Commissioner
Jamait Ali Shah was recalled to Islamabad, breaking off the
ongoing Permanent Indus Commissioner-level talks in Delhi
focused on the Kishenganga River Dam. "Hindustan Times"
Foreign Correspondent Vinod Sharma told us the talks were put
on hold in order to give the Commissioner and his colleagues
time to brief the Pakistani delegation before they travel to
Paris.

Kishenganga River Dam Still in Negotiation Stage
-------------- ---


9. (C) On May 9, after talks broke down between India and
Pakistan over a 103 meter high dam on the Kishenganga River
in the Gurez Valley, India's Commissioner for Permanent Indus
Waters Commission offered Pakistan a July 15 deadline to
resolve differences. The MEA's Mohta hoped that the two
governments would be able to solve this bilaterally, but
explained that if the parties did not reach a solution in the
next two months, Pakistan could invoke Article Nine and ask
for an expert to resolve the dispute, as in the case of
Baglihar. According to "The Hindu," before Permanent Indus
Waters talks were stopped on June 2, the two sides reached
convergence on four of the six issues, namely the flood value
in the design of the damn, the location of sedimentation
sluices, the water intake level and the release of water
downstream. Although there was no resolution on
inter-tributary transfer and protection of existing
agriculture and hydro-electric uses before talks were ended,
both sides reportedly agreed to meet again before the July

15. Despite the disagreement, the GOI has not suspended work
on the project. Mohta termed stopping work "denying people
development" and recalled the GOI experience when they gave
in to Pakistan's demand to stop work on the Tulbul Navigation
Project in 1987 and have never been allowed to resume.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The idea for the river linking project in India's
Northeast has been around for some 19 years and refuses to go
away. The UPA government slightly improved the situation in
September 2004 by agreeing to include Bangladesh in the Tista
negotiations, but has not responded to GOB calls to cooperate
further on water issues during a time of strained ties with
Dhaka. As the wealthier upper riparian state with the most
to gain from river linking, the ball is in India's court to
make concessions, which it has been reluctant to offer,
perhaps as a sign of unhappiness over other issues (e.g.
Bangladeshi migrants in India and Indian insurgent groups
reportedly in Bangladesh).


11. (C) We understand that instructions to proceed with the
neutral expert on Baglihar came straight from the PM, and
expect the GOI to follow his findings. Permanent Indus
Commissioner-level talks on the Kishenganga issue were cut
short to focus on the Baglihar meetings in Paris, which
decreases the chances of resolving the matter bilaterally
before the July 15 "deadline." The Baglihar process will
signal whether the IWT is truly a "model" for bilateral
dispute resolution, will reveal how each country reacts to
outside mediation, and may foreshadow whether this outcome
will influence Pakistan's decision to invoke Article Nine on
the Kishenganga dispute.
BLAKE