Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI4200
2005-06-03 12:35:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

GOI CAUTIOUS ON SEPARATIST VISIT TO PAKISTAN,

Tags:  PREL PTER MOPS IN PK INDO PAK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004200 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IN PK INDO PAK
SUBJECT: GOI CAUTIOUS ON SEPARATIST VISIT TO PAKISTAN,
UPBEAT ON SIACHEN

REF: NEW DELHI 3969

Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 004200

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/02/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER MOPS IN PK INDO PAK
SUBJECT: GOI CAUTIOUS ON SEPARATIST VISIT TO PAKISTAN,
UPBEAT ON SIACHEN

REF: NEW DELHI 3969

Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: During a June 3 farewell call that GOI
Kashmir Interlocutor NN Vohra requested with soon-to-depart
D/Polcouns, the senior official focused on two unprecedented
events: the ground-breaking visit of what he termed
"so-called moderate separatists" to Pakistani Kashmir and
Pakistan proper, and the planned June 12, first-ever visit of
an Indian PM to the Siachen Glacier. Vohra worried that
jihadis might assassinate a prominent separatist to
demonstrate their opposition to the landmark visit by
All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) moderates across the
LOC, the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, and other
Kashmiri-focused people-to-people CBMs. This could have a
major dampening effect on improving Indo-Pak relations.
Vohra also confirmed that the GOI was playing down recent
high infiltration figures to preserve domestic support for
rapproachement with Pakistan. Vohra said he had been asked
to cut short his planned month-long vacation to meet with the
PM upon the latter's return from Siachen. We remain cautious
about any major Indian concessions on Siachen, but the PM's
visit to the glacier could foreshadow a move by New Delhi to
break the deadlock. End Summary.

Pakistan Trip May Cause Terrorism Spike
--------------


2. (C) Commenting on the June 2 travel by moderate
All-Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) and other Kashmiri
separatist leaders across the LOC, Vohra cautioned that their
visit to Pakistan could prompt further terrorist attacks in
J&K, starting possibly after they return to J&K. Citing
Indian intelligence reports that terrorist communications and
infiltration -- particularly commanders crossing into J&K --
had increased during May, Vohra worried about a spectacular
attack, possibly an assassination attempt against a moderate
leader such as Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. This would be intended
to express opposition to the separatists' travel across the
LOC and their support for Kashmiri-focused people-to-people
CBMs, including the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus. Vohra's chief
aide, Umang Narula, added that the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba front

"Save Kashmir Movement" had recently threatened the Mirwaiz
publicly. Vohra agreed with D/PolCouns' observation that the
GOI was playing down these indicators to preserve domestic
support for rapproachement with Pakistan.

PM Visit May Herald Siachen Shift
--------------


3. (C) Turning to Siachen, Vohra agreed with D/Polcouns and
Indian strategists (Reftel) that demilitarization of the
glacier could be a relatively easy deliverable out of the
Composite Dialogue. Vohra recalled that in 1992, when he led
the Indian delegation as Defense Secretary, the two sides
were "inches away" from signing an agreement on Siachen.
Vohra said that he had been asked to cut short his vacation
to meet with the PM upon the latter's return from his planned
Siachen tour. Vohra offered that making the journey (by
two-seater light helicopter) would give the PM additional
political muscle to shift the Indian position on requiring
the verification of the Actual Ground Position Line, or to
propose any unilateral moves there, should he choose to do
so. The environmental degradation caused by prolonged
stationing troops on the glacier and the non-combat hazards
they face on a daily basis were further arguments for a
speedy agreement, Vohra stated. However, he did not promise
any new GOI initiatives to follow up what appears to have
been a fairly sterile round of talks in Islamabad.

Other Issues
--------------


4. (C) Recapping the past few years of Kashmir-oriented
highlights, Vohra also offered comments on:
-- the 2002 (and subsequent) J&K elections were a watershed:
"Despite low turnout in some areas, they were credible and a
good start" in restoring the political process after the
bitter decade of the 1990s.

-- Musharraf's November 2004 (and subsequent) proposals for
changing the political character of Kashmir: "When he talks
about 'maximum autonomy,' we still don't know what he means."
"Musharraf should not talk so much. He confuses people when
he changes what he says from day to day."

-- J&K Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's view of
"maximum autonomy:" This refers primarily to full control
over economic and financial resources, rather than greater
political and other forms of autonomy some scholars have
proposed as a possible means to address Kashmiri aspirations.

-- his long-term perspectives on Kashmir and Indo-Pak
relations: "Maybe, after 20 years of normalized relations,
the Kashmiri people should decide their own fate."
"Islamabad should decide what they want relations with India
to be in 50 or 100 years, and think about how we get there."

-- dealing with hardline, pro-Pakistan separatist leader SAS
Geelani: "He can only manifest his power through violence."

Comment
--------------


5. (C) We have found Vohra to be an open, friendly,
well-informed, and communicative interlocutor on one of New
Delhi's most sensitive subjects. Although his position lacks
the clout of other senior government appointees on security,
and most Kashmiri separatists refuse to meet with him, he has
survived for more than two years in two governments, evidence
that he obviously enjoys the confidence of the senior GOI
leadership of both Congress and the opposition BJP. Unlike
the present Home Ministry leadership, Vohra is willing to
think outside the box (to use the Prime Minister's phrase).


6. (C) Vohra's comments on Siachen are noteworthy, given his
earlier and continuing role on this issue. While we remain
cautious about any breakthrough, the fact that Manmohan Singh
will be the first PM to visit the glacier could foreshadow a
move by New Delhi to resolve this issue, possibly by removing
New Delhi's insistence on joint verification of troop
positions prior to a pull-back, or perhaps a partial,
unilateral redeployment of Indian forces to break the
deadlock.
BLAKE