Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI3769
2005-05-19 11:50:00
SECRET
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

MEA PROVIDES "NEXT STEPS" FOR US-INDIA CT JWG

Tags:  PTER PREL EFIN SNAR TBIO IN AF PK CE BG NP US INDO PAK 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 003769 

SIPDIS

STATE/CT FOR MOLANDER AND RPARENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL EFIN SNAR TBIO IN AF PK CE BG NP US INDO PAK
SUBJECT: MEA PROVIDES "NEXT STEPS" FOR US-INDIA CT JWG

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3745

B. NEW DELHI 3717

C. NEW DELHI 3647

D. NEW DELHI 3494

E. NEW DELHI 2189

F. STATE 28559

G. NEW DELHI 878

H. NEW DELHI 876

I. 04 NEW DELHI 8028

J. 04 NEW DELHI 5630

K. 04 NEW DELHI 5486

Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 NEW DELHI 003769

SIPDIS

STATE/CT FOR MOLANDER AND RPARENT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL EFIN SNAR TBIO IN AF PK CE BG NP US INDO PAK
SUBJECT: MEA PROVIDES "NEXT STEPS" FOR US-INDIA CT JWG

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3745

B. NEW DELHI 3717

C. NEW DELHI 3647

D. NEW DELHI 3494

E. NEW DELHI 2189

F. STATE 28559

G. NEW DELHI 878

H. NEW DELHI 876

I. 04 NEW DELHI 8028

J. 04 NEW DELHI 5630

K. 04 NEW DELHI 5486

Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (U) This is an Action Request -- see Para 4.


2. (U) Summary: MEA Director (Americas) Renu Pall recently
gave Poloff the GOI's understanding of the next steps agreed
to at the August 31-September 1, 2004, Sixth Meeting of the
India-US Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group (CTJWG),with
a request that this document be forwarded to Washington for
response. From our perspective in New Delhi, we have already
made significant progress in many areas, limited progress in
others, and no substantial progress in a few (see Paras 5-7).
When the next Coordinator for Counterterrorism takes office,
we recommend that the Coordinator make the scheduling of the
next US-India CTJWG a priority. End Summary.


3. (SBU) The lightly edited MEA text reads as follows.
Begin text:

Both India and the US agreed that terrorism was a challenge
the international community needs to face collectively.

Both sides agreed to further strengthen their intelligence
sharing arrangements, with an emphasis on operational
intelligence.

The Indian side suggested that the US consider moving for the
UN listing of Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which was already on the US
list. The USG agreed to consider it. It was felt that the
process of encompassing all jihadi groups must continue.

India also agreed with the long-term US objective of
de-jihadisation of the Pakistan-Afghanistan region. Both
India and the US felt that while al-Qaida may have diminished

as an organizational structure, its reach had expanded as an
ideological motivator. The challenge of terrorism continued
to mutate. Countering the attraction that the al-Qaida
ideology had come to hold was an area where India and the US
could work together.

The US assured that they continued to encourage Pakistan to
address Indian concerns regarding cross border terrorism.
Both India and the US agreed that the de-jihadisation of the
Pak-Afghanistan region was a priority.

India and the US agreed to continue coordinating their
respective policies with regard to the situation in Nepal.

On Sri Lanka, both delegations agreed on the need for
continuing the ban on the LTTE. It was felt that it would be
helpful if other countries, particularly Canada, also
proscribed the LTTE in order to make the ban more effective.

India and the US agreed that their intelligence agencies
would share information pertaining to Bangladesh becoming a
major transit point for movement of terrorist individuals,
arms and ammunition from Southeast Asia to South Asia and
from Pakistan. The US wished to continue the exchange of
assessments with India on the situation in Bangladesh. The
US requested details of camps operating in Bangladesh and
conveyed that there was a real commonality of interest with
India on this subject. It was agreed that it would be in
mutual interest to be more precise on intelligence exchange.

There was commonality of views on Afghanistan. India shared
the US objective to see Afghanistan emerge as a peaceful,
stable democracy, not vulnerable to outside manipulation by
jihadi forces. It was estimated that the opium crop in
Afghanistan had increased substantially over the prior one
year. This quantum jump would contribute to the heroin
traffic sourced from Afghanistan. The trend this year showed
that the average of the last four years in narcotics
trafficking across the India-Pak border into India had been
crossed in the first six months alone. There was agreement
on the need for additional strategies to counter financing of
terrorism through narco-trafficking.

Detailed discussions were held on training and capacity
building cooperation. The US informed the Indian side that
it would send an assessment team in October 2004 to further
bilateral cooperation in the area of Anti-Terrorism
Assistance courses and capacity building. The Indian
delegation's request that the calendar of training events be
shared in advance by the US to the extent feasible met with
understanding on the US side.

The two delegations looked at the whole range of issues
related to extradition and mutual legal assistance. The GOI
hoped to complete the process on the Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty in the coming months. Both sides agreed that there
would be symbolic and substantive advantages were the MLAT
brought into force. There was agreement that specific cases
of interest to either side should be expedited. The US was
grateful for assistance given to FBI on the IC-814 case.
India conveyed that ways needed to be found for India to
obtain more information on the IC-814 hijacking from Taliban
elements in US custody. India also flagged, in particular,
the extradition case of Sameera Jumani, the wife of Abu Salem.

The US apprised India of its decision to make its data on
lost and stolen passports available to Interpol. This was
inspired by the practice amongst European countries and was
seen as a step to prevent countries from becoming safe
havens. It was suggested that India also consider doing so.

The US requested access to Dahal, alleged to be involved in
the murder of two US security guards in the US Embassy in
Kathmandu. The Indian side agreed to look into the matter.

The US agreed to provide a detailed write-up on the Pacific
Command proposal for a Counter-Terrorism Seminar to be held
in India in February 2005 so as to explore ways to enhance
inter-operability between the US and India on
counter-terrorism related inter-agency coordination
processes. The steps to organizing such a CT seminar with
India would involve: (i) details about GOI approach on the
Seminar concept; (ii) definition of objectives by GOI and US;
(iii) initial planning conference; (iv) preparation of list
of participants i.e. officials in GOI with CT roles; (v)
discussions on the timeframe and venue; (vi) mid-planning
conference in December 2004 or two months prior to the CT
seminar; (vii) final planning conference one month prior to
CT Seminar i.e. January 2005.

The US presentation on the PISCES border control system was
noted. India conveyed that it had already developed a
software system, which was being installed in 17 airports in
India. This was along the lines of PISCES and it was hoped
that it would be in place by November 2004. The thinking on
the Indian side, therefore, was to watch this indigenous
system for some time and thereafter compare it with the
American PISCES system and identify avenues for cooperation,
which would have to meet the requirement of an inter-agency
process on the Indian side. The US requested early
indication, either way, in terms of a yes or no.

India provided a briefing on its efforts to bring in
amendments to its Anti-Money Laundering Act and to its
Financial Intelligence Unit. The US said that it looked
forward to working with the Indian FIU.

Both countries also discussed implications of the hawala
route, an issue at the G-20 meeting on October 18-19, 2004
and the FATF meeting October 20-22, 2004. There was
agreement that hawala transfers were contributing to the
financing of terrorism in South Asia. Tracking of hawala was
entirely intelligence-led. Since legal transfers were easier
to track, one approach would be to reduce the cost of money
transfer transactions and thereby reduce the recourse to
hawala. The US delegation agreed to take the points made by
India back to their colleagues in the US Department of State
and the Treasury Department.

US interest in cooperation in the field of bio-terrorism was
noted. The Indian side suggested that further discussions be
held to look for an acceptable approach to cooperation in
this field. The US proposed to present a nonpaper in
September 2004 for a table-top exercise as a starting point
to look at procedural issues. It was agreed that the Science
Congress of January 2005 would be a starting point for
discussions. Sharing of best practices, technology exchange
and capacity building were identified as broad areas for
cooperation in this future-looking area.

On the UN Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (CTED),US
expressed support for Indian suggestions and nominations to
the CTED to represent India's interest and expertise. It was
agreed that India's nominations would be conveyed to the US
as well.

End text.


4. (SBU) Action Request: Post requests that SA and S/CT
provide comments and suggestions on the above document that
can be shared with MEA.

Comment
--------------


5. (C) This MEA paper is welcome as a checklist on progress
to date and as a "to do" list, although coming so many months
after the CTJWG, many of the items have moved forward in the
interim. We have made much progress in building our CT
relationship with New Delhi. The most common obstacle we
face is the slow, cautious Indian bureaucracy. From our
perspective, we report the most significant progress in the
following areas:

-- Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT): We told the MEA that Washington
led the effort that resulted in the May 2 addition of LeT to
the UNSCR 1267 sanctions list (Ref E). India's mainstream
media presented the story in a very favorable light, and the
MEA thanked us for our action and for keeping them in the
loop as the motion wound its way through diplomatic
obstacles. Our subsequent discussions on LeT with NSA
Narayanan and the MEA Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan,
Iran) have been more vigorous (Refs A and B),and we predict
this will lead to greater information sharing on LeT.

-- Nepal: The Indo-US united diplomatic front since King
Gyanendra dismissed the Nepal parliament (Ref D and previous)
demonstrates a level of cooperation and consultation more
involved than simply "coordinating respective policies," and
stems from a recognition of the common interests at stake.
It is a template for Indo-US coordination in other policy
areas.

-- Narco-trafficking: INL funded from the 2003 LOA with the
Ministry of Finance the first in a series of workshops on
asset seizure/forfeiture under India's primary economic
crimes and counter-narcotics laws, in which DEA, FBI and
DHS/ICE participated as experts. INL will host several more
workshops throughout the country pursuant to this LOA
mini-project. Using INL funding, DEA will host a workshop
with USG experts on asset seizure/forfeiture for Indian law
enforcement agencies in August 2005.

-- ATA Training: The DS assessment team that visited in
October 2004 reported favorably on the robust program we have
with India. The Indian participants who are sent for ATA
training are well chosen and represent a good geographic mix.
They are also adapting their training for local conditions
and replicating it well in state and national police training
programs, giving the program its intended multiplier effect.
However, the GOI request to be able to lock in training
months in advance conflicts with what we understand is the
program's requirement to remain nimble and able to respond to
shifting priorities.

-- Bio-Terrorism: Our HHS Attache is planning joint Indo-US
workshops for later in 2005 with the National Institutes of
Communicable Diseases (Delhi) and the National Institute of
Virology (Pune) on inter-related topics of bio-safety and
biosecurity. The goal of these workshops is to share
information on safe handling of bio-material, safety of
personnel, and security of laboratories that house pathogens.
The concept proposal for these workshops has been shared
with the Indian agencies. We are also exploring other
avenues to engage appropriate GOI and other Indian
stakeholders on bio-security, and will report progress septel.


6. (S) On other agenda items, our progress has been more
limited:

-- LTTE: Canadian PolCouns has told Poloff that his
government is re-examining possible changes in Canada's
position toward LTTE. We will continue to engage the
Canadians on this, but have seen no evidence of a change in
policy.

-- Bangladesh: Although we see greater willingness to share
information (for instance, during A/S Rocca's April 18 visit
to New Delhi),the MEA has not responded to Embassy's
repeated requests for more detailed exchanges -- beyond that
which is the public domain (Refs G and H) -- to verify and/or
bolster their assertions regarding cross-border terrorism
originating in Bangladesh. Exchanges in ORCA channels also
continue. The disconnect between MEA's repeated verbal
agreement to cooperate and provide additional information,
and their delay in responding to our questions (Ref F),needs
to be closed further.

-- MLAT: The Indian Cabinet on November 3 ratified the Mutual
Legal Assistance Treaty, which had been on the CTJWG agenda
since 2002. The GOI adopted amendments to reciprocate the
reservations which the US Senate inserted when it ratified
the MLAT (Ref I). We are close to concluding MLAT, but we
are still discussing the modalities of how to incorporate
both countries' understandings into the final exchange of
instruments. At this point the issues all involve procedure;
no substantive disagreements remain.

-- IC-814: Please see Ref C for current status and action
request on this long-pending issue.

-- PACOM CT Seminar: Planning for the PACOM CT seminar
continues, with the ball now in India's court to nominate
workable dates for the final planning conference and the
event itself. The PACOM team, Mission staff and MEA
counterparts made significant progress in accomplishing the
organizational steps enumerated above during a successful
initial planning conference in December 2004. The seminar
objectives, approach, and general participants have been
identified, with only the event dates and details left to be
finalized.

-- FIU: Mission LE community is ready to offer training to
India's FIU once it is staffed and functioning. This cannot
happen, however, until the Prevention of Money Laundering Act
has been notified in the Official Gazette, which FIU chief
Sunil Bhargava told us should happen "by mid-June." Having
an FIU up and running would be a condition for India's
admission to the Financial Action Task Force.


7. (C) On some agenda items, we report no substantial
progress since the August-September 2004 CTJWG:

-- Extraditions: The Department of Justice has requested that
the GOI provide a supplemental affidavit to support its
extradition request for Sameera Jumani, the wife of Abu
Salem. To date, the GOI has provided no supplemental
information.

-- Sharing Passport Information: CONS and ICE recently
discussed lost/stolen passports with MHA Joint Secretary
Mishra, who reported that the MHA was still considering
making the information available to INTERPOL, and asked for
advice on how they could get our information.

-- Dahal: Legatt reports no progress in FBI access to Dahal
despite repeated requests through CBI.

-- PISCES: MHA told CONS and ICE that they would first
evaluate how well the modernized Indian system performs
before making any decision on PISCES. MHA has also asked us
for a USG point of contact to discuss integrating elements of
PISCES into their own system, but they probably will not be
interested in acquiring the entire PISCES program.

-- Hawala: There has been no action to date on cooperation
with the GOI on regarding hawala. New Delhi continues to
"agree to disagree" with us on this issue, arguing that
criminalizing hawala transactions is more effective than
regulating (and tracking) them.


8. (U) Minimize considered.
BLAKE