Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI3744
2005-05-18 13:17:00
SECRET
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIAN GOVERNMENT BRIEFS ON NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW

Tags:  PGOV KSTC KNNP TRGY ETTC CH IR IN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003744 

SIPDIS

PASS TO NRC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015
TAGS: PGOV KSTC KNNP TRGY ETTC CH IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT BRIEFS ON NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3652


B. NEW DELHI 2601

C. NEW DELHI 2599

Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003744

SIPDIS

PASS TO NRC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2015
TAGS: PGOV KSTC KNNP TRGY ETTC CH IR IN
SUBJECT: INDIAN GOVERNMENT BRIEFS ON NEW EXPORT CONTROL LAW

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3652


B. NEW DELHI 2601

C. NEW DELHI 2599

Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr., for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: MEA Additional Secretary (International
Security) Meera Shankar expressed MEA intentions to take the
lead on implementation of the new WMD law in a meeting with
Charge, PolCouns, and PolMilOff on May 18. According to
Shankar, the real success of the WMD bill was not its passage
by Parliament, but that it had found consensus within the GOI
interagency process. By framing the bill as an extension of
existing laws and expansion (not restriction) of agencies'
areas of responsibility, MEA was able to overcome ongoing
skepticism among certain GOI agencies. An interagency group
will develop a new curriculum for customs officials to raise
awareness of the provisions of the new law. Shankar signaled
that maintaining consensus for the more difficult task of
implementation, however, would benefit from more positive
signals from the US regarding flexibility to allow India
access to nuclear fuel to meet its growing energy needs.
Shankar refused to be drawn out on GOI plans for new export
control lists to complement the WMD law, noting only that the
GOI "is working on it." Finally, she disclosed that the GOI
has formed a task force to share intelligence on any
procurement opportunities Iran may be seeking for WMD
purposes. End Summary.

Consensus Was the Real Success
--------------


2. (C) Responding to Charge's congratulations on the passage
of the new law (Ref A),Shankar downplayed the praise,
stating that the law is simply the product of India's role as
a responsible nuclear power and enhances its own national
security. She did admit, however, that the law reflected
discussions with "key interlocutors." According to Shankar,
the real success of the WMD bill was not its passage by
Parliament, but that it achieved consensus within the GOI
interagency process comprised of the Departments of Atomic
Energy, Space, Revenue, Customs, the Defense Research and

Development Organization (DRDO),the Ministries of Law and
Justice, Finance, and led by MEA. As the lead agency, MEA
presented the bill as an umbrella for existing legislation;
updating and upgrading, but not replacing current laws. "If
(the agencies) thought we were intruding on their turf, they
wouldn't buy in," she said, adding, "We presented the bill as
expanding their areas of responsibility, not losing them."

New Legal Elements
--------------


3. (SBU) Reiterating that laws governing exports have been
on the Indian law books for some time, Shankar explained that
in addition to being an umbrella for existing laws, the WMD
law provides authority to reconcile differences between laws,
and introduces new elements to make GOI law more responsive
to current threats. For example, where definitions or
provisions differ between the WMD law and other laws, the WMD
law will prevail. If penal provisions differ between two
laws, however, the more severe punishment will prevail.
Further, India has laws regarding the export of chemical and
biological weapons, but the WMD law criminalizes the transfer
of a broader spectrum of weapons, and specifically prohibits
transactions involving non-state actors. Control of dual-use
items was implied in other GOI laws, but the WMD bill goes
further to explicitly control the transfer, transit,
transshipment, and brokering of dual-use items and intangible
technology, according to Shankar.

Implementation: Pending Questions
--------------


4. (SBU) Clause 7 of the law states that the GOI will
designate an authority to implement the law. However, in
Parliament, FM Natwar Singh raised the possibility that the
law would be implemented by the Cabinet Secretariat. Charge
queried which Ministry may be given this authority.
According to Shankar, MEA will continue to lead the
consultative process to determine the appropriate authority.
She stressed that existing structures such as Customs and the
Director General for Foreign Trade (DGFT) would retain
enforcement responsibility.


5. (SBU) On possible revision of India's current control
list, SCOMET, Shankar declined to speculate when the GOI
might release a new list, saying only, "We're working on it."


6. (C) Charge also asked what enforcement-enhancing changes
might be made to customs procedures which are currently
focused on revenue generation. Shankar reiterated that
enforcement measures are already carried out by the Ministry
of Home Affairs and DGFT under the Customs Act. A new
curriculum to raise awareness of the provisions of the new
law would be developed by the interagency working group on
SCOMET implementation, according to MEA Under Secretary
(Disarmament and International Security Affairs) Nutan
Kapoor. PolCouns recalled the recent break-up of a large
international narcotics ring, and noted that kind of close
cooperation should be the model for US-India interaction on
proliferation cases. With that example in mind, he asked who
would be the GOI counterpart of the Commerce Department's
Bureau of Industrial Security (BIS). Shankar reiterated that
MEA would remain the lead GOI agency for proliferation cases.
Charge expressed hope that the GOI could provide a briefing
for A/S Rademaker on GOI enforcement initiatives during his
upcoming visit in June.

Quid Pro Quos
--------------


7. (C) Achieving the full support of all the relevant
ministries as well as Parliament, Shankar expected the new
law to be recognized by the international community in terms
of greater willingness to accommodate India's "sensitivities
and concerns about existing regimes." Asserting that
Secretary Rice's positive remarks on nuclear energy

SIPDIS
cooperation had facilitated the passage of the WMD bill by
overcoming "what's in it for us" skepticism among some GOI
agencies, Shankar encouraged further positive signals from
the US, especially regarding access to nuclear fuel for its
civil energy program. PolCouns stressed that the policy
shift toward India is already demonstrable, citing recent
examples of the Chidambaram visa, the launch of a new space
working group, and increased US-India dual-use trade.


8. (U) Shankar noted PM Manmohan Singh's May 17 address to
DRDO favorably measuring the new law to the highest
international standards, but read an excerpt reiterating
India's opposition to external controls on its indigenous
programs: "India is willing to shoulder its share of
international obligations as a partner against proliferation
provided our legitimate interests are safeguarded. In the
defense field and the nuclear field, our strategic programs
are indigenous and not dependent on external sources of
support. Nor can they be the subject of externally imposed
constraints. Within these parameters, India is prepared for
the broadest form of engagement with the international
non-proliferation regime." (Speech to be reported septel.)


9. (C) Charge probed further about current GOI plans for
adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, as a requirement of
NSSP Phase II. "I'm not in a position to say," she demurred.



10. (SBU) Regarding the NSSP requirement to have outreach
events to explain export control to the private sector,
Shankar asserted that this is also an ongoing program run by
various agencies for their respective sectors, e.g., by the
Department of Chemicals for the chemical industry.

Pending Proliferation Cases
--------------


11. (C) Another source of skepticism about the value of the
US-India relationship, according to Shankar, is the perceived
double standard of US assistance on Chinese nuclear reactors
given China's known proliferation links with Pakistan. "Our
proliferation record is better than China's," Shankar
asserted. Charge responded that since China is an NPT
signatory, the US may work with it on civil nuclear projects.



12. (C) Charge inquired if the GOI had any more information
on two cases of recent proliferation concern because of their
Iranian connections: Sabero and Sandhya. Kapoor stated there
was no further information about these cases since the GOI
non-papers on March 25 (Refs B and C) and reiterated earlier
GOI requests for additional information about the end-users.


13. (S) In light of Iran's apparent efforts to diversify its
sources for WMD-related material, PolCouns asked what steps
the GOI is taking to ensure that Indian entities are not
involved. According to Shankar, the GOI has formed a task
force of relevant agencies to share intelligence on any
procurement opportunities Iran may be seeking for WMD
purposes.
BLAKE