Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI3646
2005-05-13 13:01:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA SEEKS DIALOGUE ON NEPAL END-GAME

Tags:  PREL PHUM KDEM MASS IN NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003646 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM MASS IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIA SEEKS DIALOGUE ON NEPAL END-GAME

REF: NEW DELHI 3494

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003646

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM KDEM MASS IN NP
SUBJECT: INDIA SEEKS DIALOGUE ON NEPAL END-GAME

REF: NEW DELHI 3494

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: PolCouns and Poloff met with MEA Joint
Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae on May 13 to review A/S Rocca's

SIPDIS
and Indian Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee's recent audiences with
Nepal's King Gyanendra. Rae emphasized that the King had not
relented on his opposition to a dialogue with the parties,
which required continued US and Indian pressure on the
palace. The GOI is still debating what supplies it will
provide to the RNA, but Rae suggested it may be time for the
US and India to begin looking beyond issues of military
supplies to political solutions. End Summary.


2. (C) Sharing the text of public remarks in Kathmandu,
PolCouns relayed A/S Rocca's strong message emphasizing the
need for progress on the three R's (release of detainees,
restoration of civil liberties, and reaching out to the
political parties) and improvements on human rights as a
prerequisite for additional assistance. Rae sought
clarification of A/S Rocca's call for "substantial progress,"
noting that he needed to emphasize that aspect of the USG
position within the Indian government, and then provided a
read-out of Mukherjee's May 9 meeting with King Gyanendra.

Gyanendra's Message to Ambassador Mukherjee
--------------


3. (C) Rae said the King told Ambassador Mukherjee that the
parties must take a clear stand on terrorism and corruption
for him to deal with them, and reviewed the progress he had
made on his "assurances" to PM Manmohan Singh in Jakarta,
such as ending the Emergency. The monarch also promised to
do more in the next month to lift the remaining restrictions,
reportedly stressing, "I am committed to democracy."


4. (C) Mukherjee pressed the King to take the parties'
position seriously. The monarch responded that he would ask
his Ministers to engage the parties, but reiterated his view
that restoration of the previous Parliament would be
impossible because it was unconstitutional. The parties
consider the Ministers illegitimate and will not accept
discussions with them, Rae observed, but if the King were

serious about restoring Parliament, he could find a way to do
so that meets his constitutional concerns. Rae had no sense
that the King intended to work with the parties, adding "I
feel he is restoring the panchayat regime" by appointing
loyalists throughout the government in advance of any
proposed elections.

Keep Pressure on the King
--------------


5. (C) Rae worried that if the King does not agree to a
rapprochement with the parties, then the parties' positions
will harden, leading to further radicalization and alignment
with the Maoists. The news that the Maoists have "welcomed"
the parties' joint statement is an indication of the coming
polarization, he warned, which is "fraught with serious
implications." Therefore, the USG and GOI needed to use the
parties' statement as a point to start negotiations, keeping
pressure on the King with "whatever leverages we have," he
stated.


6. (C) Rae agreed with PolCouns that it was not the place of
the USG or the GOI to lay out a roadmap for a political
solution to the impasse, but argued that it was time to start
looking past the short-term question of how much military
assistance to provide, and to consider what a final political
outcome to the King-party standoff and the Maoist insurgency
would look like. Since the Maoists supported the parties'
platform (and possibly influenced it through back-channel
contacts),it could serve as a starting point for peace
negotiations, if the King agrees to accept it as such. India
and the US should try to bring everyone together for a
comprehensive peace process, he suggested.

Military Assistance Still Debated
--------------


7. (C) Although the GOI decided on May 6 to release
non-lethal military supplies that were "in the pipeline," Rae
said the government was still debating internally what
constitutes the pipeline. The MEA was supporting the view
that the term encompasses vehicles, jackets and thermal
imagers that were at the border waiting for shipment on
February 1, while the MoD was pushing for a broader
definition that covers all supplies that the RNA had
requested before the royal takeover (to include ammunition).
For now, nothing is planned for delivery beyond the small
amount at the border, but the GOI would meet later in the day
to continue discussions on what to send to the RNA, Rae
stated.


8. (C) Rae again agreed (reftel) that a discussion between
the US DAO and Indian military on RNA ammunition needs would
help to determine the correct level of assistance to provide
to Nepal.


9. (C) Although the Indian Communist parties have protested
even the resumption of this non-lethal aid, the Congress
party leadership had smoothed over the dispute by telling
them "it's only some vehicles," Rae said. As a result, the
anticipated Parliamentary debate on the decision to resume
supplies did not occur prior to the end of the current
session.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) The Indian media has characterized the internal GOI
debate over how much assistance to provide to Nepal as policy
"U-turns," complicating efforts by the GOI to use military
assistance as a lever on King Gyanendra as leaks to the press
undermine the "message" sent to the monarch and cause
objections from both ends of the domestic political spectrum
to the perceived shift. Nevertheless, the MEA appears
confident that the suspension of aid has thus far prodded the
King to make some positive moves, releasing some detainees
and taking small steps in restoring civil liberties, and
believes that the right combination of pressure from the US,
India, and UK could motivate him to work on the third R:
reaching out to the political parties. Even when pressed,
Rae did not indicate any clear GOI preference for a way
forward, but he did signal strongly the Indian desire to
deepen our bilateral consultations on long-term end game
issues.
BLAKE