Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI3599
2005-05-12 11:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

GETTING CLOSER TO WHAT KASHMIRIS THINK

Tags:  PGOV PK IN 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003599 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015
TAGS: PGOV PK IN
SUBJECT: GETTING CLOSER TO WHAT KASHMIRIS THINK


Classified By: Polcouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003599

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/11/2015
TAGS: PGOV PK IN
SUBJECT: GETTING CLOSER TO WHAT KASHMIRIS THINK


Classified By: Polcouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. ...

(COPY THE FORMATED FILE))

SUBJECT: GETTING CLOSER TO WHAT KASHMIRIS THINK


Classified By: Polcouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Many Indian experts on J&K insist that they know what Kashmiris think about the major political issues of interest in the Valley, such as attitudes towards Pakistan, independence, and the like. During our interaction with Kashmir watchers during the last three years, we have found several to have outstanding grassroots contacts, but also have learned that their views are often based more on personal ties and experiences than on rigorous empirical data. The closest we have seen to scientific evidence is three opinion polls taken during 2002-2005, the most recent
of which was taken in April. For all their methodological
weaknesses, the surveys provide a window into sentiment and
trends in J&K, while some of the main conclusions -- little
support for accession to Pakistan, majority favoring
independence, weak separatist All-Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC) popularity, and conflicted attitudes towards the LOC
as a border -- largely track with our past reporting. End
Summary.


2. (C) It is notoriously difficult to obtain a fix on
Kashmiri views about major political issues. We have a high
degree of confidence that alienation against India runs quite
deep there, that there is substantial pro-independence
sentiment, and that a smallish minority wants to accede to
Pakistan. It is also clear that Kashmiris are very tired of
the insurgency, want foreign terrorists to stop infiltrating
and to leave the Valley, and would rejoice at a return to
normalcy. The Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus is very, very
popular, despite some criticism that the travel process is
cumbersome. Most Kashmiris want the security force footprint
to be smaller or to disappear (but many link this to a
cessation of terrorism),and human rights abuses by all sides
to the conflict to stop.


3. (C) Beyond that, assessments get trickier, despite some
Indian Kashmir watchers' firm conviction that they know
exactly what Kashmiris think -- such as assertions by some
that an overwhelming majority in the Valley would vote for
independence if they ever had the choice, to cite one fairly

widespread opinion. Without dismissing views like this, we
posit that sentiment is more difficult to quantify and
subject to variables that have not been factored into the
debate. For example, aside from the almost complete absence
of visible public debate in J&K on these and other issues,
Indian experts who have dealt with J&K for many years remind
us that Kashmiris rarely tell outsiders what they really
think -- and if they do their views are often not well
thought out. Some Kashmir watchers go so far as to joke that
they cannot be entirely certain that Kashmiris will even
accurately give their names.

Three Surveys
--------------


4. (C) In an attempt to fill the void of empirical data on
what Kashmiris really think, and to obtain a better read on
popular views on some of the bigger issues at stake in the
Valley, three attempts have been made since 2002 by private
polling firms -- Synovate India for the ""Times of India"" in
April 2005 (Srinagar and Rajouri); AC Nielsen with ""Asian
Age"" in September 2002 (Srinagar, Anantnag, Jammu, and
Udhampur); and Facts Worldwide for MORI in April 2002
(Srinagar, Jammu, Leh, and seven rural areas). Each survey
was slightly different in focus, but several questions were
similar and/or repeated, providing a sense of comparison.
None of the polling firms followed up on their questions
again, complicating attempts to trace trends. Questions also
arise concerning geographic coverage. Nevertheless, some
questions were sufficiently similar that they allow for
comparisons, and provide a window into movement over time.
The most interesting results of the April 2005 poll show:

-- interest in the LOC as the International Border:

TOI/2005 55 percent in favor
AC Nielsen/2002 1 percent (Srinagar) in favor; 8 percent
(Anantnag)
Mori did not consider this issue

-- a bit of consistency in views on independence, India and
Pakistan:

For Independence:

TOI: 54 percent
AC Nielsen: 48 percent (Srinagar); 59 percent (Anantnag)
Mori did not consider this issue

For India:

TOI 36 percent
AC Nielsen: 21 percent (Srinagar); 5 percent (Anantnag)
Mori: 61 percent

For Pakistan:

TOI: 3 percent
AC Nielsen 0 percent (Srinagar); 0 percent (Anantnag)
Mori: 6 percent

-- strong support for Indo-Pak trade:

TOI: 96 percent in favor
Mori: 70 percent in favor

-- a decline in Hurriyat popularity

TOI: 16 percent feels APHC represents them
AC Nielsen: 22 percent of population would vote for APHC

2005 Additional Points
--------------


5. (U) The April 2005 survey brought out several additional
noteworthy items:

-- Massive support in J&K (95 percent) for expanding the
Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, indicating Kashmiri public opinion
is overwhelmingly behind ""soft borders;""

-- Overwhelming sentiment (84 percent) that Indo-Pak talks on
Kashmir must include representatives of the Kashmiri people;
and

-- A majority (62 percent) believes the state government
better represents Kashmir than the Hurriyat.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) These surveys are by no means definitive readings of
Kashmiri views, but are useful as the only empirical data in
the public domain. With the usual caveats, the polls reveal
several items of interest -- particularly regarding interest
in accession to Pakistan (very low),desire for independence
(over 50 percent),and acceptance of the Hurriyat as leaders
representative of Kashmiri aspirations (relatively low). As
such, the surveys confirm most of our observations derived
from many reporting visits to J&K and extensive interaction
with Indian Kashmir experts and a broad spectrum of Kashmiri
leaders and ordinary Kashmiris during the last three years.


7. (C) There are at least two interpretations of the
apparent contradiction in the April 2005 survey between a
majority desire in the Valley for independence and acceptance
of the LOC as the Indo-Pak border: 1) Kashmiris increasingly
recognize that territory in J&K is unlikely to change hands
between India and Pakistan, and that the LOC is where the
border will eventually be; or 2) Kashmiri views remain
confused on many issues. We have found ordinary Kashmiris
often very poorly informed, XXXXXXXXXXXX such logical inconsistencies would not be unusual. Voting behavior, which we have described exhaustively following elections in 2002 and twice in 2004, is another dimension not factored into this mix, but which
demonstrates other important aspects of Kashmiri political
opinion.
BLAKE
"