MEA HOPEFUL NEPAL'S KING MAY ENGAGE PARTIES ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003494

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM MASS PTER IN NP
SUBJECT: MEA HOPEFUL NEPAL'S KING MAY ENGAGE PARTIES ON
REFORM

REF: NEW DELHI 3480

Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: In a May 9 meeting with visiting Assistant
Secretary for South Asia Christina Rocca, MEA Joint Secretary

SIPDIS
(North) Ranjit Rae welcomed the May 8 publication of a common
platform by the Nepalese political parties as a potential
"basis for talks" with King Gyanendra. The GOI plans to
encourage the King to not react negatively to the platform
statement, but to engage with the parties now that they have
taken stands on issues such as corruption that the King had
identified as prerequisites to discussions. India will push
the King to take further measures to restore civil liberties
and protect human rights, using the delivery of non-lethal
military equipment as a "gesture of good faith." A/S Rocca
flagged the issue of ammunition supplies for the RNA as one
we may face in the near future, and encouraged further
US-India discussions in defense channels to refine our
understanding of the military situation on the ground in
Nepal. End Summary.

An Opening for Negotiations?
--------------


2. (C) After noting that events had moved rapidly since A/S
Rocca's last visit three weeks ago, J/S Rae told A/S Rocca,
PolCouns, and Poloff that the GOI had been encouraging the
Nepalese political parties to make a common statement of
objectives, and was hopeful that the platform announced on
May 8 would provide a starting point for negotiations between
the parties and the palace. Before departing for Jakarta,
the King had told Indian Ambassador Mukherjee that he was
unable to negotiate with the parties as they were disjointed
and unwilling to address previous problems of governance and
corruption. As the common platform appeared to respond to
those particular objections, the GOI planned to press the
King now to engage the parties seriously on restoring
democratic government.


3. (C) Noting that the King had thus far used Article 127 of
the constitution "for all the wrong reasons," Rae pointed out
that the party platform requests the King to use that Article
to recall the Parliament, but with a limited agenda including
reviving a peace process with the Maoists. Rae suggested
that this might be palatable to the King, as it could help
assuage his fears that a restored Parliament would
immediately try to infringe on his powers. Rae argued that
one of the biggest winners from this exercise was Congress
leader GP Koirala, since he alone among party leaders had
been untainted by allegations of collusion with the palace.


3. (C) Commenting that the King's greatest concern was
retaining his position, Rae speculated that the monarch's
initial reaction to the parties' proposal would be outright
rejection. However, the combination of domestic unrest
(including party agitation and the continuing insurgency) and
careful incentives, such as the proposed delivery of
non-lethal military supplies and assurances of the
continuation of a constitutional monarchy, might convince him
to work with the political parties on a path to emerge from
the present standoff. Rae agreed that in order to leave room
for negotiation, the US and India must convince the King not
to reject the parties' statement unconditionally, since that
outcome would play into the hands of the Maoists. At this
stage, he argued, questions about "constitutionality" were
disingenuous.

Resumption of Supplies and Restoration of Civil Liberties
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Rae explained that the GOI's decision to resume
non-lethal military supplies (reftel) was intended to signal
to the King that India was pleased with the end of the
Emergency, and was releasing assistance as a "gesture of good
faith," but that New Delhi expected more steps to restore
basic civil and human rights. The supplies to be provided in
the near term included Mahindra jeeps and night vision
equipment, but the GOI was still debating whether to include
mine-proof vehicles as they had been used in the past against
civilian demonstrations. India hoped that the King's
response to receiving these supplies would be to make further
progress in restoring civil liberties, the J/S noted. He
commented that the UK, in contrast to Washington, had
appeared "distressed and disappointed" when notified of the
GOI decision.


5. (C) Rae stated that his biggest concern is that "the rule
of law is almost non-existent" in Nepal, and that Nepalese
citizens seem to have no legal recourse to contravene
government actions, even following the lifting of the
Emergency. He commented that the midnight arrest of former
PM Deuba, the ransacking of UML party offices, and the
reports of "vigilante" groups killing suspected Maoists
(which India suspected may be backed by the government) added
to the sense of fear among party leaders and other Nepalese.
Rae added that the chairman of the National Human Rights
Commission is reported to be either a supporter of the King's
actions or afraid to challenge them, and that respect for
human rights and civil liberties is something that "we must
keep drilling home" in interactions with the RGON.

Police Training and Morale
--------------


6. (C) Responding to A/S Rocca's identification of police
training as a longer-term need to provide a secure
environment for elections, Rae noted that the GOI had begun a
program for training up to 10,000 Nepalese police officers;
two batches of 300-400 had completed training before the
program was suspended after February 1. The Nepalese police
currently feel out of place under the unified command
structure that groups them together with the RNA. Rae noted
that the RNA receives all the Palace's resources and
attention, while the police are seen as an instrument of the
disbanded civilian governments. Especially in outlying
regions, police officers feel an acute disparity of equipment
and salaries compared to RNA soldiers, and some police in
remote areas live across the border in India for safety, Rae
said.

Ammunition
--------------


7. (C) A/S Rocca flagged for the Indians their earlier
estimate that the RNA had 4-6 months' worth of ammunition
from February 1, and requested that the USG and GOI
coordinate in monitoring the need for ammunition in order to
prevent the RNA from losing ground to the Maoists. Rae
agreed to ask the Indian Ministry of Defence to contact the
Embassy DAO to provide its updated estimate of the RNA's
ammunition requirements. He reiterated the GOI view that the
Maoists "must be convinced they can't win militarily" so
there is time for the current, nascent political process to
develop. He also noted with concern reports that the RNA has
been trying to source ammunition from China.


8. (C) Rae agreed that the first message to the King was to
encourage him to keep open the option of using the parties'
common platform as a point of negotiation, and that the USG
and GOI also needed to push the parties to continue to
negotiate together to find an agreeable roadmap out of the
present impasse. He commented that a US request to the King
not to "overreact" to the parties' statement was "very
important coming from Washington," and asked that A/S Rocca
emphasize to the monarch that the party proposals were not
the last word on the subject, but a place to begin
discussions of a return to democracy.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The Indian decision to release some non-lethal
military supplies to the RNA after hearing about USG steps in
that direction demonstrates the importance the GOI places on
maintaining a united front in our interactions with King
Gyanendra. Although still convinced that his steps since
April 23 have been inadequate and superficial, the GOI hopes
that offering positive incentives, in tandem with the US,
will elicit more substantial actions to engage the parties,
restore civil liberties and work toward democracy. Despite
its current sanguine outlook on ammunition needs, if the King
does not make sufficient progress, the GOI may be forced
nevertheless to resume more substantial military assistance
in response to RNA requirements or Maoist gains. Rae made
clear that the GOI is unwilling to risk an RNA collapse in
order to maintain pressure on the palace.


10. (U) A/S Rocca has cleared this message.
BLAKE