Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI3480
2005-05-09 13:46:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

GOI TO RESUME NON-LETHAL MILITARY AID TO NEPAL

Tags:  PREL MASS KDEM IN NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003480 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS KDEM IN NP
SUBJECT: GOI TO RESUME NON-LETHAL MILITARY AID TO NEPAL

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003480

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS KDEM IN NP
SUBJECT: GOI TO RESUME NON-LETHAL MILITARY AID TO NEPAL

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: MEA Joint Secretary (North) Ranjit Rae
called in PolCouns and Poloff on May 7 to inform us that the
GOI, reviewing its suspension of military assistance to
Nepal, had decided to release non-lethal supplies in the
pipeline to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA). Indian Ambassador to
Kathmandu Shiv Mukherjee has been instructed to convey this
decision to King Gyanendra, while explaining the need for
further steps toward restoration of Nepalese democracy. The
GOI does not plan to announce its decision to the press, but
a Parliamentary debate on Nepal expected for May 11-12 could
force the GOI to clarify publicly its policy. Rae agreed
that the USG and GOI should discuss further the question of
lethal supplies, including RNA requirements for ammunition.
End Summary.

Quiet Release of Supplies
--------------


2. (C) Explaining New Delhi's desire to remain in step with
Washington on Nepal policy, Rae informed us of the GOI
decision to release some of the non-lethal military supplies
already in the pipeline, mentioning that this may include
vehicles and thermal imagers, but that he was not certain of
the exact composition or value of the supplies and would need
to verify this with the MoD. A GOI non-paper noted that the
decision to resume such assistance was an acknowledgment of
positive steps the Palace had made. Rae added that the
Indian response was "frontloaded" to provide positive
incentives for the King to continue making progress to
reverse the royal takeover of power.


3. (C) Acknowledging the political risk to the GOI in light
of the King's public statements in Jakarta mischaracterizing
a potential Indian resumption of arms supplies, Rae told us
that Ambassador Mukherjee had been sent back to Kathmandu on
May 7 and instructed to inform the King of the resumption of
these specific items and nothing more. His message would be,
"You took some steps, but we want to see many more steps."
The GOI does NOT/NOT plan to make any public announcement of
its decision, but Rae noted that this may change when the
issue of military assistance to Nepal arises during May 11-12
Parliamentary debate on the PM's and FM's discussions with
the King in Jakarta. If the King again makes the wrong
moves, "we will have a problem," Rae stated.

USG-GOI Coordination for Delivering Supplies
--------------


4. (C) PolCouns expressed appreciation for the advance
notification of the GOI decision and noted that our DATTs in
Kathmandu and New Delhi had conveyed to the Indian MoD the
USG intention to provide some non-lethal items, adding that
these were the supplies referred to by A/S Rocca in her last
visit to New Delhi. Rae asked whether these supplies were
being provided on a concessional basis or if they had been
purchased commercially, to which PolCouns replied that we did
not know but would find out.


5. (C) Observing that delivery of USG supplies would be
subject to Indian overflight clearance, PolCouns stated that
we hoped we would have no problem receiving that clearance.
Given that the USG and GOI were moving in tandem on the issue
of non-lethal supplies, Rae doubted that there would be any
difficulty, but pointed out that it typically takes a week
after the request to receive clearance.

When Will the RNA Need Ammo?
--------------


6. (C) PolCouns remarked that we have been hearing more
reports about RNA shortages of ammunition for M-16 and INSAS
rifles, and suggested that we needed further bilateral
discussions to determine where the "tipping point" is for the
RNA in its need for supplies. Admitting that the GOI had
also heard similar reports, Rae agreed on the importance of
clarifying how dire the RNA's needs are, and that it was
necessary to prevent Nepal from reaching the point where the
Maoists could threaten a military victory. Additionally, Rae
urged avoiding any situation that gives a public perception
that the Maoists are gaining the upper hand, which could lead
to "anarchy."


7. (U) Rae added that he had called in the UK DCM
immediately after our meeting, who would hear the same
message.

Comment
--------------


8. (C) The GOI decision to resume the delivery of non-lethal
equipment in the pipeline in parallel with a similar USG
decision will help reinforce the public perception that
Washington and New Delhi are moving in lock-step in response
to the Palace's actions and the military situation in Nepal.
However, it will also subject the government to criticism
from the Left parties and national security hawks, who
harshly criticized the suggestions after the Jakarta summit
that the GOI was ready to resume some military supplies to
the RNA even without full restoration of democracy.
BLAKE