KOIZUMI VISIT: LOW-KEY CAP ON A MAJOR MONTH

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 003367

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2015
TAGS: PREL ETRD KNNP IN UNSC
SUBJECT: KOIZUMI VISIT: LOW-KEY CAP ON A MAJOR MONTH

REF: A. NEW DELHI 3333


B. NEW DELHI 3132

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Japanese PM Junichiro Koizumi's low-key
April 28-30 visit to India contrasted sharply with the
breathlessness that followed Chinese Premier Wen's visit two
weeks earlier. Koizumi and PM Manmohan Singh signed an
eight-point program for boosting bilateral relations,
particularly in trade and investment and maritime security.
In a notable departure from long-standing GOJ policy, the
Embassy told us the Japanese did not press New Delhi to sign
the NPT, either privately, or publicly. The only reference
to the nuclear question in the Joint Statement was a
declaration to work as "partners against proliferation,"
hinting at a Japanese desire to emulate the US approach to
this issue. While China was a prominent, if unspoken, factor
in the background of discussions, the UNSC was less so.
Tokyo's new nuclear line with New Delhi suggests that the two
governments are beginning to move away from past
tentativeness. End Summary.

PM Singh: "Renew and Reinvigorate"
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2. (C) Koizumi's India trip came at the end of a month that
saw the Secretary, Chinese Premier Wen, and Pakistan's
President Musharraf visit New Delhi, all of which factor more
prominently in India's strategic calculus than does Japan.
While the Koizumi visit did not generate a great deal of
public attention, the GOI treated it with characteristic
hyperbole. Heralding a "paradigm change in the political
ambiance of our relations," PM Manmohan Singh announced a
new, strategic focus in ties with Japan, while FM Natwar
Singh, launching the Indo-Japan Parliamentary Forum, declared
the bilateral future "bright." Echoing a Manmohan Singh
formulation, the two PMs unveiled their plan to construct an
"Arc of Advantage and Prosperity" in Asia, with an
eight-point initiative for partnership in a "New Asian Era,"
building on their five year-old "Global Partnership."


3. (SBU) Briefing the diplomatic corps on May 2, Japanese
DCM Ryoichi Horie acknowledged that the Global Partnership
"catchphrase" was something of a misnomer when it was hatched
in 2000, but that the relationship has become "more
strategic, more global, and more positive" since then. He
repeated the generally vague language of the statement, which
calls for a high-level strategic dialogue, annual meetings
between PMs, "comprehensive economic engagement," and
cooperation on security, UN reform, science and technology,
and "global challenges" including terrorism through a new CT
joint working group.

Some Things Do Change
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4. (C) In response to PolCouns' question on the nature of
the nuclear proliferation discussions, the Japanese DCM
informed us that Koizumi had not raised nuclear issues either
publicly or privately, and that GOJ policy was "more
realistic now." Rather, he explained, Tokyo and New Delhi
agreed to "promote commonalties instead of differences." The
joint statement acknowledges their diverging views, calling
for "cooperation in a constructive manner." This is a
significant departure from long-standing GOJ policy,
articulated by Japanese Ambassador Yasukuni Enoki in an
interview just prior to Koizumi's arrival: "Japan will
continue to call upon India to become a member of the NPT."
A variety of senior MEA officials have indicated that New
Delhi was pressing hard for Japan to shift away from its
ritualistic formulation on the NPT, and will no doubt welcome
Tokyo's new characterization of India as a "partner against
proliferation."

(Re)Comitting to Economic Ties
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5. (U) Declaring their commitment to a "quantum increase" in
trade, point two of India and Japan's eight-part initiative
is directed at economic engagement. The PMs agreed to
"explore" an economic partnership agreement in addition to
their policy dialogue between the Ministry of Commerce and
Japan's Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI).
Highlighting Japan's ongoing role in infrastructure
development in India, including the Delhi metro on which
Koizumi took a ride, New Delhi and Tokyo expressed interest
in greater Japanese investment in road and rail systems. The
PMs also announced cooperation on energy security through an
oil and natural gas dialogue. Notably, Koizumi did not
follow the pattern of important visitors before him (Putin,
Wen) and stop in IT center Bangalore.

Maritime Security: Room to Grow
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6. (C) Prior to the visit, the MEA emphasized to us the
strategic significance of expanding maritime cooperation from
only Coast Guards to include naval exercises as well.
Although the Japanese DCM called India Japan's "most reliable
naval power west of the Straits of Malacca," he did not
foresee more than an exchange of views and friendship visits
between the two navies. Unimpressed by bilateral efforts so
far, Commodore (ret.) Uday Bhaskar, Director of the Institute
for Defense Studies and Analysis (IDSA) suggested that India
and Japan ought to put more energy into maritime security as
"the most viable and appropriate area wherein the India-Japan
relationship can be given a strategic orientation."

The Chinese Gorilla in the Room
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7. (C) Following so soon after PRC PM Wen's stop in New
Delhi, China weighed heavily in discussions of India-Japan
relations. Ambassador Enoki said before the visit that Japan
needed to prepare for the "reality" of three big countries
coexisting in Asia. Elaborating that although his focus was
bilateral relations, this was not limited to India and Japan.
The Joint Statement explicitly echoed recent comments by
Secretary Rice in emphasizing that "a strong, prosperous and

SIPDIS
dynamic India is in the interest of Japan and vice versa,"
with China as the unspoken impetus. Echoing the same
sentiment in sharper terms, the Chairman of the Indo-Japan
Chamber of Commerce told a group at FICCI on April 29 that it
was "problematic" for Japanese businesses to concentrate
their resources in China and that they were looking to
diversify to India.

UNSC: Unexpectedly Quiet
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8. (C) UNSC reform, which initially promised to figure
prominently on the visit agenda, broke no new ground, with an
MEA contact telling us that the two sides simply reaffirmed
their positions. The Japanese DCM noted that the PMs agreed
that the G-4 should remain united and that members should
take a decision on Security Council reform before the UNGA in
September. Reflecting the new public view after UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan's recent comment that new UNSC members
were unlikely to have veto privileges (ref A),a May 2
editorial in the "Hindu" criticized New Delhi and Tokyo's
UNSC partnership as a "needless distraction" from other more
important areas of cooperation, such as trade relations.

Comment
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9. (C) Tokyo's new line on the NPT and the increasing use of
the word "strategic" in the context of bilateral ties,
represent a subtle shift in Tokyo's perception that both
stand to gain from adding content to their relationship
beyond mutual endorsement for a permanent UNSC seat. While
this visit represents a solid step in that direction, if
there were less tentativeness in the relationship, and
greater economic ballast, there would be more room for New
Delhi and Tokyo to coordinate on issues of interest to both
governments and the USG.
BLAKE