PARADIGM SHIFT ON KASHMIR UNDERWAY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 003218

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/27/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER PGOV PK IN
SUBJECT: PARADIGM SHIFT ON KASHMIR UNDERWAY

REF: NEW DELHI 2823 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Charge Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: President Musharraf's landmark visit to
Delhi has strengthened the paradigm shift underway in India
about the prospects for progress on Kashmir. Under the
leadership of PM Manmohan Singh and the Pakistani President,
the two countries have broken their impasse over Kashmir as
the "core issue" and a "dispute," and adopted the "soft
border" framework as a roadmap, albeit vague, for the future.
Musharraf's decision in Delhi to read a stern message to the
most pro-Pakistan separatist, SAS Geelani, and to embrace the
moderate faction of the All-Parties Hurriyat Conference
(APHC) has reshuffled the separatist deck. The moderate APHC
is pleased with the trends, but sees no evidence that the PM
has a strategy to deal with Kashmiri alienation, after its
leaders received what appears to have been a hamhanded
invitation to talks from the PMO prior to Musharraf's visit.
Journalists in the Valley tell us the changed Indo-Pak
template -- from "Kashmir First" to "Kashmiris First" -- has
triggered new hopes, but that they want more. End Summary.


2. (C) Demonstrating statesmanship, leadership and realism,
PM Manmohan Singh and President Musharraf broke major new
ground on Kashmir during their April 16-18 meetings in New
Delhi, producing better prospects for progress than at any
time since bilateral differences degenerated into insurgency
in 1988. Prior to the visit, there was considerable
speculation in India about how soon New Delhi's refusal to
accede to Islamabad's demand to recognize Kashmir as a
"dispute" and the "core issue" would cause the Composite
Dialogue to peter out. While we predicted (reftel) that the
two leaders would finesse their differences, there was also a
strong undercurrent of concern among Pakistan watchers that
the two sides would -- sooner rather than later -- run up
against the hard reality that their respective positions on
Kashmir were mutually exclusive.

Breaking the Impasse: Soft Borders
--------------


3. (C) The two countries' positions on Kashmir remain very
different, but the visit produced a breakthrough in how
Indians and Kashmiris are talking about and dealing with the
issue. A consensus is emerging in the Indian political class
that the two sides have broken the impasse that has
surrounded the Kashmir issue for so long and that Manmohan
Singh and Pervez Musharraf have found a way to show concrete
movement that also produces concrete results for Kashmiris,
long a major priority for residents in the Valley and for
Pakistan. The visit also sidelined the question of Kashmir
as the "core issue," although New Delhi implicitly
understands that it is a "dispute" that has to be addressed
(although has never admitted as such).


4. (C) The general formula agreed to -- which both sides
refer to as "soft borders" and encouraging people-to-people
ties and trade -- is still necessarily very vague about the
outlines of a final settlement, but it offers something of a
roadmap that both sides can live with for the short- to
medium-term that is both realistic and people-oriented, while
waiting for conditions to ripen to the point where the more
difficult territorial issues can be addressed. In India,
Musharraf also referred to the "soft borders" option as "not
a solution, but a facilitation towards a solution."


5. (C) From the Delhi perspective, we would point out that
Musharraf has not rejected the PM's two cardinal principles
-- no second partition of J&K along religious lines, and no
redrawing of existing borders -- and that this "Cricket
Summit" roadmap also takes into account the Pakistani
President's inability to accept the LOC as a border. The
PM's approach is to work towards a situation in which borders
become irrelevant, and pre-partition economic, cultural and
linguistic linkages are restored. Whether these are the
"hazy contours of a solution," as "Outlook" Foreign Affairs
correspondent V. Sudarshan recently put it, remains to be
seen, but they provide a course of action on which both
leaders have signed off, which until very recently was only
mentioned during Indo-Pak Track 2 seminars and at academic
conferences.


6. (C) The PM's approach involves a progressive softening of
the LOC and international border and removing consular and
other barriers between Kashmiris. India-based Pakistan
watchers are concluding that Musharraf has accepted this, as
well as the PM's point that the process will lead to an
outcome, and that there can be no timeframe for resolving the
problem. Jammu University Professor Siddiq Wahid, who
chaired an April 22-23 Pugwash seminar on Kashmir in
Srinagar, told D/Polcouns that Musharraf's remark that
"territorial disputes are very difficult to resolve and take
a long time" was widely noted in India. The PM had also said
that "if Kashmiris from both sides are free to meet and talk
to each other, they may come up with proposals we can look
at," on the grounds that he did not know how long the process
would take, nor could he predict where it would lead, but
that "each step we complete will unfold new possibilities
that we cannot see at this time."

Other Developments
--------------


7. (C) We draw attention to a number of additional
Kashmir-related developments that affect the calculus
surrounding this issue:

-- With the primary exception of the Hindu nationalists,
Kashmiri Pandits, and sections of the military and security
services, the Indian political class (to include the BJP) now
widely perceives Musharraf as a changed man, and "much more
realistic" about Kashmir. His visit is widely perceived to
have delivered the most important Kashmir-specific results at
least since Shimla (1972),if not longer.

-- Particularly notable are changes we have observed among
perennial anti-Pakistan hawks (such as the Observer Research
Foundation's Wilson John and the Insititute for Conflict
Management's Ajay Sahni),who have adopted a "trust but
verify" view of Musharraf in place of their former intense
distrust of the Pakistani President. Those hawks whose
problems with Pakistan are more intellectual than ideological
have taken serious note of Musharraf's repeated comments that
"Kashmir is a difficult issue," and the fact that he "no
longer talks in terms of deadlines."

-- There is also a widespread understanding (and
appreciation) in India that Musharraf took major risks to
"de-link" Kashmir from the rest of the Indo-Pak relationship,
and a growing sense that India will eventually have to "do
something" to help him fend off his domestic critics for
taking this step. Musharraf's decision to move ahead on the
larger bilateral agenda without holding it hostage to Kashmir
is viewed in India as a major step forward.

-- Indian analysts point out that the entire tenor of the
conversation on Kashmir was people-centric rather than
territory-centric, and that Musharraf no longer claimed that
the Hurriyat is the sole representative of the Kashmiri
people (although he still clearly prefers them to mainstream
politicians like Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, PDP
President Mehbooba Mufti, and National Conference President
Omar Abdullah, whose hands he shook in Delhi for the first
time ever).

-- Musharraf also praised Omar, Mehbooba, and the Mirwaiz as
"the future leaders of J&K" during his meeting with the PM,
according to several media sources, the first time since the
legendary, late J&K Chief Minister Sheikh Abdullah that a
pro-India Kashmiri politician has received such an
endorsement from Pakistan.

-- Moderate APHC leader Mirwaiz Umar Farooq told Kashmiris
during Friday prayers on April 22 that India has "accepted
the disupted nature of the Kashmir issue." (Note: No GOI
official has said this explicitly, with the PM's comments
limited to reiterating that he is sincere about working
towards a final settlement, which the moderate separatists
interpret as acknowledgement of the problem. End Note)

-- The Indian press has given prominent coverage to April 27
remarks by Pakistani Information Minister Sheikh Rashid, who
advised the Hurriyat that they should take cognisance of
"changed world realities" and consider accepting a solution
to the Kashmir problem that does not necessarily meet their
aspirations, comparing their plight to that of the
Palestinians, who are being offered much less than was
offered to them and rejected by them in the past.

-- For the first time in more than 50 years, India and
Pakistan have agreed to open trade across the LOC.

-- Indian observers have picked up on the fact that Musharraf
also referred publicly to "Jammu and Kashmir" while in India,
rather than "Kashmir" -- a semantic difference with
significant political implications.

-- There was no "resiling" during or after the Musharraf
visit, as "Hindu" foreign affairs correspondent Amit Baruah
recently noted, referring to a "disease" that has plagued
India and Pakistan in the past as diplomatic nuance has been
used to wriggle out of commitments.

Reshuffling the Separatist Deck
--------------


8. (C) During his visit to Delhi, Musharraf also reordered
the heirarchy of separatist leaders, sending a clear message
to the Kashmiris that his preferances and priorities have
changed. In recent meetings, various separatists have
confirmed to D/Polcouns that:

-- they were surprised by the stern message Musharraf read to
SAS Geelani, the oldest, most loyal, and most reliably
pro-Pakistan of the Kashmiri politicians still operating
above ground in the Valley. The Pakistani President
reportedly told Geelani that he did not understand the logic
behind his opposition to the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus, and
that he should "use his brain" with regard to developments in
J&K. Musharraf was also clearly angry that Geelani had been
criticizing him on Islamabad's policy towards its western
tribal areas, which was "none of his business," as moderate
APHC leader Prof AG Bhat put it. Geelani responded by
telling the Kashmiri press that the meeting with Musharraf
had been a "failure," that the Pakistani President had been
"caught in Delhi's trap," and that the Joint Statement
contained "nothing for us."

-- Musharraf displayed continuing coolness towards the
pro-independence JKLF, whose leader Yasin Malik expressed
amazement at how unceremoniously Geelani had been dumped as
Islamabad's favorite Kashmiri. Malik was sufficiently
annoyed at the turn of events that he did not rule out a
non-violent agitation campaign against India to force New
Delhi to accord him a role in the peace process, and hinted
that the sidelining of Geelani could radicalize rejectionist
milieux in the Valley and in Pakistani Kashmir.

-- Musharraf clearly annointed the moderates (led by the
Mirwaiz, with AG Bhat, Bilal Lone, and Maulana Abbas Ansari)
as Islamabad's new favorites, although the Pakistani High
Commission continues its contacts with the Geelani group and
several of the other four groups into which the former unite
APHC split in August 2003. We assume that Pakistani agents
continue to subsidize all the groups, as widely alleged in
Delhi. While the moderates still harbor resentment against
Pakistan for its role in breaking up the Hurriyat (which
shows no sign of being overcome),they were extremely pleased
that Musharraf had sidelined Geelani, whom they refer to with
barely disguised contempt. In the meantime, they have been
positive about the Indo-Pak peace process, but with the
proviso that it be broadened to include the them.

Hamhanded GOI Approach?
--------------


9. (C) Moderate APHC leaders also told D/Polcouns about an
approach a senior PMO official made to them prior to
Musharraf's visit, reportedly in order to discuss the
resumption of dialogue. Lone (protect) said NSA MK Narayanan
had called the Mirwaiz to offer a meeting with the PM on
April 15 or 16, but that the separatists were put off by the
brusque manner in which they had been "ordered to Delhi."
The Mirwaiz reportedly replied that a meeting on those days
would not be possible, whereupon (according to Lone)
Narayanan responded along the lines that "then the PM will
not be available for the next six months."

Ceasefire?
--------------


10. (C) The shifting plates in the Indo-Pak relationship
over Kashmir have renewed speculation in India that the GOI
may offer a ceasefire in J&K to offer a respite to the
Kashmiris and with a view to bringing the Hizbul Mujahideen
(HM) into a dialogue. After press reports that the
Muzaffarabad-based United Jihad Council (UJC) might be
interested in such a scenario, but then backgtracked on it,
public speculation has largely ceased.


11. (C) Unlike the Vajpayee PMO, this government lacks a
senior interlocutor with broad contacts and credibility among
the Kashmiris. The Home Ministry -- from the little we can
discern based on their embargo against Kashmir discussions
with the Embassy -- appears to be completely disengaged from
Kashmiri politics, and focused narrowly on the internal
security mission. Under these circumstances, and absent the
emergence of a trusted interlocutor akin to Vajpayee's AS
Dulat, it is difficult to imagine how the GOI would
practically implement a ceasefire initiative, were it
inclined to do so.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) Embassy Islamabad will have its own perspectives on
these developments, but the evidence in India is strong that
while Kashmir remains on the table, the Indo-Pak template has
changed significantly. What used to read "Kashmir First,"
now reads "Kashmiris First." This subtle change from a
terrority- to a people-based approach has triggered new hopes
among Valley residents, who are by virtually all accounts
very happy with developments -- but want more. The UPA
government has not made internal New Delhi-Srinagar dialogue
a priority, but it remains a necessary precondition to
addressing alienation against India that continues to plague
the Valley. Until that dialogue begins, the roadmap the two
leaders worked out in New Delhi provides a set of actions
that address Kashmir seriously and realistically, while
setting the stage for more ambitious GOI initiatives.
BLAKE