INDIA WAITING FOR ACTION FROM NEPAL'S KING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003164

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/26/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS KDEM PHUM IN NP CH IS SF
SUBJECT: INDIA WAITING FOR ACTION FROM NEPAL'S KING

REF: A. NEW DELHI 0386


B. NEW DELHI 2951

C. KATHMANDU 844

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: India wants to see progress toward democracy
on the ground, not just hear the right words, before resuming
arms shipments to Nepal, MEA Joint Secretary (North) Ranjit
Rae told PolCouns and Poloff on April 27. Dismissing media
reports of a "U-turn in Indian policy" as "speculation," Rae
reaffirmed the need for the GOI and USG to coordinate before
making any major changes in their Nepal strategies, but
admitted that there is pressure within the Indian system to
resume military assistance to the RNA. Rae expressed
interest in an exchange of views between US and Indian
defense establishments on the military readiness of the RNA.
End Summary.

What Happened in Jakarta
--------------


2. (C) Briefing PolCouns and Poloff on the April 22-23
Jakarta meetings of PM Manmohan Singh and Foreign Minister
Natwar Singh with King Gyanendra, J/S Rae underlined that
despite media reports of a resumption of arms supplies to the
RNA, India is still looking for concrete actions from the
King to demonstrate a commitment to multi-party democracy
before it will relax the current suspension (Ref A). The
King gave some "assurances" to the PM of this commitment, Rae
said, including an understanding that the state of emergency
would be lifted in most areas of the country. The King also
asserted that there was no media censorship (sic),and that
the RGON was moving toward release of all political
prisoners. Rae noted that the GOI has been pressing for an
end to the ban on Indian TV broadcasts in Nepal, along with
other benchmarks.


3. (C) Rae reported that King Gyanendra gave his standard
justification to the PM and the FM, explaining that the poor
performance of the Deuba government against the Maoist threat
left him no choice but to take power. More worrisome in the
Joint Secretary's view was the minimal importance Gyanendra
accorded to political parties. Recalling the King's recent
comments in Time Magazine that "parties are merely a vehicle,
and you can always change vehicles," (Ref C),Rae complained
that Gyanendra seemed to be refuting India's emphasis on the
two pillars of constitutional monarchy and multi-party
democracy, suggesting instead that Nepal needed other pillars
including anti-corruption measures and good governance.

Steps in the Wrong Direction
--------------


4. (C) Citing the arrests of former PM Deuba and other
student leaders on April 26-27 as worrying steps in the wrong
direction, Rae opined that it will be difficult to assess if
any positive actions now are true progress, or merely
piecemeal steps to please outsiders devoid of any real
commitment to multi-party democracy. The J/S said India's
next step is to wait for action in Nepal that demonstrates a
"reasonable assurance of forward movement." Rae stressed
that the GOI wants to see concrete developments on the
ground, and "not to keep hearing reassurances" from the
palace.


5. (C) Rae admitted that Deuba's arrest at the behest of a
new anti-corruption commission set up following the February
1 dismissal of government posed a challenge to the GOI.
India has been concerned that the new panel would prosecute
members of the former Deuba government for political reasons,
but the GOI also did not want to be seen trivializing the
problem of corruption. Rae was uncertain whether the MEA
would issue a statement of concern about Deuba's arrest, but
was inclined in that direction.

Press Reports to the Contrary, Conditions Remain
-------------- ---


6. (C) The Joint Secretary expressed amusement at media
speculation about a GOI promise to resume arms supplies,
commenting that the press is "always looking for a big
story." He dismissed a "Times of India" account that the
"arms pipeline" would be restored within ten days, and
referred back to Manmohan Singh's formulation that the GOI
would consider resuming arms supplies "in the proper
perspective," meaning after positive actions by the palace
(see text of the PM's press appearance in Jakarta para 11).


7. (C) Rae admitted frankly that the GOI has not decided
what benchmarks would be sufficient to resume the supply of
Indian military assistance. He said he was personally
pessimistic that the King would be willing to restore
multi-party democracy, and that it was most important to keep
up pressure on him until this goal was fully achieved. Short
of this, he speculated, the King would be willing to do many
things to get the arms supply restored, but might use future
assurances to avoid restoration of democracy. He conceded,
however, that there was pressure from other parts of the
Indian government, notably the military, to resume assistance
early. These debates will have to work themselves out within
the GOI, Rae added.

Military Situation of the RNA Uncertain
--------------


8. (C) Rae repeated his assessment shared with A/S Rocca
(Ref B) that the Maoists were militarily incapable of taking
and holding ground or defeating the RNA, but was unsure about
the status of RNA supplies. Commenting that the truth must
lie somewhere between expressions of anxiety over tight
supplies made by the RNA to the Indian Army and the confident
official statements of the RNA's progress against the
Maoists, the J/S expressed interest in a USG assessment of
the RNA's capabilities and supplies. He appreciated
PolCouns's suggestion that US and Indian military experts
exchange views on the military situation in Nepal.


9. (C) Asked about Gyanendra's visit to the Baoa Forum in
China, Rae said it was unlikely that China would step in to
provide arms to Nepal. He noted that A/S Rocca had indicated
US attention to this issue. However, the J/S expressed
concern over possible military supplies from Israel and South
Africa, despite official assurances from the Embassies of
both countries in New Delhi that they would not provide arms.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Although Rae's statements confirm our earlier
reporting that no fundamental shift has occurred in GOI
conditionality for resuming military assistance to Nepal (Ref
A),his admission of the pressure from the Indian Army to
resume arms supplies and the unnamed sources quoted in media
reports who speak favorably of an early resumption highlight
the debate taking place within government circles over how
much pressure to put on the King over democracy, and how
badly the RNA needs supplies. Rae emphasized that a decision
to resume arms supplies should be based on a political
calculation, not an assessment of the military balance.
However, he conceded that India's hang-tough approach rests
on an assumption that the Maoists are not in a position to
threaten RNA control. An exchange of assessments between our
respective defense intelligence agencies might be useful for
accurately gauging how much threat the Maoists pose to the
RNA and the need for outside military assistance to preserve
Army readiness. End Comment.

Transcript of Prime Minister Singh's Comments on April 23
-------------- --------------


11. (U) The following transcript was provided by the MEA.

Questions (inaudible): On meeting with HM the King of Nepal.

I met His Majesty the King, he had asked for a meeting and
being our close neighbour, a country with which we have
standing civilisational ties, very intimate relations, I did
agree to meet His Majesty. He gave me an account of
circumstances, compulsions in which he had to take action,
which he did take. I explained to him that as a close
neighbour and friend of Nepal, a country with which we have a
unique relationship, we have always regarded constitutional
monarchy and multi-party democracy as the twin pillars of the
Nepalese polity, and in the light of developments in recent
months our concern has been this recognition that these two
twin pillars must work together in harmony. We discussed the
situation and his perspective on the evolving situation. I
did suggest to him that it is important to take effective
measures to restart the political process and to work out a
road map for this purpose. His Majesty was quite sensitive
to these concerns, and therefore, on the whole I think the
meeting was constructive in terms of its outcome.
Q: What about military supplies?

His Majesty raised that issue with me and I said we will look
at these things in proper perspective.
BLAKE