Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI3087
2005-04-25 12:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

WEN VISIT WRAP-UP: "SIGNIFICANT BOOST," NO

Tags:  PREL EAIR CN IN UNSC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003087 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2015
TAGS: PREL EAIR CN IN UNSC
SUBJECT: WEN VISIT WRAP-UP: "SIGNIFICANT BOOST," NO
PARADIGM SHIFT

REF: NEW DELHI 2758

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 003087

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/24/2015
TAGS: PREL EAIR CN IN UNSC
SUBJECT: WEN VISIT WRAP-UP: "SIGNIFICANT BOOST," NO
PARADIGM SHIFT

REF: NEW DELHI 2758

Classified By: PolCouns Geoff Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Two weeks after Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's
"historic" April 9-12 visit to New Delhi (ref A),the initial
breathless commentary has given way to a more sober and
realistic assessment that no paradigm shift occurred, that
Beijing did not exactly endorse India's UNSC bid, and that
there is a long way to go in settling the border dispute.
The Indians, however, have sensed a new-found respect from
Beijing, reflected in China's acknowledgment of India as
globally significant, a development for which the MEA credits
growing US-India engagement. The MEA told us they pointedly
rejected Wen's strong advice that India should disassociate
itself from Japan's UNSC bid. End Summary.

Reality Check: No Paradigm Shift
--------------


2. (C) MEA Joint Secretary Ashok Kantha (China, Japan) told
PolCouns and Poloff on April 22 that while Wen and the PM
took important steps, "there has been no paradigm shift, no
jump" in relations with China. He noted that there was
"complete continuity," in GOI policy, adding that the
government has kept former PM Vajpayee, former NSA Mishra,
and Opposition Leader Advani fully informed of the border
negotiations.


3. (C) New Delhi is looking for Beijing to be sensitive to
India's security concerns as the relationship develops,
Kantha continued, noting that China was still in a "state of
denial" with regard to its relationship with Pakistan and
responsibility for that country's leaky nuclear and missile
programs. The J/S remarked that the GOI is comfortable with
Beijing's ties with Islamabad, as long as they do not
adversely affect India. Taking a realistic view of Beijing's
motivations, Kantha added that China's new willingness to
engage India was to a considerable extent a function of how
Beijing sees the US-India relationship evolving.

UNSC: Play on Words
--------------


4. (C) India's goals during the talks focused on tangible
results in New Delhi's UNSC campaign and Sikkim, while
China's were Indian recognition of its positions on Taiwan
and Tibet, Chinese DCM Zheng Qingdian told PolCouns on April


20. Three of the four were accommodated in the April 11
Joint Statement (ref A),while the fourth (UNSC) remains
elusive, notwithstanding MEA J/S Kantha's optimistic
statement that China had "fairly categorically" offered its
support for India's UNSC bid. The Indian PM was more
cautious in his remarks to Parliament on April 20, quoting
the slippery language of the Joint Statement that Beijing
"understands" India's aspirations, and "supports" a larger
Indian role in the UN (not the UNSC) and international
affairs.


5. (C) Zheng went further, confirming that China
"understands" India's ambition but that it is not ready to
"support" it. Zheng did not endorse the line we had from an
Indian journalist, that Wen had offered a firm, private
assurance of PRC support for India's candidacy. While Zheng
cited the interest of many other countries in a permanent
UNSC seat as one of the reasons for China's reluctance to
endorse India's bid, Kantha explained that India having
thrown its lot in with Japan is the stumbling block for
Beijing. The J/S recalled that during Wen's meeting with the
PM, the Chinese leader warned India of damaging its
credibility for a seat by supporting Japan so unequivocally,
speaking on the issue with great passion, at some length.
Kantha said PM Singh pointedly refused to accept this PRC
advice. Zheng characterized India as "reluctantly accepting"
of China's position on UNSC reform, adding that China and the
US' positions on the issue seemed "similar."
Inching Along on the Border
--------------


6. (C) Kantha, who was the primary GOI negotiator for the
agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for
boundary settlement (ref A),noted that his mandate was to
arrive at a political solution, and not a technical one, as
that has proven a "dead-end" in negotiations from 1998-2003.
He underscored that each of the Guiding Principles had
"operational significance," citing for example the provision
for "safeguarding" settled populations which, he argued,
boosts India's claim to Tawang, and the decision to use
"easily identifiable geographic features," for which the two
countries will conduct joint surveys. Asked about the next
phase of the negotiations, Kantha flagged the strong GOI
expectation that progress will come quickly -- months, not
years.


7. (C) Zheng observed that the Guiding Principles came about
after years of disagreement because of the changed nature of
the countries' relationship and the economic growth that both
are experiencing. The discussions included "hard talk" on
Sikkim, while the next step would be to conclude a framework
for the resolution of their boundary dispute, followed by an
actual demarcation of the boundary. While the MEA's Kantha
characterized the principles as a milestone, he cautioned
that the next phase, which will be negotiated at the Special
Representatives level, would be far more difficult, and will
require sustained engagement at the senior political level.
Lamenting the Chinese tendency to want to put off border
settlement while developing other aspects of the India
relationship, he noted that although India does not have a
specific timeframe in mind, the GOI will push for early
resolution.

Shades of Partnership
--------------


8. (C) In public discussion of the Joint Statement's
"Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity," the Indian
focus was more on the "strategic partnership," without
clarity on what the new level of engagement it would be. The
PM, in his April 20 speech to Parliament, described the
partnership as "not in the nature of a military pact or
alliance, but reflect(ing) a congruence of purpose." Kantha
explained further that in January, China had proposed a
"Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Amity." New Delhi,
however, sought not simply hollow phrases, but Chinese
acknowledgment of India's "global role." Two days before
Wen's New Delhi meetings, Beijing accepted this formulation,
which DCM Zheng characterized as the result of an evolution
in the India-China relationship over the past few years from
bilateral to "global and international in focus." The
Observer Research Foundation's Ambassador MK Rasgotra
observed recently that China has begun to recognize India's
importance, whereas ten years ago, "they had nothing but
contempt."


9. (C) Defining this new level of understanding, Kantha
underscored that from India's perspective, the relationship
with China should not be limited by their differences, had to
have a "global" element, could not progress while postponing
settlement of the border dispute, and did not imply a
military alliance or "ganging up." While this was
significant, Kantha did not ascribe too much importance to
the partnership, noting that China has such "partnerships"
with everyone from ASEAN to Mexico and even the US. Kantha
added that with respect to China, New Delhi and Washington
have a similar interest in "ensuring Beijing remains honest."


10. (C) With regard to the dozen agreements listed in the
Joint Statement, Zheng said that the texts were not made
public at the request of China, while India had supported
their release. The full text of two of the most important
documents, the "Guiding Principles" and the Line of Actual
Control (LAC) military protocol, was publicly available on
the day they were signed, and is viewable on the Indian MEA
website.

People-to-People Falls Flat
--------------


11. (C) For their proximity and colossal size, the level of
interaction between China and India is quite low. Only
40,000 Indians received visas to go to China in 2004, which
is still larger than the number of Chinese traveling south
(many to go to Buddhist pilgrimage sites in UP and Bihar).
In an attempt to fix this imbalance, and to accommodate the
kind of economic ties the two leaders predicted, DCM Zheng
said Chinese Eastern Airlines will start operating its
Beijing-Shanghai-New Delhi flight three times per week, Air
China has proposed a Beijing-Mumbai route, and that a
Xinjiang-Srinagar connection as well as South China Airlines
service to Calcutta are under consideration. The
Xinjiang-Srinagar air link is particularly important, as it
could revive the ancient Kashgar trade route, but could also
be construed as acknowledging Indian sovereignty over the
state of Jammu and Kashmir.

Comment
--------------


12. (C) For the Indian political class, the most important
outcome of the Wen visit may be the newfound seriousness with
which China is now approaching India. The GOI is very much
aware that deepening US-India relations are a factor in
Beijing's calculus, and can be expected to use this to New
Delhi's advantage, which is a benefit to the United States.
While New Delhi is open to these new approaches from Beijing,
we note a definite sense of caution in GOI assessments of the
Wen visit which reflects lingering historical mistrust,
concern over the PLA build-up in India's periphery, and
uncertainty over where exactly Beijing stands with respect to
India and the UNSC. Wen's visit tipped off a triangular
Security Council drama between India, Japan and China, the
next act of which will be played out during Japanese PM
Koizumi's visit to New Delhi April 28-30 (septel).
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