Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI2788
2005-04-13 12:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:
INDIAN LEFT REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO US SOUTH ASIA INITIATIVE
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002788
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MASS IN PK NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIAN LEFT REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO US SOUTH ASIA INITIATIVE
REF: NEW DELHI 2348
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002788
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MASS IN PK NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIAN LEFT REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO US SOUTH ASIA INITIATIVE
REF: NEW DELHI 2348
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: Most Indian strategic commentators have endorsed the Administration's March 25 South Asia Initiative, and there is an emerging consensus within the GOI that India should capitalize on this opportunity to ensure close ties to the US. India's Communist parties remain adamantly opposed, however, and are trying to convince the Congress Party to reject it. Some leaders from the Congress' left wing agree with the Communists that India should reject the military components of the Initiative. Until the party arrives at a workable consensus, party leaders like FonMin Natwar Singh and DefMin Pranab Mukherjee will move cautiously, looking for political cover to support their moves ahead with the US. Some observers speculate that Natwar will use his influence within the Left to weaken its opposition to closer bilateral relations. Some within Congress but outside decision-making circles have suggested that India reject American fighter aircraft purchases to win Left Front (LF) approval for other aspects of the initiative. The LF cannot compel Congress to reject the Initiative outright, as it does not control foreign policy. It places a higher priority on its domestic agenda, and will not risk bringing down the government on this issue. However, their inherent nuisance value could become more of a problem if we have difficulty translating the Secretary's Initiative from rhetoric to reality. End Summary.
Communists Speak Out
--------------
2. (U) Predictably, India's Communists rejected the administration's South Asia Initiative almost immediately after it was announced on March 25. On March 28, the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) called on the GOI to ""outright reject the proposal to join the infamous national missile defense system,"" noting that ""it suits the US to fuel an arms race between India and Pakistan with the sale of sophisticated weapons to both countries,"" and ""it provides a good market for its arms manufacturers."" On March 29, the Communist Party of India (CPI) General Secretary AB Bardhan warned the GOI not to accept the US offer of fighter aircraft, maintaining that the US ""wants to start an arms race in the region. They don't want peace. They don't want the region to become economically stable.""
And Stick to their Guns
--------------
3. (C) In a series of recent meetings with Poloff, Communist leaders and leftist journalists insisted that the US initiative was ""unacceptable,"" that the Left was determined to stop it, and would not change its position. They were also confident that they had enough support within Congress to oppose the Indian purchase of US fighter aircraft. On Apri 5, Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, Deputy Editor of the leftist fortnightly ""Frontline,"" claimed that while the Communists want good India/US relations, they find the South Asia initiative too high a price to pay, and are looking for a way to scuttle it. Ramakrishnan asserted that the Congress left wing agrees with the Communists that India should reject closer strategic ties with the US, and would Convince the GOI to adopt a ""wait and see"" position, using various stratagems to delay a decision on defense cooperation as long as possible.
4. (C) Leaders of three LF parties insisted to Poloff that they would not relent on GOI purchase of US fighter aircraft.
All-India Forward Bloc General Secretary G. Devarajan emphasized on April 4 that the LF has told PM Singh that GOI acceptance of the American arms package would be an ""impediment"" to its India-Pakistan peace initiative, and that it should reject the American offer and let Pakistan acquire F-16's to ""placate"" Pakistan and ""prevent an India/Pakistan arms race."" He insisted that the GOI should reject the entire US Initiative and not separate the defense and civilian cooperation components.
Defense Minister Mukherjee in the Spotlight
--------------
5. (C) Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) General Secretary Abani Roy reiterated to Poloff that the LF was angered by the US initiative, which it views as ""patronizing."" Roy claimed that the Pakistan F-16 sale was dropped on India as a ""fait accompli,"" despite repeated Indian objections, and that the USG was using it to ""browbeat"" India into accepting a relationship with the US on American terms. Roy described the offer of multi-role combat aircraft to India as a ""waste of money"" and ""dumping"" of American products. He claimed that the LF has told DefMin Mukherjee not to accept US attempts to lock India into expensive arms packages.
Instead, the GOI should scale back defense purchases and channel more money into social spending. Mukherjee purportedly responded that since the US initiative was ""a question of national security,"" he could ""not take a decision lightly.""
6. (C) According to Roy, the LF leadership is worried that Mukherjee is not fully with them. Noting that ""Mukherjee can't behave one way when he is in West Bengal and another way in New Delhi,"" Roy maintained that the Defense Minister is ""pursuing a two-faced policy,"" trying to placate the Communists while at the same time working with Congress moderates who favor closer relations with the US. Roy claimed that the LF is confident that India will never purchase US fighter aircraft. Alleging that Congress leaders are only interested in large ""commissions"" from military sales, he predicted that the GOI would reject the F-16 or F-18 in favor of a European aircraft, as ""there is money in it for them."" Roy insisted that American aircraft purchases were ""non-negotiable,"" but conceded that the Communists might be willing to look at the civilian components of the US Initiative if they ""meet India's needs.""
7. (C) CPI Secretary D. Rajan also confirmed to Poloff on April 6 that the Communists ""will not compromise"" on the military aspects of the American initiative. While he would not comment on the civil components, Rajan was confident that India would never purchase American combat aircraft. He claimed that not only are many within Congress opposed, but many senior Indian military officers (who have long-standing ties to Russian suppliers) see no value to the US offer and would recommend that the GOI reject it.
Congress's Detractors
--------------
8. (C) Poloff spoke with two Congress leaders with access to the party leadership and journalists who follow Congress party internal developments. They confirmed that some within the Congress hierarchy remain opposed to the defense components of the administration's strategic initiative.
9. (C) In an April 1 meeting, Congress MP Rashid Alvi pointed out that the Communists are pressuring Congress, that the party is divided, and has not yet decided how to respond.
Alvi advised that DefMin Mukherjee will play a key role in the GOI's decision and has not yet come out in favor of the US fighter offer. He noted that Mukherjee is from West Bengal, wants to become Prime Minister one day with Communist support, owes his political position in his home state to the Communists, and cannot afford to openly defy them. Alvi claimed that the Left is in no mood to compromise and wants Mukherjee to use his influence to convince the GOI to reject the purchase of F-16 or F-18 aircraft. Noting that the US military partnership was ""no go,"" for the Communists, Alvi claimed there was some leeway regarding nuclear energy and space.
10. (C) On March 31, Congress insider NK Sharma insisted to Poloff that despite strong support for the US Initiative from New Delhi's strategic elite, the USG should not take GOI acceptance for granted, as Congress grassroots cadres remain deeply suspicious of the United States and have not bought into the logic of the US partnership. According to Sharma, elements within the Congress leadership still believe the US favors the BJP, and does not want Congress to gain enough strength to remain in power for a full five year term.
Sharma maintained that the announcement of F-16 sales to Pakistan compounded the considerable ""anger"" within Congress regarding US handling of AQ Khan, and perceived US objections to the Indo-Iran pipeline. Sharma maintained that DefMin Mukherjee was so dependent on the Communists that he had to oppose the F-16 offer.
11. (C) ""Hindu"" political editor Harish Khare noted to Poloff that there was ""no enthusiasm"" for the US arms offer among his Congress contacts, and asserted that Congress is looking at the possibility of satisfying both the US and the LF by separating the military and civilian components, and declining the arms offer. It could also tell the USG that Congress ""must seek a political consensus"" and then drag out the process for many years. Khare confirmed that the advanced fighter offer to India did not placate the universal anger in Congress ranks regarding the offer of F-16's to Pakistan.
12. (C) Former ""India Today"" editor Zafar Agha told Poloff on April 8 that his Congress contacts believe that India will become a world power, but some want India to ally with the US ""for now,"" while others believe it is not necessary. He was confident that if Congress decides to accept the US offer, it would bring the Communists along by reminding them of the need for ""secular unity"" to meet the ""BJP threat.""
Comment
--------------
13. (C) As in the past, the Communists are determined to oppose the forging of closer US-India strategic ties, as they think they are in a position to veto the GOI purchase of US fighter aircraft. There has always been some ideological overlap between the left wing of Congress and the Communists when it comes to relations with the US, and the LF remains confident that Congress proponents will fail to convince skeptics in their own party to accept the initiative that Washington has proposed. In their leftist view the fighter sale is a ""non-starter"" as it is a ""high visibility"" component, which is widely opposed by a cross-section of Indians, including some within the military, who would prefer to stick with existing suppliers. These left leaders are eager to claim credit for stopping what they see as a program doomed to failure. For now, these leftist critics are a nuisance factor in GOI decision-making. They could become a much bigger problem, however, if Washington is perceived as failing to deliver on the bold rhetoric of the March 25 presentation and the soaring vision of US-India partnership that the Secretary presented in Delhi.
MULFORD "
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR MASS IN PK NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIAN LEFT REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO US SOUTH ASIA INITIATIVE
REF: NEW DELHI 2348
Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) Summary: Most Indian strategic commentators have endorsed the Administration's March 25 South Asia Initiative, and there is an emerging consensus within the GOI that India should capitalize on this opportunity to ensure close ties to the US. India's Communist parties remain adamantly opposed, however, and are trying to convince the Congress Party to reject it. Some leaders from the Congress' left wing agree with the Communists that India should reject the military components of the Initiative. Until the party arrives at a workable consensus, party leaders like FonMin Natwar Singh and DefMin Pranab Mukherjee will move cautiously, looking for political cover to support their moves ahead with the US. Some observers speculate that Natwar will use his influence within the Left to weaken its opposition to closer bilateral relations. Some within Congress but outside decision-making circles have suggested that India reject American fighter aircraft purchases to win Left Front (LF) approval for other aspects of the initiative. The LF cannot compel Congress to reject the Initiative outright, as it does not control foreign policy. It places a higher priority on its domestic agenda, and will not risk bringing down the government on this issue. However, their inherent nuisance value could become more of a problem if we have difficulty translating the Secretary's Initiative from rhetoric to reality. End Summary.
Communists Speak Out
--------------
2. (U) Predictably, India's Communists rejected the administration's South Asia Initiative almost immediately after it was announced on March 25. On March 28, the Communist Party of India - Marxist (CPI-M) called on the GOI to ""outright reject the proposal to join the infamous national missile defense system,"" noting that ""it suits the US to fuel an arms race between India and Pakistan with the sale of sophisticated weapons to both countries,"" and ""it provides a good market for its arms manufacturers."" On March 29, the Communist Party of India (CPI) General Secretary AB Bardhan warned the GOI not to accept the US offer of fighter aircraft, maintaining that the US ""wants to start an arms race in the region. They don't want peace. They don't want the region to become economically stable.""
And Stick to their Guns
--------------
3. (C) In a series of recent meetings with Poloff, Communist leaders and leftist journalists insisted that the US initiative was ""unacceptable,"" that the Left was determined to stop it, and would not change its position. They were also confident that they had enough support within Congress to oppose the Indian purchase of US fighter aircraft. On Apri 5, Venkitesh Ramakrishnan, Deputy Editor of the leftist fortnightly ""Frontline,"" claimed that while the Communists want good India/US relations, they find the South Asia initiative too high a price to pay, and are looking for a way to scuttle it. Ramakrishnan asserted that the Congress left wing agrees with the Communists that India should reject closer strategic ties with the US, and would Convince the GOI to adopt a ""wait and see"" position, using various stratagems to delay a decision on defense cooperation as long as possible.
4. (C) Leaders of three LF parties insisted to Poloff that they would not relent on GOI purchase of US fighter aircraft.
All-India Forward Bloc General Secretary G. Devarajan emphasized on April 4 that the LF has told PM Singh that GOI acceptance of the American arms package would be an ""impediment"" to its India-Pakistan peace initiative, and that it should reject the American offer and let Pakistan acquire F-16's to ""placate"" Pakistan and ""prevent an India/Pakistan arms race."" He insisted that the GOI should reject the entire US Initiative and not separate the defense and civilian cooperation components.
Defense Minister Mukherjee in the Spotlight
--------------
5. (C) Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) General Secretary Abani Roy reiterated to Poloff that the LF was angered by the US initiative, which it views as ""patronizing."" Roy claimed that the Pakistan F-16 sale was dropped on India as a ""fait accompli,"" despite repeated Indian objections, and that the USG was using it to ""browbeat"" India into accepting a relationship with the US on American terms. Roy described the offer of multi-role combat aircraft to India as a ""waste of money"" and ""dumping"" of American products. He claimed that the LF has told DefMin Mukherjee not to accept US attempts to lock India into expensive arms packages.
Instead, the GOI should scale back defense purchases and channel more money into social spending. Mukherjee purportedly responded that since the US initiative was ""a question of national security,"" he could ""not take a decision lightly.""
6. (C) According to Roy, the LF leadership is worried that Mukherjee is not fully with them. Noting that ""Mukherjee can't behave one way when he is in West Bengal and another way in New Delhi,"" Roy maintained that the Defense Minister is ""pursuing a two-faced policy,"" trying to placate the Communists while at the same time working with Congress moderates who favor closer relations with the US. Roy claimed that the LF is confident that India will never purchase US fighter aircraft. Alleging that Congress leaders are only interested in large ""commissions"" from military sales, he predicted that the GOI would reject the F-16 or F-18 in favor of a European aircraft, as ""there is money in it for them."" Roy insisted that American aircraft purchases were ""non-negotiable,"" but conceded that the Communists might be willing to look at the civilian components of the US Initiative if they ""meet India's needs.""
7. (C) CPI Secretary D. Rajan also confirmed to Poloff on April 6 that the Communists ""will not compromise"" on the military aspects of the American initiative. While he would not comment on the civil components, Rajan was confident that India would never purchase American combat aircraft. He claimed that not only are many within Congress opposed, but many senior Indian military officers (who have long-standing ties to Russian suppliers) see no value to the US offer and would recommend that the GOI reject it.
Congress's Detractors
--------------
8. (C) Poloff spoke with two Congress leaders with access to the party leadership and journalists who follow Congress party internal developments. They confirmed that some within the Congress hierarchy remain opposed to the defense components of the administration's strategic initiative.
9. (C) In an April 1 meeting, Congress MP Rashid Alvi pointed out that the Communists are pressuring Congress, that the party is divided, and has not yet decided how to respond.
Alvi advised that DefMin Mukherjee will play a key role in the GOI's decision and has not yet come out in favor of the US fighter offer. He noted that Mukherjee is from West Bengal, wants to become Prime Minister one day with Communist support, owes his political position in his home state to the Communists, and cannot afford to openly defy them. Alvi claimed that the Left is in no mood to compromise and wants Mukherjee to use his influence to convince the GOI to reject the purchase of F-16 or F-18 aircraft. Noting that the US military partnership was ""no go,"" for the Communists, Alvi claimed there was some leeway regarding nuclear energy and space.
10. (C) On March 31, Congress insider NK Sharma insisted to Poloff that despite strong support for the US Initiative from New Delhi's strategic elite, the USG should not take GOI acceptance for granted, as Congress grassroots cadres remain deeply suspicious of the United States and have not bought into the logic of the US partnership. According to Sharma, elements within the Congress leadership still believe the US favors the BJP, and does not want Congress to gain enough strength to remain in power for a full five year term.
Sharma maintained that the announcement of F-16 sales to Pakistan compounded the considerable ""anger"" within Congress regarding US handling of AQ Khan, and perceived US objections to the Indo-Iran pipeline. Sharma maintained that DefMin Mukherjee was so dependent on the Communists that he had to oppose the F-16 offer.
11. (C) ""Hindu"" political editor Harish Khare noted to Poloff that there was ""no enthusiasm"" for the US arms offer among his Congress contacts, and asserted that Congress is looking at the possibility of satisfying both the US and the LF by separating the military and civilian components, and declining the arms offer. It could also tell the USG that Congress ""must seek a political consensus"" and then drag out the process for many years. Khare confirmed that the advanced fighter offer to India did not placate the universal anger in Congress ranks regarding the offer of F-16's to Pakistan.
12. (C) Former ""India Today"" editor Zafar Agha told Poloff on April 8 that his Congress contacts believe that India will become a world power, but some want India to ally with the US ""for now,"" while others believe it is not necessary. He was confident that if Congress decides to accept the US offer, it would bring the Communists along by reminding them of the need for ""secular unity"" to meet the ""BJP threat.""
Comment
--------------
13. (C) As in the past, the Communists are determined to oppose the forging of closer US-India strategic ties, as they think they are in a position to veto the GOI purchase of US fighter aircraft. There has always been some ideological overlap between the left wing of Congress and the Communists when it comes to relations with the US, and the LF remains confident that Congress proponents will fail to convince skeptics in their own party to accept the initiative that Washington has proposed. In their leftist view the fighter sale is a ""non-starter"" as it is a ""high visibility"" component, which is widely opposed by a cross-section of Indians, including some within the military, who would prefer to stick with existing suppliers. These left leaders are eager to claim credit for stopping what they see as a program doomed to failure. For now, these leftist critics are a nuisance factor in GOI decision-making. They could become a much bigger problem, however, if Washington is perceived as failing to deliver on the bold rhetoric of the March 25 presentation and the soaring vision of US-India partnership that the Secretary presented in Delhi.
MULFORD "