WEN VISIT: UNSC, SIKKIM, ECONOMY STEAL THE SHOW

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NEW DELHI 002758

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2015
TAGS: PREL ETRD CN IN
SUBJECT: WEN VISIT: UNSC, SIKKIM, ECONOMY STEAL THE SHOW

REF: A. CHENNAI 695

B. NEW DELHI 2677

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's April 9-12
visit to India produced a dozen documents, and plenty of
positive commentary, but the highlights were confusion over
China's position on India in the UNSC and agreement on a
roadmap to resolution of the border dispute. New Delhi-based
China-watchers, declaring the trip a resounding success,
initially seized on an April 11 Chinese statement and MEA
descriptions of Beijing's support for India in the UNSC, only
to be disappointed by Wen's April 12 reiteration of the more
ambiguous language of the Joint Statement. Of the many
agreements and MOUs, the highlights were the border roadmap,
a joint statement in which China acknowledged Sikkim as an
Indian state, a protocol for military presence along the Line
of Actual Control (LAC),and the release of the India-China
Joint Study Group's report on Trade and Economic Cooperation.
This message reports the highlights of the bilateral
documents. A detailed assessment of the visit will follow
septel. End Summary.


2. (U) The MEA announced on April 11 that during Wen's
visit, India and China signed or released a dozen documents.
Among them were the:

--Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People's
Republic of China;
--Agreement on Political Parameters and Guiding Principles
for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question;
--Report of the India-China Joint Study Group on
Comprehensive Trade and Economic Cooperation;
--Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation of CBMs in
the Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control in the
India-China Border Areas;
--Agreement on Mutual Administrative Assistance and
Cooperation in Customs Matters;
--MOU on the Launch of the India-China Financial Dialogue;
--MOU on Civil Aviation; and
--MOU on Provision of Hydrological Information of the
Sutlej/Langqen Zangbo River in Flood Season by China to India.

Upgrade to Strategic Partner
--------------


3. (U) During his April 9-12 visit to New Delhi and
Bangalore, Wen met with PM Manmohan Singh, President APJ
Abdul Kalam, UPA Chairperson Sonia Gandhi, and Leader of the
Opposition LK Advani. The Joint Statement, signed on April
11, declared India and China's intention to establish a
"Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and
Prosperity." The statement spoke of the "incremental
progress" that Wen and Singh made, in contrast to more
ecstatic initial commentary in the media.

Lost in Translation?
--------------


4. (U) While these dozen agreements broke almost no new
ground, the Guiding Principles, the LAC Military Protocol,
the Economic Cooperation report (septel),and Wen's comments
on India and the UNSC are more significant. In the
seven-page joint statement, India noted its aspirations for
permanent UNSC membership, and China acknowledged that "India
is an important developing country." Stopping short of
offering Beijing's support, the document said that China
"understands and supports India's aspirations to play an
active role in the UN."


5. (SBU) Despite the non-committal language in the official
statement, Indians, including Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran,
on April 11 seized upon a comment Wen reportedly made that
China would be "happy" to see India as a permanent member of
the UNSC. Highlighting the Premier's remarks, Saran told the
media that this was a major step forward. The reports that
followed reflexively pointed out that the US was now the
"significant holdout" among the P-5 that had not come out to
support India's UNSC candidacy. Prior to his departure on
April 12, however, Wen dashed these hopes when, in response
to an AP reporter's question, he spoke of India and the UNSC
in the ambiguous terms of the Joint Statement. He also
reportedly stated that Japan should "face up to history" and
reconsider its UNSC bid, highlighting an issue that may
resurface when PM Koizumi follows Wen to New Delhi at the end
of April. Our media contacts, speaking on April 12, were
bitterly critical of the perceived Chinese flip-flop on the
UNSC.

Border Roadmap
--------------


6. (U) Laying a long-term plan for future resolution of
their border dispute, Singh and Wen signed off on an eleven
article agreement on the "Political Parameters and Guiding
Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary
Question" and a paragraph in the joint statement
acknowledging the "Sikkim State of the Republic of India."
The document called for China and India to find a peaceful
solution, make "mutually acceptable adjustments," continue
the Joint Working Group and Special Representatives meetings,
and observe the LAC in reaching a settlement that follows
"easily definable natural geographic features," and takes
into account the interests of the settled populations.


7. (U) Some observers hailed the principles, along with the
new Chinese map that Foreign Secretary Saran waved at a press
conference showing Sikkim as part of India, as "melting" the
border. Others, such as the "Hindustan Times" commentator
and National Security Advisory Board member Manoj Joshi,
concluded that there was "still a long way to go," and called
attention to the lack of understanding on where the LAC, on
which the Guiding Principles are based, actually is located.

In the Meantime
--------------


8. (U) Pending resolution of the border dispute, Wen and PM
Singh signed a Protocol on Modalities for the Implementation
of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along
the Line of Actual Control. Based on "strict observance" of
the LAC, the agreement:

--prohibits "large-scale military exercises" of more than
15,000 troops in "close proximity" to the line;
--requests notification for activities in excess of 5,000
troops 15 days in advance;
--provides for a meeting and investigation by the offended
party of any alleged air intrusion by military aircraft;
--establishes two border meetings annually at each of three
locations on the border; and
--outlines procedures for the treatment of personnel who may
cross the border.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) While generally light on immediate results, Wen's
stay in Bangalore (ref A) and New Delhi produced much-needed
momentum on the border dispute and highlighted the potential
for, and interest in, economic cooperation (septel). The
MEA, which spun Wen's remarks into a solid thumbs-up for
India at the UNSC, may find itself countering the initial
enthusiasm following Wen's pre-departure step back. With
this deflationary move we can expect a more sober assessment
of the visit which we will report septel. The other notable
aspect of this visit was the obvious effort that the Chinese
are putting into the cultivation of their India relationship,
after years in which the PRC regarded New Delhi with thinly
disguised disdain.
MULFORD