Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI2601
2005-04-06 13:03:00
SECRET
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIAN INVESTIGATION OF SABERO ORGANICS, LTD.

Tags:  ETTC PARM PREL IR IN CBW GOI 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T NEW DELHI 002601 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL IR IN CBW GOI
SUBJECT: INDIAN INVESTIGATION OF SABERO ORGANICS, LTD.

REF: NEW DELHI 6773

Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

S E C R E T NEW DELHI 002601

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2015
TAGS: ETTC PARM PREL IR IN CBW GOI
SUBJECT: INDIAN INVESTIGATION OF SABERO ORGANICS, LTD.

REF: NEW DELHI 6773

Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (S) On March 25, MEA Under Secretary, Disarmament and
International Security Affairs (DISA),Nutan Kapoor gave
PolMilOff a nonpaper outlining the status of the GOI
investigation of Sabero Organics' export of a CWC Schedule 3
chemical to Iran. Text of nonpaper follows in para 3.


2. (S) Because of US concerns (Reftel),the GOI discussed
the matter with Sabero and the firm has since declined
another request from the Iranian end-user, according to
Kapoor. She requested the USG provide further "persuasive
information" about the end-user that can be deployed if the
case goes to court.


3. (S) Begin text of GOI nonpaper:

Reference nonpaper handed over to USG in October 2004 in
response to information conveyed by USG regarding the export
of a CWC Schedule 3 chemical Tri Methyl Phosphite (TMP) to
Iran by an Indian firm "Sabero Organics Gujarat Limited."

Due to the continuing concerns expressed by the USG, the GOI
has advised the Indian firm to refrain from further exports
of TMP to the Iranian end-user "Raja Shimi Industrial
Manufacturing," pending completion of GOI investigations.
The firm has declined a further request made by the Iranian
entity.

While GOI investigations are ongoing, the USG is requested to
provide further persuasive information about the Iranian
end-user, the risk of diversion of the chemical to Iran's CW
program, and details about Iran's CW program. End text of
GOI nonpaper.
MULFORD