PM: PREMATURE TO COMMENT ON F-16S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002348

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/28/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS IN NSSP
SUBJECT: PM: PREMATURE TO COMMENT ON F-16S

REF: NEW DELHI 2301

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Since Reftel, comments from senior GOI
officials and governing coalition politicians on the
Administration's March 25 South Asia Initiative continue to
trickle out. The focus of remarks on March 28 was almost
exclusively on F-16s to Pakistan, rather than the larger
issues the proposal raises. Utterances ranged from careful
to negative, with the PM taking the high road -- that it was
premature to comment and that the offer would be discussed
with Washington. Defense Minister Mukherjee said the sale
was "inappropriate and ill-timed," and would adversely affect
the Indo-Pak Composite Dialogue. Foreign Minister Natwar
Singh said the F-16 matter was for the Defense Ministry to
decide, while Congress Party spokesman Anand Sharma said the
offer was "unfortunate," but "the government's
responsibility." Former BJP/NDA Foreign Minister Jaswant
Singh termed the offer "strange." The Communists are howling
with outrage, and congresses by three major Left parties in
the next two weeks could turn up the heat on the GOI.


2. (C) Today's fixation on the F-16s is unfortunate, but a
Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) meeting on the evening of
March 29 may provide a more considered GOI position. These
public statements provide early context and frame the issue,
but the political process will decide the huge issues at
stake here, which in the best case could redefine India's
strategic orientation and international partners. The
Ambassador has conducted daily PD briefings -- today with
editors, columnists, and foreign correspondents -- to ensure
that our positive story is being covered. Positive editorial
comment continues. We will be reporting extensively on the
political, military, economic, and public diplomacy
dimensions of this process as it unfolds in the weeks and
months ahead. End Summary.

PM: Premature to Comment
--------------


3. (U) Following his March 25 expression of "great
disappointment" at the prospect of sale of F-16s to Pakistan,
the PM parried the issue on March 28, saying it was
"premature to comment." He said he did not know the terms
and conditions of the offer, or what India would be getting,
but advised that the issue would be discussed with Washington.

Mukherjee: Ill-timed
--------------


4. (U) Expanding on March 26 remarks, Defense Minister
Pranab Mukherjee called the US F-16 decision "inappropriate
and ill-timed" given that India and Pakistan were involved in
a Composite Dialogue (CD). Speaking in Calcutta, a bastion
of communist strength, he argued that the aircraft were not
used for fighting terrorism, but for waging full-fledged war,
and asserted that a sale would have an adverse impact on the
CD and on Indo-Pak relations, and "might jeopardize"
confidence building measures.

Congress and Natwar: Let Defense Decide
--------------


5. (U) Congress spokesman Anand Sharma made the first public
statement for his party on March 28, calling the announcement
"unfortunate and disappointing," and suggesting that the US
was violating its own policy and global norms and undermining
international law and US law. Calling the offer "worrying,"
and highlighting Pakistan's record as a proliferator, he
hoped that the US Congress would take this into account.
Asked whether the UPA government should accept the offer of
F-16s and F-18s, Sharma took a pass, saying that Congress
wanted to improve Indo-US relations, but that it was "for the
government to decide." On March 28, Foreign Minister Natwar
Singh parried a question on F-16s, commenting, "The Defense
Ministry has to decide. Ask them."
BJP: Strange
--------------


6. (U) On March 29, former Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh
termed the offer of F-16s to Pakistan "strange." Observing
that New Delhi was not begging for arms, he argued that India
has emerged as a power to be reckoned with on its own
strength, and not because of any patron or sponsor. He
slammed the UPA government's handling of the issue, because
the PM and Mukherjee were speaking in discordant voices.
Jaswant found "no logic" in the position that the US was
offering weapons to India and Pakistan because of an
improvement in relations between them.

Communists Howling
--------------


7. (U) The CPM Politburo warned the government on March 28
to reject the aircraft offer outright. Washington was trying
to draw India into a strategic military relationship, and was
fueling an arms race in South Asia for the benefit of the US
arms industry. Questioning the reliability of the US as a
supplier, the CPM insisted that India pursue an independent
foreign policy and forge closer relations with other
countries, including China.


8. (C) The F-16s and the larger issue of closer relations
with Washington are expected to come up at three important
conferences/congresses of Left parties which support the UPA
coalition from the outside in the next several weeks. The
most important will be the CPM National Congress April 6-11
in New Delhi. The pro-Moscow CPI congress will take place in
Chandigarh March 29-April 3, followed by another conference
by the Forward Bloc April 4-5 in New Delhi.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) It is unfortunate that Mukherjee and governing party
politicians in recent days have focused on the F-16s to
Pakistan issue rather than on the larger Initiative, but a
more considered opinion may emerge from a CCS meeting
scheduled for late on March 29. These public remarks are of
course merely the early salvos in what is likely to be a long
period of debate and decision making. They are useful,
however, in providing early context and for framing the
issue, but the domestic political process will be much more
important in deciding the huge issues at stake here, which in
the best case could redefine India's strategic orientation
and international partners.


10. (C) The Ambassador has conducted daily PD briefings --
today with editors, columnists, and foreign correspondents --
to ensure that our positive story is being covered.
Editorial opinion in the major national dailies continues to
be largely positive, with the "Indian Express" arguing on
March 28 that the Indian political class risked missing the
main point -- the rare US offer to help make India a world
power -- and that New Delhi should consider the offer
seriously "to test American intentions," concluding that "if
the GOI were to scoff at this idea, it would indicate myopia
of a very high order." Mission will be reporting extensively
on the political, military, economic, and public diplomacy
dimensions of this process as it unfolds in the weeks and
months ahead.
MULFORD