Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI2185
2005-03-22 12:22:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

MEA DEFENDS RECORD ON BURMA AHEAD OF FM SINGH TRIP

Tags:  PREL PHUM ENRG PTER IN BM BD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002185 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM ENRG PTER IN BM BD
SUBJECT: MEA DEFENDS RECORD ON BURMA AHEAD OF FM SINGH TRIP

REF: A. STATE 42847

B. 03 NEW DELHI 6983

C. NEW DELHI 1426

Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 002185

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2015
TAGS: PREL PHUM ENRG PTER IN BM BD
SUBJECT: MEA DEFENDS RECORD ON BURMA AHEAD OF FM SINGH TRIP

REF: A. STATE 42847

B. 03 NEW DELHI 6983

C. NEW DELHI 1426

Classified By: PolCouns Geoffrey Pyatt, for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Joint Secretary (SE Asia I) Mitra Vashishta
defended India's policies in Burma in a March 17 meeting with
PolCouns and Poloff, suggesting that progress on democratic
reforms was dependent on engagement with the Burmese body
politic, and warning that the USG focus on Aung San Suu Kyi
(ASSK) could backfire. Foreign Minister Natwar Singh leaves
for a four-day visit to Burma on March 24, but MEA contacts
tell us not to expect significant new developments, despite
press reports speculating about the reopening of the
"Stilwell Road." Vashishta did not believe Bangladesh would
cooperate on a potential gas pipeline from Burma to India,
suggesting that the project will remain hypothetical. End
Summary.

GOI and USG Policies
--------------


2. (C) In a wide-ranging discussion with PolCouns and Poloff
about GOI and USG policies toward Burma, outgoing Joint
Secretary Vashishta defended Indian engagement with and plans

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for Burma. Pressed on the apparent contradiction between
India's new doctrine of active support for democracy in the
region (Ref C) and its policy toward Rangoon, the Joint
Secretary averred that more time was needed for GOI policies

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to bear fruit. Drawing a parallel to the current Indian
pressure on Nepal, she suggested that the GOI was waiting for
a time when its influence across Burmese society would
increase to the point where the regime would listen to Indian
demands for democracy.


3. (C) Responding to the USG push for a resolution on Burma
in the Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) (Ref A),Vashishta
doubted the effectiveness of any such action. There was not
enough international involvement in Burma for outside
pressure to have an effect, she argued, adding that the US
and European policy of isolation will not work because
China's support allows Burma to get away with ignoring
international pressure.


4. (C) The Joint Secretary warned that the US and European

preoccupation with imprisoned leader ASSK could be
counterproductive. While ASSK's status was important, it was
not the only issue. Pondering the "cost of getting her out,"
she cautioned that international pressure focused only on
freedom for ASSK might let the junta "get away with more" in
return for freeing the detained democracy activist.
Vashishta repeated the GOI's view that ASSK is less relevant
to democracy promotion than increased engagement with the
society (Ref B).

No Blank Check
--------------


5. (C) Vashishta acknowledged that India's current policy
could be construed as giving a blank check to the junta, but
replied that the GOI was following the best policy for
dealing with Than Shwe. She acknowledged that the GOI needed
to do a much better job of describing publicly its support
for democratic forces in Burma, in order to refute
perceptions of a morally vacant approach. The regime would
not respond to isolation or sanctions, she argued, because
that would cause it to lose face. While India was trying to
engage Burma to gain influence with the junta, US policy had
nothing positive to offer the regime. She added that India's
previous USG-approved disdain for the regime in Rangoon had
let China gain influence in Burma at India's expense.

Foreign Minister to Visit Rangoon
--------------


6. (C) Foreign Minister Singh will visit Rangoon March
24-27, another stop on his tour of India's neighbors in his
first year in office. MEA Undersecretary (South-East Asia)
Pooja Kapoor told Poloff that the FM is expected to meet with
Than as well as the Burmese Prime Minister and Foreign
Minister, where he will raise India's concern for democracy,
political reforms, and treatment of the political opposition.
Although noted strategic commentator C Raja Mohan has
speculated that the GOI is discussing reopening the "Stilwell
Road" linking India, China and Burma, Kapoor stated that no
new announcements would come out of the meetings.


7. (C) While democracy may be on the agenda, the GOI is more
concerned with insurgent groups operating across the border
between Burma and Manipur state in India, MG (ret) Ashok
Mehta, a noted Burma expert, told Poloff. Mehta suggested
that Natwar's priorities will be encouraging Burmese military
action against insurgents, and reiterating GOI proposals made
during Than's October 2004 New Delhi visit for defense
cooperation and equipment sales. Although India has not
conducted joint military operations with Burma, Mehta
asserted that two Indian Army brigades are currently
operating against insurgents in Manipur on the Burmese
border, a line we have also heard from other security
contacts.

Gas Pipeline Unlikely
--------------


8. (C) Vashishta predicted that the proposal for a gas
pipeline from Burma to India via Bangladesh would collapse
because of obstacles placed by Dhaka, lamenting the
"obstructionist" attitude and internal disputes between
Bangladeshi leaders. There was no will among the politicians
in Bangladesh to make it work, she complained, and Burma and
India had no influence over them.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) The Foreign Minister's visit to Rangoon is a routine
stop on his calendar, but is incongruous coming during the
meeting of the UNCHR and following Foreign Secretary Saran's
February 14 speech in which he stated that India would always
stand with democratic elements in neighboring countries (Ref
C). The GOI shows no signs of fading in its belief that
further engagement across the society, rather than isolation,
is the best way to induce democratic reform in Burma.
Conveniently, GOI engagement with the junta also furthers
India's own strategic interests in cracking down on
insurgents in Manipur, exploring new options for energy
supplies, and countering the rise of Chinese influence in
India's periphery.
MULFORD