Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI1938
2005-03-14 08:29:00
SECRET
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

INDIA WANTS HIGH FIDELITY MISSILE DEFENSE EXERCISES

Tags:  KOMC MARR PGOV PREL TNGD IN NSSP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 001938 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2015
TAGS: KOMC MARR PGOV PREL TNGD IN NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIA WANTS HIGH FIDELITY MISSILE DEFENSE EXERCISES

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.5 (B, D)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 001938

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/13/2015
TAGS: KOMC MARR PGOV PREL TNGD IN NSSP
SUBJECT: INDIA WANTS HIGH FIDELITY MISSILE DEFENSE EXERCISES

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.5 (B, D)


1. (S) Summary: In her remarks at the initial working group
meeting of the US-India Missile Defense (MD) Workshop in
Hyderabad on March 3-4, MEA Additional Secretary for
International Security Meera Shankar affirmed New Delhi's
desire for a cooperative MD technology relationship with the
US over the long term, and said that the GOI would like to
formulate its overall strategic MD objectives in cooperation
with the USG. The subject of "Framework MOU,s" for
facilitating missile defense cooperation, similar to what the
US has with a select group of other countries, was raised by
the Indian side. On the planned Workshop exercises, the
Indian delegation hoped for a very high-fidelity simulation
of actual threats and missile defenses that would generate
hard data for use in MD strategic and acquisition planning.
The Indian delegation presented a classified briefing
reflecting their perception of the ballistic missile threat
to India, and a separate briefing characterized as the GOI
"wish list" for US-India Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)
modeling and simulation exercises. After it became clear
that GOI desires were beyond the scope of the MDA's
International Modeling and Simulation (IMS) tool, the US
delegation re-focused the Indian delegation on the original
proposal for a realistic, but lower fidelity, plan to
exercise decision-making at the policy and operational levels
during a simulated missile attack. The GOI agreed, but asked
for much higher fidelity modeling and simulation exercises in
the future. A framework for upcoming Planning and Command
Post Exercises (PLANEX/CPX) was agreed upon, and options for
the GOI to pursue high-fidelity MD exercises with the USG
were discussed. Noticeably lacking from the discussions were
explicit references to indigenous MD production, categories
of assets India might like to defend against missile attack,
or co-production of BMDS hardware with the US. Hosted at one
of India's most sensitive missile research facilities, this

exchange reflected the deepening level of candor in the
US-India MD relationship. End Summary.


2. (S) While welcoming the US delegation, Dr. V.K. Saraswat
of the Defense Research and Development Organization's
Research Centre Imarat (DRDO/RCI) discussed the common
missile threats facing both India and the US, and the mutual
benefits of working together on them. He hoped that the
US-India MD Workshop would lead to a formulation to mitigate
such threats. In her opening remarks, A/S Shankar added
several key points, including:

- Both countries have the political commitment to advance
missile defense cooperation and strengthen US-Indian ties;

- Both sides emphasize MD as a stabilizing tool to support
the global security environment;

- India was among the first countries to recognize and
support US missile defense proposals;

- The GOI welcomes the US offer to make the Patriot Advanced
Capability-2 (PAC-2) MD system available as part of NSSP
(Next Steps in Strategic Partnership) Phase 1;

- India hopes for close cooperation with the US on missile
defense technology over a long time horizon;

- Missile defense can help India maintain a credible "No
First Use" nuclear posture;

- By itself, the international nuclear non-proliferation
regime cannot stem proliferators, which "tend to collect in
our neighborhood"; and,

- India is in an "arc of proliferators," and MD might help
stabilize the situation and neutralize those using "nuclear
blackmail."


3. (SBU) Phil Jamison, OSD Office of Missile Defense Policy,
noted the February 22 PAC-2 briefing in New Delhi at which US
missile defense policy, including cooperation with allies and
friends, had been discussed extensively. He tied those
discussions to the meeting in Hyderabad, suggesting that both
sides might be able to look back and view these two weeks as
the beginning of what could be a long-term missile defense
relationship. A/S Shankar agreed.

US Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) Update
-------------- --------------


4. (SBU) Robert Ciarrocchi, Chief of MDA/ISA's Asia and
Middle East Division, presented a status update on the US
BMDS. He emphasized Presidential guidance to deploy
available missile defenses while working on future systems,
and to cooperate with existing allies and new friends.
Ciarrocchi explained MDA efforts to carry out that guidance,
including a spiral development program that is moving from
lower-tier missile defenses to overarching systems that
integrate sensors, communication links, and interceptors for
combating ballistic threats in boost, mid-course, and
penetration phases. He also underscored expanding MD
cooperation with allies and friends worldwide.


5. (C) Questions from the Indian delegation on Ciarrocchi's
brief included:

- What types of MD memoranda of understanding does the US
have with its partners?

- Are MD systems specifications based on the needs of friends
and allies, or just on US needs?

- How important is interoperability with allies in US BMDS
design?

- Does the US intend to have global missile launch and
tracking sensors with regionalized interceptor batteries?

- What is the status of SBIRS (Space Based Infrared Radar
System)?

- Are kinetic energy interceptors and spaced based missile
defenses integrated or separate programs?

- What does the US mean by "near-peer" ballistic missile
threat?

PLANEX/CPX Dialogue
--------------


6. (S) Scott Barham, an SRS Technologies contractor for the
MDA's Joint National Integration Center (JNIC),next opened a
dialogue on the background, assumptions, scope, and agenda
for the MD Workshop. During those discussions, a large gap
between GOI desires and what JNIC was prepared to deliver
quickly became obvious. MDA plans suggested a PLANEX and CPX
using the JNIC's generic International Modeling and
Simulation (IMS) software to provide ballistic missile attack
planning and execution experience for policy-makers and air
defense commanders. While also anticipating a PLANEX and
CPX, India hoped for very high-fidelity modeling and
simulation that incorporated parameters of actual threats,
including MD countermeasures, and parameters of
actual/planned defense options against a variety of ballistic
attack scenarios. In short, the GOI wanted hard data for
developing BMDS strategy and making acquisition decisions.


7. (S) Barham explained that IMS can approximate threat and
BMDS parameters well enough to aid in concept of operations
development and to refine MD tactics, techniques and
procedures, but that it was not an appropriate tool to
generate data for acquisition decisions. The Indians were
concerned that the proposed exercises were not much of a step
up from modeling and simulation demonstrations previously
presented, but the US delegation assured them that the
proposed PLANEX and CPX were fully interactive with outcomes
that vary based on the decisions of the participants.


8. (S) Jamison recommended that India initially focus on a
realistic, but lower fidelity, plan to exercise
decision-making at the policy and operational levels during a
missile attack. Specifically, he recommended an initial
exercise scenario set in the 2008 time-frame. He emphasized
the importance of having a cross-section of relevant
government policy-making organizations participate -- i.e.,
MOD and the PM,s security staff as well as MEA. After
further discussion, the Indian side agreed to the following
vision for the PLANEX/CPX:

- Detection ability and intercept parameters as close as
possible to BMDS planned for the 2008 time-frame;

- A two-part exercise with one iteration using stand-alone
missile defenses and a second incorporating early warning
sensors and upper-tier BMDS;

- Survivability of BMDS assets as part of the model;

- Simulation of geography and terrain that is relevant to
India;

- Demonstration of differences in missile threats "by way of
timeline";

- An exercise scope that includes land and sea-based
(submarine launched) multi-directional ballistic attacks (no
winged aircraft or cruise missiles) including missile
launches from short, medium, and long distances; and

- Policy involvement at an appropriate level.


9. (C) Additional dialogue centered around how JNIC could
incorporate as many of the GOI desires as possible into the
PLANEX/CPX using existing IMS software.


10. (C) PolOff suggested that, in light of the gap between
Indian desires for higher fidelity modeling and simulation
and what the MDA was currently able to offer, the GOI could
define their requirements and transmit a separate letter of
request to the USG while continuing with the current effort.
Jamison also suggested that both sides look for another forum
to discuss missile defense policy-program issues, such as
some type of US-India missile defense working group on the
margins of other political-military technical discussions.


GOI Ballistic Missile Threat Perception
--------------


11. (S) A.S. Sarma, DRDO/RCI Air Defense Project Director,
gave a classified briefing on the GOI's perception of the
Ballistic Missile Threat to India. The Indian delegation
asked that information contained in the brief not be given
wide dissemination within the USG, but controlled on a
need-to-know basis. The brief included threat rings from
existing ballistic threats in the region, as well as those
under development. The main thrust was that the ballistic
threat to India was not from a single sector, but, in a
worst-case scenario, could include coordinated, simultaneous
attacks from 360 degrees with multiple objects. (Note: A
hard copy of the briefing was not made available to the US
delegation. End Note.)

GOI Proposals for Future Modeling & Simulation Cooperation
-------------- --------------


12. (S) As part of the classified brief, the Indian
delegation offered to make DRDO experts available, at some
unspecified point in the future, for a collaborative effort
with the US to develop advanced BMDS modeling and simulation
software. Speaking in the context of MD modeling and
simulation, Sarma listed available Indian expertise as: 1)
System Analysis, 2) Modeling and Simulation, 3) Planning and
Control, and 4) Software Development. His bottom line: if
the US wants India to do (future) hardware and software
development, that could be used with "others," India wants to
do it.


13. (C) N. Prabhakar, a DRDO/RCI Project Director, also
presented a "BMD Simulation For Planning" briefing that he
characterized as a GOI "wish list" for cooperative BMD
exercises. GOI areas of interest, from his briefing slides,
include:

- Threat Perception and Analysis;

- Effectiveness and Cost Economics;

- Design Considerations;

- Macro/Micro Planning; and

- Simulation Scenarios

Under Simulation Scenarios, Prabhakar listed additional
sub-points as follows:

- Define the Parameters:
-- Ballistic Missile Threats
-- MD Countermeasures
-- BMDS

- Interception Policy:
-- Effects of Change in the Threat Pattern
-- Adaptability/Growth Potential
-- Cost of Defense
-- Time Imperatives
-- Kill Assessment

- Structure Definitions:
-- Impact of Lay-out Factors
-- Time-line Considerations
-- Hit to Kill/Near Miss
-- Warhead Kill Mechanisms
-- Multi-Sensors
-- Postulated Countermeasures

- Optimized Defense Layout
-- Leakage Probabilities
-- Defended Assets List
-- Sensor Capabilities
-- Launch Platforms
-- Sensor Platforms
-- Interceptor Capabilities
-- Communication Requirements
-- Command and Control Strategies and Alternatives
-- Integrated Logistics Management
-- Trade-Offs

- Nominal Performance
-- Worst Case Performance
-- Parametric Sensitivity
-- Monte Carlo (random "roll of the dice" scenarios)
-- Break Point Analysis

PLANEX/CPX Road Map
--------------


14. (C) The working group reached broad agreement on the way
ahead for a PLANEX as follows.

- 2005 Agenda:
-- May: Demonstration and technical explanation, by JNIC,
of the IMS tool (in India);
-- August: Working Group meeting and Initial Planning
Conference for the PLANEX (in India);
-- December: PLANEX (in India).

- Participation:
-- India: Representatives from the MOD, MEA, DRDO, NSCS,
and the military services;
-- US: Representatives from OSD/P, MDA/IS, MDA/IC, State,
and observers from PACOM.

- Primary Points of Contact:
-- India: Ms. Nutan Kapoor, MEA/DISA
-- US: Mr. Robert Ciarrocchi, MDA/ISA

- Purpose: Facilitated and iterative exercises to examine
basic concepts of BMD planning and operations.

- Objectives:
-- Demonstrate impact of very short response times;
-- Demonstrate relevant short, medium, and long-range
ballistic threats from multiple directions;
-- Demonstrate basic MD planning skills, BMDS design, and
allocation of defensive resources;
-- Provide a representation of key policy and operational
challenges associated with BMD planning and execution.

- Basic Event Configuration:
-- A relevant scenario, for India, using notional
geography;
-- A relevant baseline threat depiction
-- Workstation configuration that incorporates both
policy and operational considerations;
-- A first iteration relying on stand-alone BMDS; and
-- A second iteration demonstrating the added value of
additional threat sensors and upper-tier BMDS.


15. (C) The Indian delegation preferred not to set a time
for the CPX Final Planning Conference or the CPX itself until
after the PLANEX in December. Details on the exact number
and types of Indian participants and the IMS workstations
needed to support them will be finalized at the August
meeting.

MEA Closing Remarks
--------------


16. (C) In her closing statement, A/S Shankar referred to
the "wish list" briefing, and affirmed her hope that US-India
MD cooperation would go well beyond the proposed PLANEX and
CPX. She claimed India may be interested in other BMD
systems besides PAC-2, to include PAC-3, MEADS, and perhaps
upper tier systems such as THAAD. Shankar also stated that
the GOI would like to build its overall strategic missile
defense objectives in cooperation with the USG.

Comment
--------------


17. (S) While not stated explicitly, the GOI appears to
desire extensive US-India cooperation on BMDS, along the
lines of what is developing between the US and Japan.
Questions on MOUs, next generation BMDS, and availability of
sensor and tracking data to US friends and allies all point
in that direction, as do stated desires to cooperate on MD
technology and formulate overall MD strategic objectives in
coordination with the US. Moreover, the Indian delegation
gave the impression of being willing to devote enough
resources to missile defense to become a significant player.
Indian strategic thinking on missile defense is in its
infancy, but, as related in a conversation on the margins
between PolOff and Dr. Saraswat, DRDO/RCI is on the cutting
edge of strategic and acquisition planning with its technical
focus on making hard data available to policy-makers.


18. (C) Noticeably lacking from the working group
discussions were any significant GOI references to indigenous
BMDS production, or reference to specific categories of
targets they might like to defend against ballistic missile
attack. During the meetings they made no specific mention of
co-production of BMDS hardware or other offsets that could be
part of future MD collaboration, although in private
conversation with Jamison, Saraswat hinted that such
cooperation might be a desirable longer-term goal.

Workshop Participants
--------------


19. (SBU) Participants in the MD Workshop meetings included:

Indian Delegation:
- Dr. V.K. Saraswat, Director, DRDO/RCI
- Meera Shankar, MEA Additional Secretary (Intl. Security)
- Nutan Kapoor Mahavar, MEA Under Secretary (DISA)
- Santosh Jha, MEA Deputy Secretary (Americas)
- N. Prabhakar, DRDO/RCI Project Director
- A.S. Sarma, DRDO/RCI Project Director (Air Defense)
- Surendra Kumar, DRDO/RCI Project Dir. (Missile Defense)
- N.V. Kadam, DRDO/RCI Emeritus Scientist (Mobile Systems)
- S. Jaya, DRDO/RCI Project Director (Communications)
- A.M. Tapas, DRDO/RCI Dep. Proj. Dir. (Regional Analysis)
- Debasis Dutta, DRDO
- Siva Kumar, DRDO/RCI (Microwave Sensors)
- Col. R. Bhutani, Operational Director
- Gp. Capt. S.K. Midha, Director of Air Defense
- Air Cmde. P. Singh, Integrated Defense Staff
- A.K. Chattergee, DRDO Director of Intl. Cooperation
- K.V.S.S. Prasad Rao, DRDO Chief Controller, R&D (Tech.)

US Delegation:
- Robert Ciarrocchi, MDA/ISA Chief, Asia & Middle East Div.
- Phil Jamison, OSD/ISP Asst. for Missile Defense Policy
- Scott Barham, MDA/JNIC Contractor (SRS Technologies)
- Maj. Rick Bairett, US Embassy New Delhi Pol-Mil Officer


20. (U) This message has been cleared by Robert Ciarrocchi
MDA/ISA, and Phil Jamison, OSD/ISP.
MULFORD