INDIA'S COMMUNISTS - CONTENT TO SUPPORT THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 NEW DELHI 001854

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV ELAB PREL PINR IN
SUBJECT: INDIA'S COMMUNISTS - CONTENT TO SUPPORT THE
GOVERNMENT FOR NOW - BUT NOT OVER THE LONG-TERM

REF: A. NEW DELHI 1710

B. NEW DELHI 1519

C. NEW DELHI 1274

D. CALCUTTA 97

E. CALCUTTA 68

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: The strong performance of the BJP following
recent State Assembly elections has convinced India's
mainstream Communists to downplay their differences with the
ruling United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and cooperate for
the time being to meet the "rightist" threat. The Communists
view Congress as "enemy number two," however, and their
long-term strategy is to form a "third front" government that
excludes Congress. As long as the Left Front (LF) parties
remain with the UPA they will scale down their economic
demands to "welfare capitalism" based on poverty alleviation
and social programs. Over the long term, however, the LF
would like to destroy the Naxalite and Maoist parties and
absorb their followers into a "united front" committed to
parliamentary democracy and opposed to "neo-liberal"
development policies propounded by the US, World Bank and
IMF. India's Communist parties are committed, cadre-based,
and have never been stronger in Parliament, in the states
they rule, and in popularity. Long confined to West Bengal,
Kerala, and Tripura, they could begin to "break out" in the
years ahead, and expand into other states such as Bihar, and
Jharkhand, where they could provide an alternative to corrupt
caste-based parties. Indian Communists increasingly see the
electoral success of Communist/Socialist parties in Latin
America as the trend for the future, rather than the violent
Naxalites. End Summary.

The Left in a Nutshell
--------------


2. (U) The Indian Communist movement spans an ideological
spectrum from the far-left Naxalites to the relatively
moderate Communist Party of India (CPI). The Naxalites are a
group of disparate Maoist parties which advocate violent
revolution (Ref C). The largest Naxalite party is the
Communist Party of India (Maoist). Slightly to their right
is a group of small Maoist parties which advocate the same
radical goals but have eschewed violence in favor of
parliamentary democracy. One of these, the Communist Party
of India (Marxist-Leninist) won seven seats in Bihar's recent
Assembly Election. The Communist Party of India (Marxist) or
CPI(M) is India's largest and most powerful Communist group.
It advocated a pro-China policy during the Sino-Soviet split,
but now rejects the Chinese model. Having ruled West Bengal
for 17 years, it has revised its Marxist tenets and become
more pragmatic. The CPI, founded in 1925, is India's first
Communist Party and all other Communist groups trace their
origin to it. Slavishly devoted to the Soviet Union, the CPI
has lost considerable power and popularity to the CPI(M)
since the end of the Cold War. In February, the CPI(M)
rebuffed a CPI merger proposal.


3. (U) The CPI and CPI(M) and two non-Communist parties, the
Forward Bloc (FB) and the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP)
constitute the Left Front (LF),which supports the United
Progressive Alliance (UPA) government from outside. Although
largely confined to their "red forts" of West Bengal, Kerala,
and Tripura, these four parties had their best electoral
performance ever in the 2004 Parliamentary Elections. The LF
currently has 59 MPs, (CPI(M) 43, CPI 10, FB 3, RSP 3). The
LF relies on several prominent spokesmen in New Delhi to
articulate its positions and handle day to day negotiations
with the UPA. These include: CPM(M) General Secretary
Harkishen Singh Surjeet, CPI(M) Politburo members Prakash
Karat and Sitaram Yechuri, CPI Secretariat Member D. Raja,
and CPI General Secretary A.B. Bardhan.

Basic Ideology
--------------


4. (U) Like Communist Parties worldwide, the Indian
Communist Parties engage in constant ideological wrangling,
but agree on some basic points.
--There is no role for violence; Communist parties should
participate in parliamentary democracy.

--The Naxalites are "adventurists," who should renounce
violence and rejoin the fold of mainstream Communist parties.


--Globalization is for the present inevitable and cannot be
avoided or stopped, and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is
essential for India's economic development, but should be
restricted and closely monitored.

--Government intervention in the economy is necessary to
prevent exploitation of the poor, carry out redistribution of
resources, and achieve a measure of poverty alleviation.

--Countries like India should maintain a mixed economy with a
vibrant "profit-making" public sector.

--Asset redistribution should be achieved through taxation of
the wealthy and government-sponsored social welfare programs
for the poor, especially in rural areas.

--The United States, and multilateral financial institutions
such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund cannot
dictate India's economic and foreign policies.

--India should renounce nuclear weapons, reduce military
spending, accept no military alliances, especially with the
US, and normalize relations with Pakistan.

--While India's Communists should maintain cordial relations
with other Communist Parties, none should serve as a model
for India, which will have to devise a country specific
socialist system that reflects its own cultural values.

Relations with Congress
--------------


5. (U) Of the four parties in the LF, only the CPI has had
cordial relations with Congress. After the 2004 elections,
the CPI wanted the LF to join the government, but was
rebuffed by its three partners and acquiesced in the
interests of "Left Unity." Within the CPI(M) several senior
leaders, including Jyoti Basu, were also in favor of joining
the UPA. After being overruled in internal party conclaves,
Basu and other leaders went along with the majority view as
required by "party discipline." Congen Calcutta reports that
the LF has repeatedly stated that as a "bourgeois party,"
Congress does not share the Communists' ideology and values.
The LF's long-term goal is to establish a "third front" of
secular, socialist parties, that does not include Congress.
However, the LF claims to support the UPA to prevent
"communalist forces" (the BJP) from returning to power, and
to ensure that India's economic policies address the needs of
the poor. As a condition for its support of the UPA, the LF
insisted on a "Common Minimum Program" (CMP),which is aimed
at providing "development with a human face," the political
slogan of the UPA government.


6. (U) Since the UPA has been in power, the LF has
repeatedly accused Congress of failing to implement the CMP
and not properly consulting with the LF. Although the LF has
a coordination committee which meets regularly with the
Congress leadership, it accuses Congress of making important
economic decisions without consultation. Since the UPA has
been in power the LF and Congress have clashed over a number
of issues including:

--privatization of the pension fund for government employees:

--allowing 74 per cent FDI in private sector banks;

--FDI liberalization in civil aviation;
--removal of subsidies on fuel;
--enhanced military ties between India and the US and India
and Israel; and

--allowing 74 per cent FDI in the telecom sector.


7. (U) When the UPA was formed in May 2004, the LF committed
to support the GOI "from the outside," noting that while it
would criticize individual policies, it would not bring down
the government. Despite this commitment, there have been
several instances when it appeared that the tension between
the LF and Congress had reached the boiling point, with
Communist leaders stating that they had reached the end of
their patience and were putting the UPA on notice that it
should not take LF support for granted. Many LF party
conferences are scheduled for this spring as follows:

--The Revolutionary Socialist Party National Conference,
February 17-20;

--The Communist Party of India National Conference - March
29-April 3;

--The Forward Bloc International Conference - April 4-5; and

--The Communist Party of India (Marxist) Conference - April
6-12.

Party spokesmen have reiterated that they would address the
LF/UPA relationship at the conferences and discuss other
options, to include withdrawing support from the UPA and the
formation of a "third front."

One Tune Before the Elections
--------------


8. (C) The state Assembly Elections (Refs A and B) and the
announcement of the budget in Parliament have played a key
role in the evolution of LF attitudes towards Congress and
the UPA. Poloff met with Communist leaders before and after
these events and noticed a distinct change in their political
line. The pre-election views were fiery and anti-Congress,
while post-election statements were decidedly less so.


9. (C) In a February 17 meeting with Poloff, G. Devarajan,
the Secretary of the All-India Forward Bloc (FB) maintained
that his party's rank-and-file were unhappy with the UPA
government and would press for a shift to the left.
Devarajan predicted that "bad days are ahead," as the tension
between the Left and Congress could grow unmanageable,
opening up the possibility of a "third front." He confirmed
that since a third front government is the ultimate goal of
the LF, a split with the UPA was inevitable, and the only
issue is of timing. Devarajan maintained that the LF would
not "take the initiative" until the BJP is sufficiently
weakened as to no longer pose a threat. The breaking point
could be the 2006 elections in West Bengal or even before.
He confirmed that the Common Minimum Program (CMP) was the
"bare minimum" for Left support of the UPA. Reluctant to
accept the presence in India of non-unionized American retail
chains, Devarajan confirmed that the LF would confer with
Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) representatives at their
conferences, regarding whether chains such as Walmart would
be acceptable.


10. (C) Devarajan argued that Congress won "only" 142 seats
in the 2004 election, far less than the Congress high point
of 1984, when it won 415 seats in a house of 545. In
Devarajan's view, this electoral performance was not a
mandate for Congress and its "Neo-liberal" policies. Rather,
the people of India voted for Congress as the best way to get
the communal BJP out of power. Devarajan maintained that
what Indians really want is a shift in focus from the urban
middle class to the rural masses, and the UPA must provide
for the common people or face their wrath at the ballot box.
Devarajan conceded that while the LF is opposed to much of
neo-liberalism, it has only one MP from the entire Hindi
belt, is confined to its "red forts," and does not have the
power to stop it. According to Devarajan, the LF can work
with PM Manmohan Singh, but is not happy with FinMin
Chidambaram, and is pressing for his replacement in the next
Cabinet reshuffle.


11. (C) Abani Roy, the Secretary of the Revolutionary
Socialist Party (RSP),echoed Devarajan in a February 24
meeting with Poloff. Emphasizing that the LF is "finding it
difficult to support this government," even for the sake of
Left unity, but did not think that a good opportunity to
break with the UPA would emerge until the 2006 elections in
West Bengal, where the LF would campaign against Congress.
Roy argued that India needed a "third front," that would
accurately reflect political opinion and would be good for
India, providing the poor with their own voice in the
democratic system. Roy dismissed any possibility that
"non-Left regional parties" such as the Samajwadi Party (SP)
of UP and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) of Bihar would be
asked to join the third front, as "we are only interested in
anti-Capitalist forces." According to Roy, the LF is not
happy with the UPA, which is not doing enough to alleviate
India's pervasive poverty, and provide basic necessities to
the poorest of the poor. He argued that since India is an
undeveloped country, the GOI must play a strong role in the
economy. Roy complained that India's "bad government
machinery" soaked up money dedicated to poverty alleviation,
while the UPA was curtailed anti-poverty programs.

Another Tune Afterwards
--------------


12. (C) In a March 2 meeting with Poloff, CPI Secretary and
principal spokesman D. Raja made it clear that circumstances
had changed, and the LF was now more amenable to working with
Congress. Raja expressed some satisfaction with FinMin
Chidambaram's budget presentation to Parliament. While the
LF had presented the UPA with a demand for a 50,000 crore
rupee (USD 1.15 billion) social spending program, he seemed
pleased that 25,000 crore (USD 575 million) had been
allocated. He also noted that government subsidies on food,
petroleum and fertilizers would continue at the behest of the
LF. Raja was adamant that these social programs would never
be implemented were it not for the LF.


13. (C) Raja was also pleased with the tax revenue
initiatives contained in the budget, which he characterized
as "serious efforts to mobilize resources." He emphasized
that the LF believed that India should mobilize its own
resources to address poverty and not rely on FDI. For
example, he stated, corporate taxation of Indian industrial
houses should be increased rather than reduced. He praised
the budget provision imposing a 10 rupee (USD .30) tax on
withdrawals of rupees 10,000 (USD 230) or more.


14. (C) Characterizing those who supported neo-liberalism as
"little more than animals," who don't have a "basic community
spirit," Raja maintained that the LF would ensure that this
"failed system based on human greed," would not take root in
India. Raja maintained that the current UPA government was
just an intermediate step for the LF, which wanted to see a
third front government take power in India. According to
Raja, the UPA would never unify India's "secular democratic
parties," and the LF had gained stature from its marriage of
convenience with the UPA and felt encouraged.


15. (C) The LF was quick to distance itself from the
Congress power grab in Jharkhand and Goa (Refs A and B),with
the CPI(M) Politburo dismissing "the hasty manner" with which
the Jharkhand governor swore in the Shibu Soren government in
Jharkhand as "controversial." In private, however, Raja told
Poloff that the LF's first priority was to ensure that the
BJP "communalists" do not return to power. According to
Raja, the Communists have determined that the Congress
missteps have revived the BJP and its NDA alliance, which
would now take the offensive. Raja confirmed that the LF
would stand with Congress to prevent a BJP return to power
and put aside talk of a third front or open confrontation
with the UPA until the BJP threat is nullified.

Swing to the Left
--------------


16. (U) On January 22, Poloff attended a panel discussion
that provided some insight into what direction India's
Communist/Left parties are headed. The panel, on the
"anti-Imperialist Struggle of the Venezuelan People," was
sponsored by the Third World Studies Center, a Delhi group
that represents the left wings of India's Communist parties.
It included Prakash Karat, the CPI(M) ideologue, marked to
assume a leadership role in India's Communist movement in the
next several months. The panelists emphasized that the Left
has been too accommodating to Congress and should expand its
opposition to neo-liberalism beyond rhetoric to organizing.


17. (U) The panelists argued that if India's Communist
parties continue to placate Congress, over the long term it
will exacerbate India's rich/poor divide and encourage
Naxalites to greater violence, resulting in needless
bloodshed. They emphasized that mainstream Communists must
demonstrate to Naxalites that they are serious about
addressing the needs of India's poor. This was endorsed on
February 8, by the Karnataka State Committee of the CPI(M),
which urged Naxalites to forego violence in favor of peaceful
methods to combat social injustice and exploitation. G.C.
Bayyareddy, the Secretary of the Committee, said that the
best way to combat Naxalism was to distribute land to the
landless, give title deeds to tribals, provide fair
compensation to families affected by development projects,
and protect tribals' social and cultural rights.


18. (U) The panelists contended that rather than the
Nepalese Maoists, the Indian Left should adopt as a its model
the democratic, non-violent movement of President Hugo Chavez
of Venezuela, and other Left parties of Latin America which
are scoring electoral gains. They contended that the Left
should use some of the same tactics developed by Chavez and
other Latin American leaders to prevent the US, the IMF and
World Bank from "dominating India." Karat noted that the
Left Front pressured the UPA to extend an invitation to
Chavez to make a state visit to India in March and would
mobilize to give him a "warm welcome," and pressure the GOI
to defend Venezuela from "another US-orchestrated coup
attempt (Ref E)."

Comment
--------------


19. (C) India's Communists have modified their Marxist views
since taking power in West Bengal and other states. When
governing, they tend to take a pragmatic approach at the
regional level that is often belied by some of their rhetoric
at public events. As Communists, however, they take a
historic view of their role, with tactical and strategic
objectives and short-term and long-term strategies. Over the
short-term, the LF wants to keep the BJP out of power long
enough for the Sangh Parivar's political appeal to fade. If
this means that they must work with Congress, they are
willing to make the sacrifice. While supporting the UPA,
however, the LF wants to keep its distance from Congress
economic policies and maintain its credibility by stressing a
"welfare capitalism" approach based on poverty alleviation
and social programs.


20. (C) The Communists' willingness to cooperate with
Congress depends on large measure on how the Congress
leadership packages and presents economic reforms. We expect
the LF to support a greater role for the private sector in
the food processing, retailing, real estate, and
manufacturing sectors if the GOI provides benefits for
farmers and low-income consumers. The LF will also likely
tolerate partial privatization of public sector units if a
significant portion of the proceeds are used to fund social
programs, as Congress has promised. The Communists will
likely resist Congress' efforts to expand private investment
in banking and increase labor market flexibility.


21. (C) When the BJP challenge has been addressed and the
"rightist enemies" have faded away, the LF would turn its
attention to Congress, "the second enemy." Communist
ideologues argue that the BJP is a short-term threat, as
"communal politics" has no future in India. Increasingly,
they are coming to agree that "neo-liberal" development
policies propounded by Congress are a long-term threat that
poses a greater danger. To address that threat, the
mainstream Communists hope to destroy the Maoist and Naxalite
parties (Refs C and D),which they dismiss as violent
"adventurists," and convince their less radical followers to
join a common "anti-imperialist" front that will be united,
democratic, non-violent, and plugged into an international
network of friendly parties and governments.


22. (C) Media profiles of India, including those in the US,
have stressed that rapid economic growth is lifting many
boats, and downplayed popular opposition to economic
liberalization. However, the growing power, popularity and
political influence of the India's Communists indicate that
all will not be smooth sailing. The Indian Left envisions
that the "internal contradictions of neo-liberalism" will
soon become apparent in India, as they have in Latin America,
and the country will then be ready to accept a third front
government that does not include Congress. States like
Jharkhand and Bihar, where class divisions are acute and
growing, provide an opportunity for Communist expansion in
the coming years, and the Left's political power is likely to
increase along with its seats in Parliament.
MULFORD