FOREIGN SECRETARY SARAN PESSIMISTIC ON NEPAL'S KING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001482

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS PREF IN NP BT UK
SUBJECT: FOREIGN SECRETARY SARAN PESSIMISTIC ON NEPAL'S KING


Classified By: Acting DCM Geoffrey Pyatt. Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: King Gyanendra's actions are "exactly
opposite of what is required," Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam
Saran told visiting Ambassador to Nepal James Moriarty on
February 25. Ambassador Moriarty and Saran agreed on the
need for concerted pressure on the King from India, the US,
and the UK. Saran did not object to Ambassador Moriarty's
comment that although the US plans to withhold the delivery
of weapons until there is improvement in the political
situation, non-lethal aid and military training would likely
continue. Saran took a very tough line on the King,
expressing pessimism about Gyanendra's ability to make the
right moves, and agreed on the need for milestones that would
demonstrate that the King is moving in the right direction.
Saran also agreed to re-engage the government of Bhutan
regarding the ongoing effort to repatriate Bhutanese refugees
in camps in Nepal. End Summary.


2. (C) Stopping in New Delhi en route to Kathmandu following
consultations in Washington, Ambassador Moriarty, accompanied
by PolCouns and Poloff, called on Foreign Secretary Shyam
Saran to discuss Indian and US views on the re-establishment
of democracy in Nepal. Throughout the meeting, Saran
expressed great suspicion of King Gyanendra's motives and the
King's willingness to take steps that would lead to
restoration of democracy in Nepal. Saran stated that while
the King may "say the right things" in his statements, it was
clear from his actions (e.g., his appointment of convinced
monarchist Tulsi Giri as vice-chairman of the council of
ministers) that he does not believe in multi-party democracy.

Maoists and Military Aid
--------------


3. (C) Saran expressed his belief that the King seeks to
restore an absolute monarchy and does not understand how to
defeat the Maoist insurgency. He said that the US, India and
the King have a strong interest in preventing a Maoist
takeover in Nepal, but the King's actions undermine that
goal. If the King's actions ultimately led to stability and
a Maoist defeat, the setbacks to democracy might be palatable
to India, he opined. However, the February 1 dismissal of
the government was "exactly opposite of what is required."
Saran reiterated that the King had restrained the RNA from
taking the fight to the Maoists prior to February 1 and that
the dismissal of the government had not reversed that. In
fact, stated Saran, the King's actions had necessitated
further retrenchment of the RNA into the Kathmandu Valley,
abandoning the field to the Maoists elsewhere. (Note:
Embassy Kathmandu will coordinate with the Indian Embassy to
check on this allegation. End note.) Much of Nepal outside
the Valley was now "on autopilot," with no government
presence, he asserted.


4. (C) Saran referred to the suspension of military aid by
the UK and India as a much-needed "jolt" to bring the King
back on the right track. He admitted that suspension was the
only lever available, and hoped that the US and UK would be
supportive. He noted that the announced suspensions left a
gap in RNA supplies, but if the King felt there was even a
"hint" that the RNA could fill that gap from other sources,
then pressure would dissipate. Saran did not see a risk of
imminent military collapse. Ambassador Moriarty informed
Saran that the next anticipated US provision of lethal
assistance would be the expected May delivery of 3,000 M-16
rifles, adding that if the King does not take steps to
restore democracy by then, this consignment would be unlikely
to proceed. However, non-lethal military aid and training
(in particular JCETS training of the RNA Ranger units) are
scheduled for March and April, and would probably be provided
as planned. Ambassador Moriarty underlined that no final US
decision has been taken in this regard. Saran did not
respond to the news that US military training, like India's,
would probably continue.

Working with the King and the Parties
--------------


5. (C) In response to Ambassador Moriarty's presentation of
the steps that the King must take to show seriousness about
restoring democracy (release of political detainees;
restoration of most if not all of the constitutional
freedoms; reaching out to the political parties to
participate in the government),Saran agreed that the US and
India should press the King. However, the Foreign Secretary
remained convinced that the King's goal was to consolidate
his position as an absolute monarch. Saran noted that the
King's situation had become "very bad," with even the initial
popular support for his moves fading as production, food
supplies, and even government customs revenues have been
curtailed as a result of Maoist-initiated road closures.


6. (C) Saran agreed that the King realizes that his seizure
of power was not as easy as he had initially thought, and he
might respond to pressure. The Foreign Secretary noted signs
of "desperation" in the King's latest statements, and
speculated that this might, if true, allow India and the US
to work with him. He highlighted the importance of leaving a
way out for the King that would not humiliate him, adding
that India had been careful not to attack the King personally
for this reason.


7. (C) Ambassador Moriarty cautioned the GOI that creating a
"democracy movement in exile" from the second-tier party
activists who have moved to New Delhi could backfire: these
individuals had relatively little clout inside Nepal and any
assistance to them by the GOI would make most Nepalis suspect
their motives. Acknowledging that the MEA has been in
contact with these politicians, Saran stated that there was
little danger of allowing them too much influence, as it was
clear that the party leaders in Nepal would resume their
roles upon being released. He speculated that continued
shutting out the parties from political life would cause them
to give up on a compromise with the King and fall in with the
Maoists. He agreed on the necessity to maintain pressure on
the Maoists to force them to realize that they will not
achieve a Maoist state, and asserted that a united front of
the parties with the monarchy is essential to maintaining
that pressure.

Bhutanese Refugees
--------------


8. (C) Saran agreed that the signs of progress on
repatriation of Bhutanese refugees achieved during the
October 2004 visit of PRM A/S Dewey were frozen due to the
crisis in Nepal. He suggested that the GOI could speak to
the Bhutanese about their willingness to continue identifying
and repatriating the refugees. Saran worried that if the
Bhutanese heard about a concrete proposal to resettle
refugees abroad, the RGOB would refuse to take any back. He
felt it was most important to focus on repatriation of
Category 1 refugees to get momentum going.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) We were struck by Saran's deep pessimism about the
King's willingness to make good-faith efforts to restore
democracy, which may reflect a sense of betrayal by the
Palace. His exasperation may result to a considerable extent
from India's multiple unheeded warnings to the King not to
take this step. That said, when pressed, Saran was willing
to acknowledge that continued concerted efforts by the GOI
and USG might help convince the King to move in the right
direction.


10. (U) Notable also was the positive local media coverage
of Ambassador Moriarty's visit, which focused on the close
coordination between the USG and GOI, and Ambassador
Mulford's comments to the press that India had a leading role
in responding to the Nepal crisis.


11. (U) Ambassador Moriarty has cleared this message.
MULFORD