INDO-US SECURITY COOPERATION: THE WAY AHEAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001481

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2015
TAGS: KSTC MARR MASS PGOV PREL IN US
SUBJECT: INDO-US SECURITY COOPERATION: THE WAY AHEAD

Classified By: A/DCM Geoff Pyatt; Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: Meeting on 23 February, MEA Joint Secretary
(Americas) S. Jaishankar and DSCA Director for Middle East,
Asia and North Africa Ed Ross agreed that a large cooperative
defense program, such as a P-3 or C-130 sale, would build
trust and demonstrate US reliability as a defense supplier.
Jaishankar warned that the IAF cannot continue extending the
deadline for a US response on the multi-role fighter RFI
without appearing to give an unfair competitive advantage to
US contractors. He was favorably inclined to our proposals
to post a security cooperation liaison officer at the Indian
Embassy in Washington, and possibly a military liaison to
PACOM, as well as to enter into a bilateral dialogue on the
US Quadrennial Defense Review. Finally, Jaishankar
reiterated concerns about how US policy and Indian
perceptions are affecting progress on the NSSP. End Summary.


2. (C) Opening this February 23 discussion, Jaishankar
proposed a customer-oriented defense cooperation approach in
which India and the US look closely at India's problems and
requirements, and see where the US can provide the most
assistance. He made the following additional points in
relation to security cooperation:

- Both governments must attack the presumption that the USG
and GOI cannot do business together;
- The Tsunami relief effort demonstrated "operational
comfort" between the two countries;
- Raising the relationship to a new level will require both
governments to go into new areas;
- Not everything will work out, but some things will, so the
relationship is worth pursuing;
- There was a palpable keenness to do business at the recent
Aero-India international airshow; i.e. the US aerospace
industry wants to be in the Indian market;
- There is residual frustration over problems procuring US
parts for Sea King and Sea Harrier aircraft, resulting from
the 1998 sanctions;
- The Indian military is aware that, in spite of past
concerns about US "reliability," they should do a risk
evaluation and move forward; and
- From a policy standpoint, Jaishankar will recommend to the
MOD that the time to move forward is now.


3. (U) Ross agreed with Jaishankar's overall approach, and
asserted that a major US-India project will cause the pace of
the bilateral relationship to pick up substantially, and will
help both countries' bureaucracies to mesh. He also affirmed:

- There is no inherent incompatibility between USG and GOI
bureaucracies;
- Only time and effort will help the systems adjust to each
other; and
- DSCA is looking for an opportunity to collaborate on a very
specific program to build trust and demonstrate commitment.

Multi-role Fighter RFI
--------------


4. (C) To Jaishankar's query about a US response to the
Indian Air Force RFI for procurement of 126 multi-role
fighters, Ross replied that while he could not give a
specific date, the USG was treating the request very
seriously and needed "a little more time." Jaishankar
acknowledged his recent phone conversation with Peter Flory,
OSD PDASD (ISA),informing him that the Ross delegation would
not have a definitive response to the RFI, and would request
additional time. Jaishankar said MEA's recommendation to the
MOD was to be as flexible as possible in allowing more time
for the US response. However, he was clear that with answers
already received from other suppliers, the GOI could not
extend the RFI deadline much longer without appearing to give
an unfair competitive advantage to US contractors.

GOI Defense Cooperation Liaisons
--------------

5. (C) Ross recommended that the GOI post a security
cooperation liaison at the Indian Embassy in Washington to
interact with DSCA, the US military, and other USG agencies
involved in security cooperation (similar to a DoD Office of
Defense Cooperation). Explaining the advantages of having a
GOI officer in the US intimately familiar with FMS and export
licensing procedures, who can contact the right people to
answer questions from New Delhi, Ross suggested that the best
time to appoint such a person is before a major defense
cooperation project gets under way. Jaishankar expressed
interest, adding that he would work with the US Embassy on a
job description.


6. (C) In response to Jaishankar's question on whether other
countries have liaisons to US commands such as PACOM, USD
member Jim Alverson, OSD/ISA India desk officer, explained
that some countries do, and that PACOM had expressed interest
in a Liaison Officer from India. Jaishankar said he had
heard various people make a case for it, and thought India
should consider the idea.

Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Dialogue
--------------


7. (C) OSD/ISA's Alverson conveyed an OSD proposal for
dialogue with the GOI that would inform DoD's work on its
next QDR. He explained that DoD wanted to solicit ideas and
viewpoints from a very small number of allies and partners,
and wanted India included in this effort. Jaishankar called
the proposal a "splendid idea" that could not have come at a
better time.

MEA Concerns on the NSSP
--------------


8. (C) Jaishankar also went over previously expressed
concerns related to the NSSP process. The first involved
October 2004 USG sanctions against two Indian scientists in
"a very public way" with "very little proof," over alleged
technology transfers to Iran. Though he considered it an
"aberration" in US-GOI coordination, Jaishankar claimed this
incident embarrassed him personally. Specifically, he did
not understand why State Department officials could contact
him personally for a "favor" regarding an imminent IAEA
meeting on Iran, while hours later he had to find out about
sanctions from the Federal Register.


9. (C) While Jaishankar understood our concern about
WMD-related technology transfers to Iran, he stressed that if
US policy is expanded to say India can not "sell a
screwdriver" to Iran without being sanctioned, "we have a
problem."


10. (C) Jaishankar's final worry involved the Indian
Department of Atomic Energy's (DAE's) "very weak" enthusiasm
for the NSSP's civil nuclear component. While he did not
elaborate in this setting, he was concerned that the GOI
needs DAE support to maintain momentum on the NSSP. He
expressed hope that the US would look for NSSP areas that can
be interpreted generously enough for DAE to feel like there
is something in it for them.


11. (U) Mr. Ross and Mr. Alverson cleared this message.
MULFORD