Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NEWDELHI1274
2005-02-18 05:11:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy New Delhi
Cable title:  

NAXALITES AND SYMPATHIZERS ENCOURAGED BY NEPAL

Tags:  PTER PGOV ELAB PHUM PINR IN NP 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 001274 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV ELAB PHUM PINR IN NP
SUBJECT: NAXALITES AND SYMPATHIZERS ENCOURAGED BY NEPAL
EVENTS - HAVE BIG PLANS FOR INDIA

REF: A. 04 CHENNAI 1395

B. CHENNAI 120

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., Reason 1.5 (B,D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 08 NEW DELHI 001274

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PGOV ELAB PHUM PINR IN NP
SUBJECT: NAXALITES AND SYMPATHIZERS ENCOURAGED BY NEPAL
EVENTS - HAVE BIG PLANS FOR INDIA

REF: A. 04 CHENNAI 1395

B. CHENNAI 120

Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr., Reason 1.5 (B,D)


1. (C) Summary: In a reflection of India's mounting concern
about internal disorder, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee
recently described India's Naxalite insurgency as "the
gravest threat to our internal security." This worry is also
reflected in the stern GOI reaction to the coup in Nepal,
with the GOI attributing the September 2004 merger of a once
disparate Naxalite movement into the Communist Party of India
(Maoist) in part to Maoist gains in recent years in Nepal.
Named after the West Bengal village of Naxalbari, where
peasants revolted in May 1967, Naxalite strategy is to create
a "revolutionary corridor" from Nepal southward and extending
across eight states, followed by a "Compact Revolutionary
Zone (CRZ)" that they can control and administer, and
finally, a Maoist state in this area. While Naxalite
violence has spread into 15 states in Central and Eastern
India, the level of violence has not increased dramatically,
with the GOI reporting roughly the same number of deaths
(500) in 2004 as in 2003. Naxalites have taken root in
regions ruled by a nexus of organized criminals and corrupt
politicians, where governance is poor and poverty and
injustice endemic. Indian experts note that Naxalism tends
to find favor among peasants in agricultural areas suffering
from "extreme distress," which suggests that the movement's
potential to spread may be limited. The GOI sees increased
development assistance and law enforcement action as the keys
to a solution, but cannot succeed until the police and local
politicians radically change their approach to governance.
In addition, the GOI has only recently focused on Naxalism,
as the previous National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government
made "Islamic terrorism" its top priority. The mainstream
Communists would like to absorb the Naxalites, whose leaders
have thus far rejected this possibility on the grounds that
Congress long ago coopted the Communists into supporting

economic reform. Naxalites have attacked at least one
affiliate of a US corporation (Coca Cola),but not American
citizens. End Summary.

What is a Naxalite?
--------------


2. (U) The Naxalites view themselves as a historical
movement with a long-term vision, and both short-term and
strategic goals. For the present, they are bent on securing
a base in India's remote areas, but hope to carry out a
revolution in all of India that will result in the
establishment of a "People's Republic." The Naxalite
movement was an attempt by young Indian Communists in the
late 1960's to renew the Communist movement, which they
charged was being coopted into mainstream politics. Its name
comes from a peasant movement which started in the village of
Naxalbari in the Darjeeling District of West Bengal in May
1967, and formally began in 1969 when activists formed the
Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist).


3. (U) The CPI(ML) concluded that a traditional Marxist
revolution based on an urban proletariat could not take place
in India, as it is largely a agrarian, pre-Industrial
society. The party's ideology instead sought to create a
peasant movement focusing on land reform and agricultural
issues, and its largely urban proponents fanned out to remote
areas of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh to organize. The CPI(ML)
quickly fragmented into factions, as leaders developed
ideological differences and broke away to form their own
groups, some of which turned to violent insurgency. Once
fighters reach the age of 45, they are urged to surrender,
gain amnesty and work above ground to support the younger
fighters.


4. (U) GOI and Indian press accounts assert that Naxalite
influence has increased dramatically in the past year, with
Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee recently describing the
Naxalite insurgency as "the gravest threat to India's
internal security." A GOI intelligence report leaked to the
press in January claimed that as of September 2004, Naxalites
were active in 156 districts in 13 states, and by February
2005 this had reportedly expanded to 170 districts in 15
states, although evidence is difficult to verify. There are
purportedly 35 active Naxalite groups in India, although only
12 engage in political violence. The GOI estimated that
approximately 6,000 persons have been killed in the Naxalite
insurgency in the past 10 years. With a well-established
support base in some areas, the Naxalites have in some
instances negotiated unofficial cease-fires with political
parties, which allow them to operate freely without fear of
police intervention.

Military Capabilities
--------------


5. (C) Although they can gather up to company strength (150
cadres) to conduct attacks, the Naxalites usually operate at
the squad level (15 cadres). Their combat with Indian
security forces has been restricted to classic small infantry
encounters, relying primarily on concentration of superior
forces, attacking at a time and place of their choosing, and
use of surprise and ambushes, to overcome the military
superiority of the enemy. GOI and Indian think tank reports
verify that Indian Naxalites do not receive weapons from
abroad. They have determined that while the Naxalites have
armorers that manufacture and repair weapons, their principal
source remains the Indian security forces and the local arms
market At present they rely on infantry weapons, including
some automatic weapons, but have begun to construct crude
indirect fire weapons (mortars),which are inaccurate and of
little military value.


6. (C) The biggest upgrade in Naxalite military capabilities
has been the integration of Claymore mines into their
attacks. The most spectacular use of Claymores was on
October 1, 2003, when Naxalites attempted to assassinate AP
Chief Minister Chandrababa Naidu with a simultaneous
detonation of up to nine mines. Since the Naidu attack,
Naxalites have used Claymores several times to kill up to
eight policemen at a time by detonating the mines under their
vehicles as they travel along rural roads. Indian analysts
have hypthosized that the Naxalites are acquiring the mines
and training in their use from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam (LTTE),but have not presented verifiable proof to back
up this assertion. Naxalite groups have repeatedly oppose
the presence of American multinationals in India and have
targeted their facilities for attack, most notably an attack
on a Coca Cola bottling plant. However, they have not
threatened American citizens or conducted attacks against
them.

Nepal as Inspiration
--------------


7. (U) The "Peoples' War success" of the Communist Party of
Nepal (Maoist) inspired India's Naxalites to restructure
their organizations on the Nepalese pattern. The main tenets
of the CPN (Maoist) ideology and its relationship to India
were outlined in an extensive interview conducted by American
Communist journalist Li Onesto with Prachanda, the CPN
(Maoist) General Secretary on February 20, 2000. (The full
text of the interview is found at www.lionesto.net).


8. (U) Prachanda pointed out that his party has cooperated
with the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) and People's War (PW)
since before the declaration of the Nepalese "people's war"
in 1996, and that "the Nepalese revolution is part of the
world revolution." Despite this cooperation, Prachanda
derided his Indian comrades as "adventurists with no vision."
He insisted that Indian Naxalites have fruitlessly spent 25
years attempting to establish a "guerrilla zone," without
realizing that this is only "transitional." He urged Indian
Naxalites "to seize, to capture, base areas," and govern
them, as his party has done in Nepal, noting that this is not
possible without "strong mass support." While this interview
is now some five years old, it is still viewed here as among
the most reliable windows into the views of Nepal's Maoist
leaders.

War Against India
--------------


9. (U) Prachanda insisted that as his movement becomes
successful in Nepal, India will commit its armed forces to
counter-insurgency there, saying "that when the Indian Army
comes in with thousands and thousands of soldiers, it will be
a very big thing. But we are not afraid of the Indian Army,
because, in one way, it will be a very good thing. They will
give us lots of guns. And lots of people will fight them.
This will be a national war." As part of its strategy of
preparing for war against India, the CPN (Maoist) has been
working with the Naxalites to build a strong Indian support
base to tie down Indian security forces and hinder the Indian
Army from successfully prosecuting war in Nepal. He
predicted that after the Indian Army is defeated, the CPN
(Maoist) will declare a Peoples Republic of Nepal.

The Indian Revolutionary Corridor
--------------


10. (U) The CPN (Maoist) was the principal agent in the
creation of a Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and
Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA) in 2001. The
Committee includes the CPN (Maoist),the CPI (Maoist) and the
Communist Party of India - Marxist Leninist - Janashakti
group, as well as three Bangladeshi Maoist parties and one
from Sri Lanka (Ref B). The Janashakti ("people's power")
Group claims that it no longer participates in peoples war
and has run candidates for elective office. In September
2004, with the reported support of CCOMPOSA and Nepalese
Maoists, the MCC and PW united to form the Communist Party of
India (Maoist),which is modeled after the CPN (Maoist) and
has adopted an almost identical ideology and strategy. The
CPI (Maoist) has since expanded its activities to new areas
of India in the hope of creating a "revolutionary corridor"
extending from Nepal across eight Indian states, including
Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and
Madhya Pradesh, Uttaranchal and Karnataka. This region is
called the "compact revolutionary zone (CRZ)" in Maoist
jargon. In some areas of these states Naxalites have
established parallel administrations which extract
"revolutionary taxes," run schools, and administer justice.

The Bihar Stronghold
--------------


11. (C) The CPI (Maoist) is strongest in Bihar, where it is
active in 30 of the state's 40 districts. The Indian Home
Minister told Parliament on December 14, 2004 that Maoists
had killed 513 people across India in 2004. Of these, 155
were killed in Bihar. Although press reports indicate that
Naxalites are active in 16-18 of neighboring Jharkhand's 22
districts, Consulate Calcutta sources claim that Naxalites
are active at some level in the entire state. Dr. Ajai Sahni
of the Institute of Conflict Management (ICM) provided a
number of reasons why Naxalism has found a home in Bihar.
The state is dominated by an unusually rigid caste system in
which the upper castes oppress and exploit the Dalits and
tribals and violently resist social change. To maintain
their stranglehold on power, Bihar's upper castes fund an
army of criminals (the Ranvir Sena) armed with over 16,000
weapons, including automatic rifles and grenade launchers.
The Ranvir Sena has carried out several massacres of Dalits
in the state and is patronized by all the political parties
except the Left. Sahni argued that this has resulted in
"extreme distress" of the state's tribals and dalits, who
turn to the Naxalites for protection and justice.

Life in Bihar
--------------


12. (C) A journalist who recently returned from an extended
stay in Bihar described to Poloff how the Naxalites function
in the state. He maintained that they have a virtual "shadow
government" in parts of Bihar, and collect taxes from
virtually every business (sic) in the countryside and erect
barriers at night to collect tolls from truckers. One
businessman in Jharkhand described how he routinely added
extra amounts to his contract bids to pay off the Naxalites,
who would not otherwise allow his projects to proceed. The
journalist claimed that most people in Bihar, including the
Naxalites, no longer view the insurgency as an ideological
struggle, but rather as a way of life, and that some Naxalite
leaders are making a good living from it. The reporter
claimed that the Bihar Naxalites do not provide a better way
of life or infrastructure to the state, but bring a measure
of justice to the poorer classes and castes, in that the high
castes no longer interfere in the lives of the low castes in
areas where Naxalites are active.


13. (C) Another journalist told Poloff that the Bihar police
have long stopped trying to battle the Naxalites, preferring
to make their own separate arrangements with their leaders.
Under the agreements the two sides agree not to fire on one
another. The police then fire off their ammunition in the
jungle once every month and claim it was used in "encounters"
with the Naxalites. The journalist asserted that police are
killed by the Naxalites only when they have not yet realized
the arrangement, and insist on conducting anti-Naxalite
patrols. Those officers who survive quickly "get smart" and
adjust to the system, he maintained.

Bihari Police Assessment
--------------


14. (C) In a February 10 meeting in Patna, Director General
of Police (DGP) M.R. Sinha (protect) told Poloff that "key
Maoists" from Nepal and Bihar are working together.
Commenting that interrogations of "hundreds of Naxalites"
during the past few years demonstrated increased
Naxalite/Maoist activity along the border with Nepal, Sinha
credited increasing cross-border cooperation to the growing
strength of Nepali Maoists, and their desire to create a
"grand liberation zone" (sic) stretching from the Indian
Ocean to the Himalayas. The Nepalese Maoists believe they
must work with their Naxalite counterparts in India to
realize their dream, he stated.


15. (C) Sinha affirmed that while Sitamarhi, Darbhangha,
Bettiah and Bagaha are the four Bihari districts with the
most Naxalite activity, 30 of the state's 40 districts have
some Naxalite presence. According to Sinha, the police are
well-aware that the Naxalite problem on the Nepal border has
grown worse over the last four years, but have only been able
to launch a few operations against them. He commented that
he had "been there and walked the border many times" and the
terrain favors the Maoists, especially because the police
forces are undermanned. Complaining that a 2001 proposal to
triple the number of police in the region was never
implemented, Sinha confirmed that there are currently only
enough officers to post one man about ever kilometer along
the border, and this is not nearly enough to inhibit
Maoist/Naxalite movement. He asserted that very few Maoists
and Naxalites he had interrogated knew or cared about the
movement's politics and ideology, and were only involved to
earn money. This makes it easy to recruit informants, he
maintained, since the police can easily double a Maoist
fighter's daily wage of about 50 rupees (about usd 1.25).

The Impact of Elections
--------------


16. (U) State elections are currently taking place in Bihar
and Jharkhand. According to the GOI, the CPI (Maoist)
launched a series of attacks on police after calling on
voters in both states to boycott these elections. While
Naxalite/police violence has caused casualties on both sides,
the CPI (Maoist) has denied the boycott call, saying that the
Indian security forces are using the election as an excuse to
intimidate the Maoists. One Maoist leader argued that the
CPI (Maoist) could easily have enforced a total boycott, but
are too busy "sorting out organizational issues following the
merger of PW and MCC" to bother with the election.

Nepal-India Nexus
--------------


17. (U) The GOI also attributes the recent upsurge in
Naxalite activity to infiltration from Nepal, saying that
King Gyanendra's February 1 crackdown could lead CPN (Maoist)
leaders flee to India and join forces with the Naxalites.
Local media have reported that Nepalese Maoist leaders are
already in India, including Baburam Bhattarai, considered to
be number two in the CPN (Maoist) hierarchy after Prachanda,
and the movement's ideological/intellectual leader. Despite
these assertions, there is no evidence that Nepali Maoists
have joined the fighting in India. According to Prakash
Singh, a former Director General of the Border Security Force
(BSF),"Nepalese Maoists come here, get arms and ammunition
from their counterparts and return to their original bases in
Nepal."


18. (C) Bihar DGP B.R. Sinha argued to Poloff that a Royal
Nepalese Army (RNA) crackdown on the Maoists would only make
the situation in Bihar worse if rebels seek shelter in India.
He dismissed this as "unlikely," however, as the RNA was not
strong enough to combat the Maoists, and would spend most of
its resources attempting to secure the Kathmandu Valley. He
commented that, if pressed by the RNA, Maoists would more
likely retreat further into the Nepalese jungle, which they
already control.

South Also Simmering
--------------


19. (U) Naxalite violence also continues unabated in South
India, which has been wracked by tit-for-tat killings, as
Naxalites ambush the police, who then kill Naxalites in
"encounters." Andhra Pradesh (AP) is the only state which
has negotiated a "cease fire" with the Naxalites, which
resulted in a seven month suspension of violence. The
conflict resumed in January, however, (Ref A) after police
allegedly killed a number of Maoists in "encounters," and the
Naxalites responded with attacks on police, politicians, and
property. The CPI (Maoist) asserts that it was forced to
retaliate after police picked up unarmed Naxalites, murdered
them, dumped their bodies in the forest and claimed they were
killed in gunfights. Chief Minister YS Rajashekhara Reddy
has asserted that the CPI (Maoist) has taken advantage of the
peace process to rearm and consolidate. While the police
insist they will challenge Naxalites carrying arms, the state
administration, eager to get the Maoists back to the
negotiation table, is urging both sides to exercise restraint.


20. (U) Noted terrorism expert Ajai Sahni claims that
lopsided economic liberalization in AP has increased Naxalite
popularity, as former Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu's
development policies were urban centric and ignored economic
problems in the countryside. As a result, many of the
state's farmers were put into "extreme distress" and provided
support to Naxalite groups, he stated. Nihar Nayak, a
research associate at the Institute for Conflict Management,
assessed that "over the past five years, Naxalite activities
have increased in the districts surrounding Bangalore city -
India's 'Silicon Valley,'" and that "the economic impact of
the Naxalite rampage is potentially devastating."

Former Insider's View
--------------


21. (C) Anand Swaroop Verma has been a Communist and
Naxalite sympathizer since the 1970s. Although no longer
active in any Communist organization, Verma reportedly
continues to be trusted by the various Naxalite factions and
has entree to their leadership. Writing primarily in Hindi,
Verma is the author of several books on Nepali Maoists, and
is the Convenor of the Indo/Nepal People's Unity Forum, an
Indian support group for Nepali Maoists. The works of Verma
and other Naxalite supporters can be read at
www.revolutionarydemocracy.org.


22. (C) Verma pointed out to Poloff that the CPI (Maoist)
describes the current Indian state as "a criminal nexus in
which politics and crime have become irrevocably
intertwined." The Party has no illusions that it will have
sufficient armed force to overthrow the state over the short
term, but plans to use violence to establish a secure base
and compel the "ruling class" to negotiate its demands. The
CPI (Maoist) believes its rural, peasant-based revolution
will eliminate feudalism and neo-colonialism from the
countryside and capture the cities in the revolution's final
phase. It plans to enact radical land reform, break up the
estates of big landholders, divide the property among
landless laborers, implement minimum wage laws, and end
bonded labor.


23. (C) Verma recently pointed out to Poloff that Indian
Naxalites have split into two contending factions: The
Communist Party of India (Maoist),and a group of
above-ground Maoist parties with the same goals, but which no
longer espouse armed struggle and "people's war." Verma
noted, however, that the above-ground Maoist parties retain
their arms and have clashed with the CPI (Maoist) on several
occasions. Both factions believe that the Indian state is
the principal enemy, but advocate different revolutionary
models. The CPI (Maoist),like its counterpart in Nepal,
describes India as a "semi-colonial" state that is becoming a
de-facto colony of the US and its Indian supporters.
However, it prefers a "New Democratic Revolution" based in
the countryside and carried out by the peasants. The
above-ground parties call for a non-violent, urban-based
"Socialist Revolution," led by the working class, and
centered around opposition to "Neo-liberalism," which it
describes as another variant of "American imperialism."

Not Just a few Peasants with Guns
--------------


24. (C) Verma described the Naxalite movement as "very
strong," pointing out that it started in Bihar and Andhra
Pradesh (AP),but has since spread to Madhya Pradesh (MP),
Chhattisgarh, Uttar Pradesh (UP),and Jharkhand. He could
not or would not quantify how many Naxalites are under arms.
Agreeing that the CPN (Maoist) is the model for India's
Naxalite groups, Verma noted that the ideologies of Communist
parties in China and Cuba do not apply to South Asia. Nepali
Maoists are providing support, but no state provides aid, he
claimed.


25. (C) Verma also conceded that some of India's Naxalites
are "adventurists" who are carrying on "class war without a
purpose." He claimed that without proper "training"
guerrillas carry out "aberrations" such as extortion, murder,
torture, and disfigurement in the name of "class struggle."
In order to gain legitimacy, he said, Indian Naxalites will
have to declare "liberated zones," such as those that exist
in Nepal, and administer them fairly. Such a move will "win
the sympathy of the rural masses." While such zones do not
exist today, there are plenty of rural areas that Naxalites
"rule at night" and where no representative of the Indian
state dares to go.

The GOI Increasingly Worried - Changes Tack
--------------


26. (U) Reflecting a series of increasingly worried
statements by DefMin Mukherjee and PM Manmohan Singh, the GOI
response to the rising tide of Naxalism has been to adopt a
carrot and stick approach. On February 7, Home Minister
Shivraj Patil said that the GOI "encourages the states to
form unified commands, under the respective Chief Ministers,
comprising state police and central paramilitary forces to
deal with the naxal menace." He pointed out that New Delhi
had provided 23 battalions of paramilitaries to those states
affected by Naxalite violence. However, Patil noted, police
measures alone would not provide a long-term solution to the
problem, only "social justice, the removal of economic
disparity, development and a fresh initiative" by the state
governments would work. Patil added that the GOI would
provide "special schemes in naxal-hit areas, especially in
the forest and the development-starved regions" in the next
five year plan. This was echoed in PM Singh's recently
announced "Action Plan" for the next six months, which lists
"Monitor Naxalism with a view to improve the situation," as
one of its primary goals.


27. (C) The GOI prefers that the Naxalite issue be addressed
by state governments and their security forces, an approach
which has prevented effective coordination of security
efforts. The repeated complaint of the West Bengal
Government, for example, is that the Naxalites cross from
Jharkhand to conduct attacks and then return to their
safe-havens, and that the Jharkhand government is not doing
enough (or anything) to prevent it. The ineffectiveness of
this approach was demonstrated by a February 11 Naxalite
attack in Karnataka. The Naxalites assembled in AP, crossed
the state border into Karnataka, attacked a police station
and retreated into AP immediately thereafter. Speaking in
Jharkhand on February 13, PM Singh pledged that the GOI
"would soon come out with a comprehensive strategy to cope
with the Naxal problem." He noted that "Naxalism is a
problem Jharkhand is already grappling with, but it requires
greater coordination between the state and the center to curb
it."

Comment
--------------


28. (C) It is difficult to quantify the extent of support
for the Naxalite cause in India's rural areas, but all
evidence suggests that it has grown considerably over the
past two years. This is partly due to encouragement by
Maoist gains in Nepal, and partly to the inability of the
Indian state to counter it effectively. The Maoists operate
in remote, isolated areas with largely tribal and/or lower
caste populations that are poor, underdeveloped and alienated
from the central government. These regions provide fertile
soil in which Naxalism can grow, but are not found throughout
the country. Even fairly alarmist Indian analysts concede
that Naxalism does not take root in cities, and only in
rural, agricultural areas experiencing "extreme stress,"
which suggests that the insurgency may have geographical and
socio-economic limits. While poverty is widespread in India,
the large numbers of poor in other areas of the country are
more likely to respond to the non-violent variants of
Communism propounded by the above-ground parties (septel),
than to the Naxalites' calls to violent revolution.


29. (C) The GOI approach to Naxalism has been marked by
inconsistency, swinging between defining it simply as a
law-and-order problem and declaring it a symptom of a much
deeper social/economic malaise. Different states have also
defined the problem differently. These varying approaches
have prevented the emergence of a clear and consistent policy
and provided the Naxalites with breathing space to expand
their movement.


30. (C) Naxalism is likely to endure, however, because the
GOI does not have the ability or the will to address it
effectively. The "carrot and stick" approach laid out by
Home Minister Patil has slim chance of success. The strong
nexus between corrupt politicians and organized crime in the
areas where Naxalites have taken root, prevents development
programs from being implemented. In these areas, political
parties, criminal organizations, and the police work together
to monopolize power and maintain the status quo. This often
leaves the Naxalites as the only organized group perceived by
the poor as defending it from exploitation.


31. (C) Likewise, security forces in these areas tend to be
poorly trained, poorly motivated, poorly equipped, and
riddled with corruption. It would take years of training and
major investments to rebuild the police from the ground up
and shape them into an independent and effective force
capable of ensuring basic law and order in the districts
where the Naxalites are active. There is no indication that
the GOI intends to undertake such a program. In their
present state, the police cannot provide the stick that will
force the Naxalites to give up violence and come to the
negotiating table.


32. (C) Despite assistance from Nepalese Maoists, India's
Naxalites cannot defeat the security forces, or establish the
"base area" they need to demonstrate their ability to govern.
After 25 years of waging insurgency, they have accomplished
little more than to render parts of their self-declared "CRZ"
ungovernable and to rule the night in remote areas. With
neither the Naxalites nor the authorities in a position to
prevail, the prognosis is an indefinite stalemate.


33. (C) The mainstream Communist parties favor an end to the
insurgency, and would like to absorb the Naxalites or to see
them convert their organizations into Maoist political
parties. However, open hostility between the Naxalites and
the mainstream Communists has prevented this from coming
about. For the Naxalites, India's Communist parties are too
close to Congress and its "neo-liberal" economic policies,
considering then "deviationist." Naxalites have demonstrated
that they have a sufficient base of support in some areas to
win election to local offices and state Legislative
Assemblies, but they refuse to join mainstream politics as
long as they face the prospect of death at the hands of local
political mafias after emerging from the underground.


34. (C) We will address the relationship between the Maoists
and the Communists parties backing the United Progressive
Alliance (UPA) septel.
MULFORD