NRC COMMISSIONER MERRIFIELD MEETS MEA ADDITIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NEW DELHI 001264

SIPDIS

DEPT PASS TO NRC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/17/2015
TAGS: CVIS ENRG ETTC IN KNNP KSCA PREL TRGY TSPL NSSP
SUBJECT: NRC COMMISSIONER MERRIFIELD MEETS MEA ADDITIONAL
SECRETARY MEERA SHANKAR


SIPDIS

REF: A. NEW DELHI 1261

B. NEW DELHI 1263

Classified By: DCM ROBERT BLAKE, REASON 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: On February 11 NRC Commissioner Merrifield
met MEA Additional Secretary Meera Shankar who has the
non-proliferation portfolio within her purview. Commissioner
Merrifield expressed satisfaction with his visit to Indian
facilities and suggested that further cooperation could bring
regulatory technical personnel to NRC and that thermo
hydraulic testing facilities at BARC could be of interest to
NRC in certification of new CANDU reactor designs. Shankar
suggested material research, nuclear safety codes,
proliferation resistant reactors, ITER, and personnel
exchanges as additional areas for cooperation. She also
indicated the importance of imports of nuclear fuel to
further development of India's nuclear power program. End
summary.

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Merrifield Expresses Satisfaction With Indian Engagement
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2. (C) Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Commissioner
Jeffrey S. Merrifield said he came to India with deep
curiosity and interest about the nuclear safety programs of
AERB, the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the
Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). He told
Shankar that the AERB capabilities are impressive and that
Hall 7 of BARC has some extraordinary facilities to carryout
tests on CANDU related hardware (Ref. B).


3. (C) The Commissioner told Shankar that he was afforded
good access at Tarapur 1 & 2 and reactor-face access at
Tarapur 4 as well as unprecedented access at RAPS 1, 2, 3 & 4
as well as the comprehensive tour of RAPS 5 & 6, which are
under construction. The Commissioner told Shankar that he
had visited all nuclear power plants in the United States and
over 100 facilities abroad and by international standards the
material conditions of Indian nuclear power plants compared
favorably with plants he has seen elsewhere in the world.


4. (C) The Commissioner told Shankar that he feels it is
important to move forward with bilateral cooperation with
AERB. He expressed his wish to accept AERB staff at NRC.
The Commissioner said that he and the NRC are great
supporters of World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO)
benchmarking nuclear power stations. In his view, WANO
exchanges provide an opportunity for operators of US nuclear
power plants and operators of Indian nuclear power plants to
mutually benefit by witnessing best operating and safety
practices in each other's plants. Merrifield said that in
the field of nuclear safety, one can never know or learn
enough.


5. (C) The Commissioner told Shankar that the visit to India
has empowered him to push the dialogue further and that
through his thorough engagement of the India nuclear power
industry, executives and technical personnel, site visits
during this journey to India, he has been able to gauge the
vigor and dynamism of the Indian nuclear industry.

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MEA Shankar's View on U.S.-Indian Nuclear Cooperation and
Indian Export Controls
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6. (C) Shankar expressed satisfaction that Commissioner
Merrifield visited a number of nuclear power plants, both
safeguarded as well as unsafeguarded. She also expressed
satisfaction about the positive impression that Merrifield
received. In India's view, the dialogue on nuclear safety is
an important part of the overall U.S.-India relationship. It
is India's wish that cooperation in the peaceful uses of
nuclear energy expand.


7. (C) The U.S.-India relationship has undergone a
transformation, Shankar said, and India wishes it to move in
a pragmatic way. With the NSSP the relationship has made
progress in non-nuclear areas and some progress with regards
to safeguarded facilities. Thus, the Government of India
looks forward to more cooperation.


8. (C) She went on to say that India has a cradle to grave
control of technologies and materials that apply to nuclear
exports. India has the Atomic Energy Act, Shankar said,
which predates many of the laws that other countries have put
in place to protect nuclear materials, technology and know
how. It is not really in India's interest that its
technologies fall into the hands of those countries that may
want harm India's interests. India has a number of redundant
checks on issuing licenses for production and transport of
nuclear materials. Customs is fastidious on clearances that
affect nuclear materials. In addition, India keeps its
regulations in the nuclear field up to date so that control
systems remain relevant.


9. (C) Responding to DCM Blake's observation that in order
to move forward on NSSP the U.S. was looking forward to
India's progress on export control regulation, Shankar said
that India is making progress, that there is much on India's
agenda and that India is actively engaged. However, it is
tough to develop a consensus, Shankar said. Common ground
develops in inter-agency meetings in Delhi, but the common
ground quickly crumbles when participants try to develop
consensus in and buy-in from the institutions they represent.
Shankar mused that in this regard there is a lot to be said
about authoritarian governance as it forges consensus without
effort.

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Further Development of Nuclear Power in India
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10. (C) Shankar explained that India's goal is to have in
place 20 gigawatts of nuclear power by 2020, an option that
it can insure using a thorium based fuel cycle. This option
is attractive because it will allow India to expand the
nuclear power program based on internal resources. Nuclear
energy has its advantages as it is environmentally benign and
produces no greenhouse emissions. The costs of building
nuclear power plants have gone down dramatically for NPCIL,
so India believes that nuclear power generation is quickly
becoming very cost effective when compared to other sources
of energy.


11. (C) Thus, supplies of nuclear fuel continue to be of
interest to India and it is an area where the U.S. might want
to have a re-look given the zooming price of liquid
hydrocarbons. India understands that constraints of U.S. law
prevent the US from providing fuel. But, if other states
agreed to provide nuclear fuel to India, the US, perhaps
ought not to oppose such arrangements, Shankar said.


12. (C) In the nuclear field, India is looking at options
that would allow it to obtain nuclear fuel from elsewhere.
One option worth considering is to put nuclear power plants
that are built through international cooperation under
site-specific safeguards. At this time, however, India does
not intend to put the power plants it has built on its own
under site-specific safeguards.


13. (C) Given the objectives of sustained economic growth
and India's demographics, if India is going to insure rapid
development it must ensure its energy program keeps pace.
Constraints on expanding the nuclear program will hold back
India's development, as nuclear energy is a critical part of
India's energy supply mix. The Indian energy market, Shankar
said, is very price inelastic. Markets cannot absorb very
sharp energy price increases as resistance to price increases
in India can lead to anarchic behavior. Thus, India
envisions that international cooperation in meeting its
future energy needs will allow India to develop faster.


14. (C) Shankar then steered the discussion to harmonization
of guidelines under the nuclear safety convention. India
believes that there is a mismatch between nuclear safety
requirements and availability of equipment under the Nuclear
Suppliers Group (NSG). In India's view, it would be
important to harmonize the nuclear safety exception that will
allow a more flexible interpretation of NSG rules such that
technology transfers that promote nuclear safety can take
place. In short, India and the U.S. must find creative
solutions to end the isolation of the India nuclear power
program and bring about benefits that both the US and India
can share.


15. (C) Merrifield told Shankar that in his view as an
attorney, legislation and regulation always arise from a
back-looking perspective. Thus, now that we are in 2005, the
U.S.-India dialogue on nuclear matters is far different but
takes place under a framework that developed over the course
of 40 years. There is a need to review these issues with a
more forward-looking perspective.


16. (C) With regards to nuclear regulation, nuclear safety
knows no international boundaries, Merrifield said. It is
important that the U.S. and India reduce barriers to improve
safety and be able to move forward under the NSSP framework.

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India's Wishes for Collaboration on Nuclear Safety
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17. (C) In the nuclear area, Shankar said, the focus on
nuclear safety is welcome. There have been workshops between
the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) in India and the U.S. and it
looks like the agenda that had been agreed to originally has
been completed. Thus, perhaps, the U.S. and India ought to
look at additional areas where future cooperation. Shankar
identified four areas that would be of interest to India:

-- New reactor design;
-- Nuclear reactor material degradation;
-- Probabalistic risk assessment; and
-- Training of personnel.


18. (C) Shankar elaborated that India would very much like
to have an opportunity to place some young scientists, for
periods of about six months, within NRC or at educational
institutions that have strong programs in nuclear safety and
power. In addition, India is also looking forward to
validation of nuclear reactor safety software where the US
and India could validate each other's safety codes.


19. (C) Regarding U.S.-specific cooperation, India is
interested in proliferation resistant reactors and would like
very much to participate in the Gen-IV R&D project, as it
strongly believes that India has something to bring to the
table.


20. (C) Merrifield told Shankar that, while NRC is eager to
benchmark codes and to allow comparison of predictions of
U.S. and Indian codes, some of the details of what
cooperation is possible depend on our government's progress
on the NSSP process. With regard to Gen-IV, Merrifield told
Shankar that DOE is in the lead. The Commissioner is aware
that India has capabilities that it could bring to the table
and the Commissioner promised that he would highlight India's
capabilities and its interest in Gen-IV when he engages DOE
officials upon his return.

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Use of BARC Facilities For Safety Testing of CANDU Components
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21. (C) Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) International
Affairs Director Raghuraman asked Merrifield to provide some
clarification about opportunities there may be for safety
collaborations on thermo hydraulics, which could take
advantage of equipment in Hall 7 of BARC. Merrifield
qualified that the prevalence of Pressurized Water Reactors
(PWR) in the U.S. called for development of specialized
facilities that address safety questions that are relevant to
those reactors. The U.S. has research facilities that allow
the NRC to determine that safety requirements for PWRs are
met. In contrast, if the NRC were asked to certify a CANDU
reactor for construction in the U.S., the U.S. does not have
any CANDU reactors in its inventory, nor does the U.S. have
any facilities to validate information that the reactor
manufacturer would need to provide in support of the
certification requirements. Thus, if questions were to arise
with the certification of the new CANDU reactor, it is
conceivable that the U.S. might consider requesting India's
collaboration to use the facilities in Hall 7 of BARC.


22. (C) Commissioner Merrifield told Shankar that the NRC,
as a regulatory agency, looks at issues very broadly and
examines those in which it can find creative solutions to
move forward. As a regulatory agency, NRC embraces other
regulatory agencies. In NRC's view, regulation of the
nuclear industry benefits the public by allowing utilities to
deliver power, in a safe manner, at costs that are consistent
with high standards of safety and public protection.

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Visas Challenge Indian Participation in WANO
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23. (C) As it regards India's participation in WANO, the NRC
is very supportive of WANO benchmarking and the U.S. nuclear
industry has already benefited from interactions from NPCIL
in the WANO context. In the WANO context, Shankar observed,
some Indian nuclear power program participants had been
denied visas to participate in IAEA sponsored activities.
Merrifield said that while visas are not in the purview of
NRC, NRC became aware of the difficulties that S.K. Jain,
Managing Director of NPCIL, was facing in obtaining a visa to
travel to the United States. In this case, NRC collaborated
with Embassy New Delhi to ensure that Jain could travel to
the United States to participate in the meeting.


24. (C) Regarding visa issues, DCM Blake added that timely
submission of visa applications provides an opportunity for
consular and Embassy officials to help insure travel of
Indian scientists to the United States without delay.

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India Wishes to Participate in ITER
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25. (C) Shankar also expressed interest for India's
participation in the ITER project. India discussed the ITER
project with the leadership of the European Commission (EC)
during their visit to India. India was told that the EC has
an open mind and Shankar wanted to make sure that it flagged
India's interest in participation in ITER and hoped that the
U.S. would support India's endeavors.


26. (C) Merrifield explained that in regard to ITER, the
site selection has become a challenge that is clouding the
discussions about those who would like to participate in the
project. Nonetheless, he stated that we would inform DOE
about the interest of the Government of India in this matter.

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Meeting Participants
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27. (C) NRC Commissioner Jeffrey S. Merrifield
NRC Deputy Director Margaret Doane
DCM Robert Blake
SciCouns Marco Di Capua
Madam Meera Shankar, Additional Secretary, UN, MEA
Santosh Jha, Deputy Secretary, US and Canada, MEA

K. Raghuraman, Head, International Studies, Department of
Atomic Energy


28. (C) NRC Commissioner Merrifield cleared this cable.


29. (C) NRC Commissioner also met with Foreign Secretary
Shyam Saran (Ref. A) and MEA Joint Secretary S. Jaishankar
(Ref. B)
MULFORD