GOI WITHOUT PLAN "B", HOPING NEPAL KING WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001262

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/16/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREF PREL IN NP BT
SUBJECT: GOI WITHOUT PLAN "B", HOPING NEPAL KING WILL
RESPOND TO DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE


Classified By: DCM Robert O. Blake, Jr. for Reasons 1.4 (B, D)


1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador used the return to New Delhi
of Ambassador Shiv Mukherjee as an opportunity to discuss
with the GOI the current strategy on Nepal. During the
February 16 meeting, also attended by MEA Joint Secretary
(Nepal/Bhutan) Ranjit Rae, Polcouns and Poloff, Mukherjee
expressed hope that the King would respond to international
pressure within the next two weeks by restoring a democratic
government, but implied that New Delhi does not have a
contingency plan if this does not occur. Mukherjee and Rae
stated that neither the Maoists nor the Royal Nepalese Army
(RNA) have the strength to defeat the other militarily, and
that a political solution must be found. They indicated a
Maoist victory would be unacceptable and implied India will
quickly adjust its arms embargo if the RNA begins to suffer
substantial losses. Mukherjee expressed support for the idea
of a joint US/UK/India demarche when the three ambassadors
return to Kathmandu, but cautioned this would require
political-level approval. He concluded that it is unlikely
there will be any significant progress on the issue of the
Bhutanese refugees during the current power struggle. End
Summary.

Return to Democracy
--------------


2. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's query regarding the
GOI strategy, Mukherjee indicated that the GOI hopes King
Gyanendra will respond to international pressure in a short
period of time, possibly within the next eight to ten days,
and make moves towards restoring democracy in Nepal. He
predicted that the possibility of losing aid from donor
countries and military assistance from India, and the
increasing diplomatic pressure will force the King to change
his policy. However, when the Ambassador asked what would
happen if the King does not restore democracy, Rae reiterated
that he expected the King to do so, demonstrating that it is
unlikely the GOI has developed a contingency plan if the
current efforts fail. Mukherjee stressed the importance of
the King developing a road map for the return to democratic
rule and that "he must do it quickly." He commented that the
GOI is not demanding the King re-establish democracy in a
given way (such as restoring the previous government),only
that it happens. "If he makes the right kind of gestures, it
could be business as usual," Mukherjee stated.

Maoists
--------------


3. (C) Neither the Maoist nor the RNA has the ability to
defeat the other in combat, Mukherjee stated. Rae commented
that the Maoists do not have the firepower to take Kathmandu
or any of the larger towns with a significant RNA presence,
although their writ runs free in the countryside. Mukherjee
added that the Maoists can sustain the insurgency
indefinitely and "to avoid this the King must respond to our
actions and come back to the (negotiations) table." He
expected that the RNA could maintain operations for about 3
to 4 months before supply problems would hamper their
activities and allow the Maoists to make headway. If the
Maoist succeed in making early progress, Mukherjee commented,
the GOI would have to rethink its strategy. India's foremost
objective, he added, is to prevent a Maoist victory.

Diplomatic Efforts
--------------


4. (C) Mukherjee expressed support for a joint US/UK/India
demarche to demonstrate to the King that the international
community is committed to its demand for a return to
democracy after the Chief's of Missions return to Kathmandu
(Mukherjee plans to go back on February 20). While calling
this a "very pragmatic step," he also noted that it would
need to be blessed at political levels of the GOI. He added
that he was glad most of the interested countries had been
firm and on-message, with the exception of Pakistan, China
and Russia. Mukherjee agreed with Polcouns that further
Mil/Mil information sharing between the US and India
regarding the ground situation in Nepal could be beneficial.

Bhutanese Refugees
--------------


5. (C) Mukherjee noted that the political upheaval in Nepal
has put the issue of the Bhutanese refugees on the back
burner. He added that nothing was happening before the
King's action and it is very unlikely the Royal Government of
Bhutan will be willing to resume the Joint Verification
process during this time of uncertainty in Kathmandu. When
questioned about Maoist activity in the camps, he commented
that the UNHCR has reported the Maoist are present in the
area, but does not see it as a major danger.

Comment
--------------


6. (C) This discussion was helpful insofar it confirmed GOI
agreement regarding the imperative of preventing a Maoist
victory, but worrisome in its exposure of the GOI's "hope for
the best" diplomatic strategy. Given what we understand is
the low likelihood of the King yielding to US/UK/Indian
pressure for a return to full democracy, we may wish to begin
a serious dialogue with the Indian Government about fleshing
out a fallback plan. One opportunity for doing this would be
a visit to New Delhi by Ambassador Moriarty in connection
with his return to post.
MULFORD