SARAN URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON NEPAL, WILL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NEW DELHI 001114

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/10/2015
TAGS: PREL MASS IN NP
SUBJECT: SARAN URGES CONTINUED PRESSURE ON NEPAL, WILL
RECALL AMBASSADOR

REF: A. STATE 25168


B. STATE 24949

Classified By: Ambassador David C. Mulford. Reasons 1.5. (B,D)


1. (U) This is an action request. See para 9.


2. (C) Summary: As instructed reftels, the Ambassador
advised Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran on February 11 of the
USG position on assistance to Nepal and our intention to
withdraw our Ambassador as early as February 14. Arguing
that the RNA had enough supplies for some time, Saran pressed
for a postponement of US military assistance. Following the
meeting, MEA Joint Secretary (Americas) S Jaishankar called
Polcouns requesting a formal reassurance from Washington that
the US would not fill the gap created by the GOI and UK
suspension of military supplies, given the "centrality of
this issue." Saran said India would also recall its
Ambassador, but the timing and duration might not be
identical with ours. The GOI had been thinking along similar
lines, and the MEA will revert to us on exact timing. Saran
reported that sources in Kathmandu have told the GOI that the
King is looking for a way out of the crisis and has sent an
intermediary to New Delhi for discussions. The Foreign
Secretary offered to provide more specificity after he meets

SIPDIS
that person on February 12. End Summary.


3. (C) In a late afternoon meeting on February 11, the
Ambassador underlined to Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran our
desire to remain in close consultation with India over the
crisis in Nepal, but drew attention to slight differences in
our positions on military assistance (Ref B). Saran was
aware that the USG intends to review its assistance programs,
but pressed for a postponement of military assistance. He
understood our desire not to embolden the Maoists, but
emphasized that India also did "not wish to give satisfaction
to the other side." The UK had also drawn this line, he
noted, and the next few weeks would be crucial. He did not
agree with the argument that the RNA could collapse as a
result, observing that they had enough arms to carry them
over for some time. We need to build on the pressure, he
said. The King is feeling the heat, and "if we let up it
will disappear."


4. (C) The Ambassador responded by pointing out that the
differences between our positions seemed mostly semantic:
India has a major arms supply relationship that it has
suspended, but does not wish to announce that it has done so.
In contrast, the US does not have such a relationship, and
the USG does not wish to make a public statement, because
there is nothing to stop right now.


5. (C) Saran replied that "the King should know that we will
not open the floodgates, and will not send masses of
equipment. He should not get that satisfaction from us," and
urged the US to be "clear about what we say." Following the
meeting, MEA J/S (Americas) S. Jaishankar called Polcouns
requesting a formal reassurance from Washington that the US
will not attempt to fill the military supply gap created by
the Indian (and UK) suspension of military supplies. That is
"the key signal at this point," Jaishankar emphasized, adding
that he "hopes we understand the centrality of this issue"
for the GOI.


6. (C) As instructed Ref A, the Ambassador then informed
Saran that the United States may recall its Ambassador as
early as February 14, and urged India to join with us and the
UK in order to send the strongest possible message to the
King. The Foreign Secretary responded that India was also
planning to recall its Ambassador for consultations, but that
the timing and duration might not be identical with ours.
The step would follow in the next several days, he stated.
Jaishankar told Polcouns after the meeting that India shares
our view on the withdrawal of Ambassadors, and was thinking
along the same lines even before our approach. MEA J/S
(Nepal) Ranjit Rae will revert on the specific timing, but it
will be "sooner rather than later." Saran would be happy to
meet with Ambassador Moriarty if he comes through Delhi on
his way out of Kathmandu.

King Looking for a Way Out?
--------------

7. (C) Saran then reported that highly reliable sources in
Kathmandu have told the GOI that the King is looking for a
way out of the crisis. The King is aware that India did not
agree with his recent actions, and has sent an intermediary
to New Delhi for discussions. The Foreign Secretary said he
would meet that person on February 12, and could provide more
specificity after they meet.


8. (C) During the last several days, very reliable sources
had also told the GOI that the King had timed his takeover to
coincide with the SAARC Summit, in the hope that he would
present the grouping with a fait accompli. He thought he had
a foolproof plan, but has now realized he miscalculated, and
that his scenario was unravelling. The King is not suicidal,
Saran observed, which makes it all the more important for us
to keep up the pressure.


9. (C) Action Request: Given the importance of remaining as
close as possible to India and the UK on Nepal, Mission
requests a formal Washington reassurance that the US will not
attempt to fill the military supply gap created by the US and
UK suspension of military supplies, as well as guidance
regarding the exact state of the US military supply pipeline
to Nepal. A reply by OOB February 12 before the expected
February 13 encounter between NSA Narayanan and Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld at Wehrkunde would be appreciated.
MULFORD