Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NDJAMENA933
2005-06-14 16:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHADIAN MEDIATION TEAM VIEWS ON ABUJA TALKS

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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 ------------------020ED8 141649Z /38 
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1781
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000933 

SIPDIS


ABUJA PASS TO YATES, ELMORE; DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C,
AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W
FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA
FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHADIAN MEDIATION TEAM VIEWS ON ABUJA TALKS

REF: A. WALL-SNYDER TELEPHONE CALL OF MAY 30

B. 2005

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000933

SIPDIS


ABUJA PASS TO YATES, ELMORE; DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C,
AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI, PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W
FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA
FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/14/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: CHADIAN MEDIATION TEAM VIEWS ON ABUJA TALKS

REF: A. WALL-SNYDER TELEPHONE CALL OF MAY 30

B. 2005

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Chad's non-attendance for the opening days
of the peace talks in Abuja stems from the mediation team's
misgivings over the preparedness of the rebel movement
delegations to negotiate and suspicions of Libyan maneuvering
to close a deal outside the Abuja process. Ambassador Wall
and P/E officer met with General Mahamat Ali Abdullah on June
13 and 14 to urge Chad's participation in the current round
of talks. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of all
the players working within the Abuja peace process. Ali and
Deby's Special Advisor for International Relations Ahmad
Allam-mi will likely arrive in Abuja on June 15. In other
news, the SLM's field commanders are planning a meeting on
June 25 in Darfur to discuss a number of issues, including
leadership and command and control. End Summary.


2. (C) On June 13, P/E officer met with General Mahamat Ali
Abdullah, the Chairman of the Joint Commission on the
N'Djamena Humanitarian Cease-fire and the leader of Chad's
Mediation Team, to discuss Chad's non-participation in the
current round of talks in Abuja. Ali had spent the weekend
making funeral arrangements for a relative and said that he
would likely travel to Abuja on June 15. Ali expressed his
concern about the lack of U.S. participation in the
verification commission effort. He said that this led
European partners to balk at participating. P/E officer
explained our understanding (ref) that at the time of the
mission, the U.S. lacked qualified personnel to join the team
and preferred to wait until an assessment team arrives this
summer to identify a U.S. representative.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHADIAN VIEWS ON PROGRESS
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (C) Chad believes that the rebel movements internal

problems will scuttle any document signed at this time,
according to Ali. He is particularly concerned that the bulk
of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) could disavow
Khalil Ibrahim's faction. Ali believes that Khalil is now
cooperating with the Government of Sudan because he lacks a
presence on the ground. He suspects that Khalil's faction
fears it has lost its legitimacy and decided to cut a deal in
exchange for representation in the government. The Sudan
Liberation Movement's (SLM) problems are more important, in
Chad's view. SLM must be pushed to overcome its internal
divisions, according to Ali, because it is clearly more
numerous on the ground than JEM. He noted that there are
other players in the SLM now, some of whom do not support
either Abdelwahid or Mini.


4. (C) Ali outlined Chad's perspective on a reasonable
timeline for the peace process. First, the SLM holds its
conference to sort out its leadership problems and names a
negotiating team. The JEM also must hold a reconciliation
meeting to deal with its division between Khalil and Mohammed
Saleh. Second, the verification of positions on the ground
is the logical next step. This will also confirm that the
actual leaders of the movements are also represented on the
ground. Third, the plan for the separation of forces is
designed and the cease-fire begins to take effect. Fourth,
the international community provides the African Union enough
logistical assistance to prevent the rebel movements from
coming under attack in their zones. Fifth, there is a need
to begin laying the groundwork for inter-communal
reconciliation. The international community could help by
facilitating contact between the rebel movements, local
communities and traditional leaders, and government
authorities on the ground. These steps will help consolidate
the cease-fire and create the necessary conditions for
durable negotiations.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DOUBTS ABOUT LIBYAN AND ERITREAN AGENDAS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


5. (C) Ali stated that Libya wants the parties to sign a

declaration of principles so that it can push them to sign a
peace agreement at the African Union summit in Tripoli.
Libya's agenda is it to take the negotiations out of the
hands of the African Union. The Libyans have given the rebel
movements access to aircraft, hotels, and money. Libya also
facilitated Dr. Khalil Ibrahim's "deal" with the Government
of Sudan, according to Ali


6. (C) Ali confirmed the rumors of a confrontation between
the Presidents of Chad and Eritrea in Tripoli. President
Deby apparently had a heated debate with Eritrean President
Isais in which Eritrea accused Chad of not being a neutral
mediator and Deby accused Eritrea of funding and re-arming
JEM's Dr. Khalil Ibrahim. Deby and the Chadian mediators
apparently believe that Eritrea is giving weapons to Khalil
to rebuild his presence on the ground in Darfur to legitimize
him as JEM's representative in negotiations.

- - - - - - - - - -
FAST, DURABLE PEACE
- - - - - - - - - -


7. (C) On June 14, Ambassador Wall met with Ali to urge
Chad's participation in Abuja. Ali stated that both Chad and
the United States are paying a lot for the crisis in Darfur
in humanitarian and security assistance. He described his
visits to several internally-displaced persons camps in Sudan
and said that the IDP's are clearly suffering worse than the
refugees in Chad. He urged the United States to keep
pressure on the Government of Sudan to seek a peaceful
resolution. He also noted that need for inter-communal
reconciliation.


8. (C) He then outlined Chad's concerns about the rebel
movement's deep internal problems, particularly Libyan
manipulation of Khalil, Mini Minawi, and Abdelwahid. The
Libyans and others want a fast peace, but the path they are
on may produce an agreement but not a lasting peace. He said
that Chad wants a fast, but durable peace. He also
reiterated Chad's problems with the African Union's mediation
efforts and its unfamiliarity with the rebel movements. The
AU and others work only with the heads of the movements, but
not the entire body, according to Ali. This has contributed
to a lack of understanding of the profound nature of the
movements' divisions. Nonetheless, Ali said Chad hopes that
Salim Salim's involvement gives the process direction.


9. (C) Ambassador Wall emphasized that the African
Union-led talks is the only credible venue for mitigating the
competing interests of all of the players. Chad need to
remain committed to the AU process. Chad can express its
opinion on the situation at the negotiations and remain part
of the equation. However, Chad's arguments cannot be heard
from N'Djamena. Ali agreed and said that he will likely
travel to Abuja on June 15.


10. (C) Ifeanyi Nwosu, Political Counselor, Nigerian Embassy
in N'Djamena, told P/E officer on June 13, that President
Olusegun Obasanjo has asked Deby to come to Abuja for this
round of talks. Nwosu stated that Nigeria sees Chad as the
country in the region bearing the brunt of the Darfur crisis.
Therefore, Obasanjo wants Chad to be represented. Nigeria
also is concerned about Libyan meddling and desire to move
the negotiations to Tripoli.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SLM FIELD COMMANDERS TO MEET JUNE 25
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) Another development that may or may not affect the
current round of talks is the organization by SLM field
commanders of a meeting among themselves in Darfur beginning
on June 25. According to a non-governmental organization,
the SLM field commanders act relatively independently of
either Mini or Abdelwahid. They are capable actors who have
independent means of securing resources. In interviews with
23 of SLM's commanders (out of 50 or 60),the NGO stated that
the field commanders are tired of both Mini and Abdelwahid.
Mini has very little support on the ground, despite his
arguments to the contrary, according to the commanders in
North and West Darfur. The field commanders do not expect
either Abdelwahid or Mini to show up. The meeting will

discuss better internal communication, cease-fire violations,
and accountability mechanisms.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


12. (C) Chad's representatives are not expecting much in
Abuja. They argue for pushing harder to lay the groundwork
with the SLM, JEM, and their forces in the field before
attempting negotiations on a political settlement. Having
delayed their arrival in Abuja, Chad appears now to believe
that it has made its point. We expect Ali and Allam-mi to
depart N'Djamena early morning on June 15.


13. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL


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