CHAD PUBLICLY ACCUSES SUDAN OF AIDING CHADIAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000565

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, INR, INR/GGI, PRM,
USAID/OTI; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD PUBLICLY ACCUSES SUDAN OF AIDING CHADIAN
REBELS

REF: A. NDJAMENA 04 962

B. NDJAMENA 405

C. NDJAMENA 441

D. NDJAMENA 543

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: On April 8, the Chadian Government convoked
the diplomatic corps to accuse Khartoum publicly of
"maintaining, arming, and financing" Chadian rebel groups
inside Sudan. There are 3,000 Chadian rebels near El
Geneina, Sudan, according to the Minister of Justice. Chad
has long suspected Sudanese support for its opponents. This
public accusation is an indication of President Deby's
frustration with the Government of Sudan over the Darfur
peace process and what he believes is its assistance to his
enemies. It also comes at a time when Deby is considering
possible ways to assist the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM).
End Summary.

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STRONG WORDS
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2. (U) On April 8, Minister of Justice Kalzeube Payimi
Deubet, in his capacity as acting Foreign Minister, convoked
the diplomatic corps to convey the Government of Chad's
concerns about Sudanese support for Chadian rebels. Kalzeube
stated that subject of the Council of Ministers meeting on
April 7 was the security and stability of Chad.
Specifically, the presence of 3,000 Chadian rebels
concentrated in Sudan near Makjar, Sudan not far from El
Geneina. Kalzeube noted that Chad has made multiple
bilateral demarches to bring an end to GOS support for the
Chadian rebels. Despite its assurances and promises, the
communique states that the GOS's "special services have
continued to maintain, arm, and finance the Chadian opponents
that have established themselves in Sudanese territory." The
Chadians convoked the Sudanese Ambassador on April 7 to
discuss Chad's preoccupation with the situation and to lodge
a formal protest. In addition, the Chadian Government
demanded an explanation.


3. (U) The communique also states that given "the
indifference of the Sudanese Government", the Chadian
Government "felt it is important to inform friendly countries
and international organizations accredited to Chad of this
grave situation on our borders and of legitimate
counter-measures that may need to be taken." The communique
also noted that Chad continues to host 300,000 refugees with
only limited means. Despite the GOS's "hostile attitude",
the Chadian Government continues with its Darfur mediation
efforts and uses all of its influence with the rebel
movements to negotiate in good faith and to accept a peaceful
solution to the crisis. The communique notes that "Chad does
not allow the Sudanese rebel movements to use Chadian
territory as a rear base."


4. (U) The Government of Chad also reiterated its friendly
policy relations, cooperation, and good neighborliness with
Sudan. The communique notes President Deby's personal
involvement with bringing an end to the Darfur crisis and
Chad's continuing availability to pursue a political
solution, which depends upon the good will of the GOS.

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BACKGROUND
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5. (C) On June 17, 2004, Presidential Advisor Allam-mi Ahmad
publicly alleged that Chadian Arabs were being recruited into
the jandjaweed. (Ref A) At that time, he noted the existence
of Chadian rebels associated with the Renewed National Front
of Chad (FNTR) inside Sudan, but stopped short of accusing
the GOS of supporting them. The Chadian Government has long
been concerned about potential linkages between jandjaweed
and Chadian rebels and the potential for spillover into Chad.
Over the past year, we have received reports from Chadian
Government ministers, Sudanese rebel groups, and African
Union observers about the presence of Chadian rebels inside
Sudan. The Chadian rebel groups are allegedly of Tama and


Arab ethnic origin and may include disgruntled Chadian
military officers that lost out in various military
reshufflings. The group reportedly has weapons and plans to
overthrow President Deby and to prevent his son, Brahim, from
coming to power, according to one of its members. In In
February, Minister of Defense Emmanuel Nadingar asked the
Defense Attache if the U.S. could assist in providing
information on the Chadian rebel groups. Chadian military
officials are unclear about the numbers and intentions of the
Chadian rebels.


6. (C) The Chadian Government strongly suspects that
Chadian rebels are associated with former Chadian Ambassador
to Washington Ahmat Hassabalah Soubiane. One group, the
Front for the Defense of the Democracy and Constitution
(FDDC),according to press reports, is headed by a relative
of Soubiane and is trying to unify a number of Chadian rebel
movements. There reportedly was a meeting in Paris in May
2004 where the FDDC met with a number of other rebel leaders
to form an alliance against President Deby. (Comment: This
group may be the FNTR referred to by Allam-mi and/or the
military arm of the Coalition to Defend Democratic and
Constitutional Rights (CDDC) led by Soubiane. End Comment.)
Press reports indicate that no agreement was reached at that
time. The Chadian press also has reported the existence of
other Chadian rebel groups, such as the Democratic and
Revolutionary Council (CDR),the Popular Resistance
Convention (CPR),and the Council of National Resistance
(CNR). None of these appear to be a threat to the regime.


7. (C) Some of the Chadian Government's security jitters are
being triggered by Deby's fears of a coalescing of opposition
forces in the run-up to the public referendum to remove
presidential term limits on June 6 and the presidential
elections in 2006. For example, two weeks ago, prominent
opposition leader Jean Alingue's passport was seized, and he
was prevented from attending a meeting of Chadian opposition
leaders in Paris. There were reports that Ahmat Hassabalah
Soubiane was allegedly traveling to Paris at the same time.
On the ground, humanitarian workers note an increase in the
number of Chadian forces on the border with Sudan and an
increase in the number of incursions by cattle thieves.

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A CHADIAN REAR BASE FOR SUDANESE REBELS?
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8. (C) Recent developments in President Deby's relationship
with the SLM may also be linked to the Chadian protest over
Sudanese support for the Chadian rebels. (See Refs B, C, D)
Deby's consultations with SLM may have been motivated by his
desire to use SLM as a counterweight against Sudanese
Government support for Chadian rebels. Deby may also be
discussing this issue this week with two of SLM Chairman
Abdelwahid Nur's advisors who reportedly are en route to
N'Djamena at Deby's invitation.


9. (C) The topics for discussion may be the inclusion of
Eritrea as a facilitator in the Darfur peace process,
according to Adam Shogar and two of Abdelwahid's field
commanders. The rebel movements and Chadian officials
contend that Libya and Egypt were brought into the process
because of their ability to influence key actors. If there
is to be a solution to the crisis, Eritrea must be included
because of its support for rebel leaders. The SLM leaders
may be attempting to broker a better relationship between
Chad and Eritrea. Deby may view Eritrea's involvement in the
peace process as a counterweight to that of Egypt and Libya
on the GOS's side, according to SLM members. Secondly, the
meeting is intended to improve the relationship between Deby
and Abdelwahid. Another final agenda item, according to SLM
members, is a discussion of the possible use of Chadian
territory for SLM's resupply or as a rear base, which would
be a new and potentially destabilizing development.

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COMMENT
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10. (C) This is the first time that the Chadian Government
has officially delivered such a blunt and confrontational
charge against Sudan. Deby has complained before about


Khartoum's unwillingness to get serious about stopping
violence in Darfur, but he has tried to keep good relations
with Sudan. Nonetheless, Deby and his advisors' concerns
about potential destabilization in eastern Chad are
long-standing and well-founded. Deby himself staged two
campaigns to change Chad's leadership in N'Djamena from
Sudanese territory. Deby will likely weigh his options
carefully, because allowing SLM activity on Chadian soil
would be an invitation for reprisals from Sudan.


11. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL


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