Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NDJAMENA405
2005-03-17 13:57:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD'S CHANGING TACTICS ON DARFUR

Tags:  PREL PREF PHUM CD SU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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 ------------------CCBBD8 171403Z /38 
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1154
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000405 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, PRM, USAID/OTI; LONDON AND
PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL,
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD'S CHANGING TACTICS ON DARFUR

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000405

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, PRM, USAID/OTI; LONDON AND
PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL,
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/16/2014
TAGS: PREL PREF PHUM CD SU
SUBJECT: CHAD'S CHANGING TACTICS ON DARFUR

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Chadian President Idriss Deby's latest move
to break the current impasse in Darfur involves working with
the Sudan Liberation Movement. Currently, the Chadian
Government is hosting a number of leaders and field
commanders from the SLM in N'Djamena for discussions about
the movement's leadership and organizational problems. This
change in tactics represents a recognition that other
approaches, such as the creation of an alternative rebel
movement, have failed. SLM members here in N'Djamena are
cautious because Deby's objectives are not clear and he
remains susceptible to manipulation from Khartoum.
Non-Zaghawa members of the SLM view the discussions as an
effort by the Chadian Government to back SLM's Zaghawa
leadership. Still others charge that Deby is trying to coopt
malleable SLM leaders to divide and weaken the movement. End
Summary.

- - - - - - - - - -
INVITATION TO CHAD
- - - - - - - - - -


2. (C) After the February 16-17 Joint Commission meeting,
President Idriss Deby invited Sudan Liberation Movement
leaders and members to discuss SLM's leadership and
organizational problems. According to Dr. Sharif Harir, the
Chadians apparently want to repair strained relations with
the SLM. Harir arrived three weeks ago. He said the
Chadians invited Mini Minawi and Abdelwahid Nour at least two
or three times. Field commanders, mostly Fur, have been in
N'Djamena for over a week. The assembled members of the SLM
in N'Djamena were welcomed by President Deby on March 11.
Deby told the SLM members that he wanted to improve his
government's strained relations with the SLM and help the
movement better organize itself as an institution. Harir
said that the consultations were also aimed at selecting a
negotiating team and SLM's goals for the Abuja talks. SLM
Chairman Abdelwahid Nour is in Libya and General Secretary
Mini Minawi is in Rome. (Comment: Mini fears coming to
N'Djamena and Abdelwahid Nour is awaiting a report from his

field commanders already in N'Djamena. End Comment.)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
SLM CHAIRMAN ALLEGES CHADIAN DIRTY TRICKS
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


3. (C) On March 9, SLM Chairman Abdelwahid Nour sent the
Ambassador a fax and called P/E officer regarding the
well-being of his field commanders in N'Djamena who he
claimed were being detained and possibly beaten by Chadian
security agents. The fax also alleged that the Chadian
Government lured his field commanders to N'Djamena by saying
that Abdelwahid was on his way to Chad. Abdelwahid also told
P/E officer that he believes the Chadian Government is
attempting to pay off some of his commanders to overthrow him
as SLM's leader. He requested that the U.S. Embassy check
into the safety of Ahmed Kubur, Sulieman Marajan, Dr. Saleh,
and Mohammed Harin.


4. (C) P/E officer met several times with a group of Fur
members of SLM in N'Djamena in an effort to locate the "Fur
four". They did not know the whereabouts of the four
commanders mentioned in Abdelwahid's fax and were concerned
because they had heard rumors that some of the commanders
were being badly treated. Initially, SLM's Joint Commission
representative based in N'Djamena, Adam Shogar, told P/E
officer that they were at a Chadian Government guesthouse
under "tight security" on March 10. Chad Mediation Team
members General Mahamat Ali and Presidential Advisor Allam-mi
were surprised by P/E officer's request to see the four
commanders and asked if the U.S. thought the commanders had
been thrown in jail. P/E officer insisted and Ali and
Allam-mi relented, giving "permission" to visit the
guesthouse to see that the Fur commanders are being "well
cared for". Arrangements are being made for the contact.


5. (C) The claims of Abdelwahid and others that Chad is
attempting to manipulate the SLM's leadership appear to be
supported by recent activities in Chad. For example, the
separation of the four Fur commanders from the other Fur SLM
members and the evasive behavior of the Chadians and Shogar
over the location of the field commanders. Dandjo members of
SLM informed P/E officer that the Chadians are coopting SLM's
Zaghawa members and key Fur commanders to remove Abdelwahid
from SLM's leadership. During several recent discussions,

Harir and Shogar floated a number of ideas that we had
previously heard from the Chadian Government, including the
idea of a safehaven zone for Sudanese refugees inside Sudan.
P/E officer quickly discredited the idea. Sudanese money-man
Hassan Birgo's presence in N'Djamena is also likely related
to the current discussions over SLM leadership issues. Adam
Shogar, without transport or money for transport or Thuraya
cards for a year, now has access to car.

- - - - - - - -
JETTISONING JEM
- - - - - - - -


6. (C) The Government of Chad has completely written off the
Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and ignored their request
to hold an "urgent" Joint Commission meeting. JEM's Joint
Commission members are in London and Libya. Ahmed Lissan
Tugod has called P/E officer, SLM members in Chad, and the
Chad mediators regarding various communiques. He also
informed the Chadians that the JEM is pulling its members
from the Cease-fire Commission. (Note: It is not clear if
this has happened. End Note.) The Chadian Government makes
no secret about it dislike for JEM's leadership and its
support for the National Movement for Reform and Development
(NMRD) as an attempt to split and weaken JEM. Over the past
weeks, there have been signs that the Chadian Government also
realizes that the NMRD option has outlived its utility and
may not have been money well-spent. In addition, the
Sudanese refugees in camps in Chad were not interested in
taking advantage of the idea of "safehaven zones" inside
Sudan. In a telling comment, Ali told P/E officer on March
14 that the NMRD is finished.


7. (C) The Chadians believe that divisions over Dr. Khalil
Ibrahim's Islamic agenda and ties to Turabi are becoming more
pronounced and harder to deny. Ali and Harir speculate that
fired field commander Mohammed Saleh and other secular
members of JEM will eventually join ranks with SLM.
(Comment: Upon receiving news of his dismissal prior to his
return to the field, Saleh said he would be mobilizing
like-minded commanders that could resist Khalil's money to
leave JEM. End Comment.)


8. (C) Saleh also told P/E officer that JEM does not have
enough positions on the ground to verify and can no longer
deny its connections to Turabi after Khalil gave orders to
field commanders to assist in the failed coup attempt in
Sudan. Saleh also alleged JEM listed Turabi and/or his
associates as JEM political prisoners. N'Djamena-based and
visiting SLM members share Ali, and Allam-mi's conviction
that JEM's continued inflexibility and habit of negotiating
by communique from Asmara will ultimately undermine the
prospects of a joint-negotiating position with SLM.

- - - - - - - - - - - - -
CHAD'S CURRENT GAME PLAN
- - - - - - - - - - - - -


9. (C) Harir explained that some SLM members are willing to
take the risk of talking with the Chadians because a better
working relationship is in the interest of longstanding
familial ties. However, Harir said SLM is being cautious
because of concerns about Deby's vulnerability to the
Government of Sudan's influence. First, Deby is genuinely
preoccupied with the possibility of Sudanese support for an
Arab, Islamic government in N'Djamena. Deby knows that
leadership changes in Chad begin in Darfur. As Army Chief,
Deby helped put Hissein Habre into power in 1982 from Darfur,
where he took refuge, and in 1990, when Deby himself came to
power. Second, Chadian authorities are concerned about
Chadian rebel groups located inside Sudan and jandjaweed
members who are Chadian and who have been well-armed by
Sudanese officials. Finally, according to Harir, even if
Deby takes a position contrary to Khartoum's wishes, his
position can easily be undermined by payoffs to those under
the President. Deby also may be turning to the SLM for
domestic reasons. He may be giving in to pressure from
family members to provide support for the SLM, especially
since the public referendum on removing term limits is coming
up in June.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


8. (C) Chadian authorities recognize that SLM's leadership
and organizational issues are hampering the peace process.

Chadian officials appear to want a stronger, better organized
SLM that can be manipulated and that can diminish the power
of leaders, such as Abdelwahid, whom they as an obstacle to a
peace settlement. Also, the Chadians may calculate that the
SLM needs to be able to better able to articulate its
political positions and implement its commitments. SLM could
also diminish JEM's presence and positions in the talks if it
is better organized. The key problem remains Chad's ulterior
motives, which SLM rightfully does not trust. If Chad
divides SLM's leadership and coopts Zaghawa members, it then
alienates other ethnic groups, weakening the movement and its
ability to negotiate. This tactic would be short-sighted.
SLM members point out that it is worth talking to the
Chadians because Deby has enough at stake in the situation
and he will not let Chad be sidelined. In addition, the SLM
is learning more about Chadian motives as the discussions
progress.


9. (C) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
CASEBEER


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