Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NDJAMENA262
2005-02-20 12:00:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

SEVENTH JOINT COMMISSION MEETING: PROCESS INCHING

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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INFO LOG-00 NP-00 AID-00 AMAD-00 CIAE-00 INL-00 USNW-00 
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 PA-00 GIWI-00 PRS-00 P-00 CFPP-00 FMPC-00 SP-00 
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 DRL-00 G-00 NFAT-00 SAS-00 /001W
 ------------------BB7155 201203Z /38 
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0999
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USLO TRIPOLI 
USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000262 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, DRL, INR, AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, PRM,
USAID/OTI; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: SEVENTH JOINT COMMISSION MEETING: PROCESS INCHING
AHEAD

REF: NDJAMENA 261

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 000262

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR D, P, DRL, INR, AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, PRM,
USAID/OTI; LONDON AND PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR
CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: SEVENTH JOINT COMMISSION MEETING: PROCESS INCHING
AHEAD

REF: NDJAMENA 261

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Idriss Deby and African Union
Commission President Alpha Konare opened the well-attended
seventh Joint Commission on the Darfur Humanitarian Ceasefire
(JC) on February 16. Despite an announced "boycott" of the
meeting by leaders of the rebel movements, the Sudan
Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A) and Justice and Equality
Movement (JEM) were ably represented. The movements
negotiated a delinking of the JC from the N'Djamena Summit on
Darfur and obtained the commitment of the GOS to withdraw
from two key areas within two weeks. The African Union's
Ceasefire Commission Chairman criticized the GOS's
disarmament plan because it did not target the jandjaweed.
The ambiguous concept of a team to verify the locations of
the parties surprisingly won support, for now. The JC ended
on a positive note in sharp contrast to the previous two
meetings, where either side walked out or disputed the
Chairman's conclusions. Finally, SLM/A leader Mini Minawi
will be meeting with President Deby in Chad in approximately
two weeks. End Summary.

- - - - - - -
PARTICIPANTS
- - - - - - -


2. (U) Held on the heels of the N'Djamena Summit (reftel)
and billed as a high-level meeting, most delegations had
enhanced representation. President Idriss Deby and African
Union Commission President Alpha Konare attended the opening
session on February 16. The meeting was chaired by JC
President Mahamat Ali. Ambassador Sam Ibok headed the
African Union delegation. The Secretary General's Special
Representative Jan Pronk led the United Nations group.
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Tidjani spoke for the
GOS. The U.S. delegation consisted of Ambassador Wall,
Ambassador John Yates (retired),and P/E officer.


3. (C) Adam Shogar and Jamal Abdulrhman-Arbab (SLM/A) and
Mohammed Saleh (JEM) broke ranks with the Asmara-based

leadership's boycott of the meeting. On February 12 and 13,
P/E officer received several calls from JEM's JC
representatives Ahmed Lissan Tugod from Asmara and Talgedin
Niam from Dubai saying that the movements would not attend
the JC because they were not adequately consulted prior about
the meeting, its agenda, and its relationship to the summit.
Moreover, Tugod and Niam both said there was a plan afoot to
include the National Movement for Democracy and Reform (NMRD)
in the meeting. (Comment: They were correct; National
Security Agency chief Chaibo and Minister for Public Security
Abderahman Moussa invited the NMRD, according to NMRD leader
Norain Minawi. JC President Ali and President Deby's
half-brother Daoussa Deby ousted the NMRD from the room. End
Comment.) Shogar and Saleh were convinced to participate by
arguments that the movements cannot gain anything by
boycotting; the only way to obtain their goals is to make
demands from within the process, not from outside.

- - - - - - - -
DEBY'S REMARKS
- - - - - - - -


4. (C) On February 16, President Idriss Deby urged the
Sudanese parties to respect their commitments. He stated
that nine months after the signing of the ceasefire, the
situation on the ground was worse in Darfur. He welcomed
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir's pledges made during the
heads of state meeting. (Comment: These commitments were
never publicly disclosed before the JC. End Comment.) He
also urged the rebel movements to respect the ceasefire. He
noted that the time had come to know the exact locations of
the parties to devise a separation plan for the various
forces and a disarmament plan for the jandjaweed. As a
result, the President of the Joint Commission would be
sending of a verification mission to Darfur soon, Deby said.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
CEASEFIRE COMMISSION REPORT
- - - -- - - - - - - - - -



5. (C) African Union Ceasefire Commission Chairman (CFC) MG
Festus Okonkwo described an escalation of ceasefire
violations, primarily by the Government of Sudan and
jandjaweeed, over the past month. He attributed the upsurge
in militia attacks on civilians as attention-getting behavior
as well as the result of uncertainty over the inconclusive
peace talks in Abuja. Many incidents involved armed groups
that are not party to the ceasefire, but a major source of
the attacks were the jandjaweed with GOS support. In
addition, Okonkwo lamented the five unprovoked attacks on the
AU Mission to Sudan (AMIS),which he described as deliberate
attempts to truncate AU operations. Okonkwo said the GOS's
attempt to prevent SLM/A and JEM members returning from Abuja
peace talks from flying through El-Fasher Airport on January
10 as an action that will hamper future peace talks if not
resolved.


6. (C) Okonkwo described the AU takeover of Labado from the
GOS and the CFC patrolling of major highways as major
achievements. Okonkwo confirmed that the GOS gave the CFC
the location of their forces, but that the rebel movements
have given AMIS a number of conditions. These include the
suspension of GOS aerial reconnaissance and bombardment,
guarantees that the GOS will not use jandjaweed to attack
their positions, the declaration of a no-fly zone in Darfur,
a clear plan to disarm the jandjaweed, patrols of major roads
by the CFC, the provision of jandjaweed positions, and the
identification of SLA's own positions at the beginning of the
mission. (Comment: Okonkwo privately expressed surprise at
the SLA's request. End Comment.)


7. (U) As of January 10, 2005, the AU Mission in Sudan is
made up 1853 personnel, including 378 military observers,
1403 protection force members, 20 Ceasefire Commission
Members and International Support Staff, and 52 civilian
police officers.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
DISARMAMENT PLAN FOUND LACKING
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


8. (C) Okonkwo welcomed the Government of Sudan's (GOS)
disarmament plan for the jandjaweed, but questioned its
workability, the GOS's seriousness, and recommended that it
be rewritten. Okonkwo's key criticism was that the plan does
not disarm the jandjaweed. The GOS plan outlined four groups
to be disarmed: armed tribal militias, armed robbery gangs,
rebel groups, and ribat groups. The jandjaweed were
categorized under the armed robbery groups and described them
as individuals from different tribes, both Arab and non-Arab.
Okonkwo said that this categorization was a "deliberate
deviation" from the specified target group in all of the
signed agreements, the jandjaweed. The GOS plans to disarm
the armed robbery gangs by erecting road barriers on all
roads. Okonkwo said that this should not be part of a
disarmament plan and should be handled by the police.
Okonkwo also pointed out that disarming the rebel groups is
not the GOS's responsibility. The plan for the tribal
militias is to take a census of their weapons and the tribes
will commit to use these weapons only in self-defense, which
Okonkwo also criticized.


9. (C) In addition to not addressing the jandjaweed, Okonkwo
said the plan lacked elements of a public information or
civic education program, did not outline procedures for
disarmament, such as the timing, methodology, disposal of the
weapons; did not include procedures for verification and
monitoring of the process or expertise and technical
requirements, failed to address broader weapons management
issues, and lacked an incentive package.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
KEY ISSUES AND OUTCOMES
- - - - - - - - - - - -


10. (C) The withdrawal of GOS forces from pre-December 8
positions and the delinking of any of the JC's conclusions
from the previous day's N'Djamena Summit on Darfur dominated
the 12-hour discussion. At one point, after receiving the
draft text of the conclusions of the meeting with
instructions from JC President Ali to accept it on a
take-it-leave-it basis, the representatives of the movements
threatened to leave the meeting without an agreed document.


Most other delegations encouraged them to present their
objections and explore ways to address them in a revised
text.


11. (C) In the end, two key outcomes were achieved. The
first was the GOS's commitment to remove its forces from
Marla, Graida, and Ishma within two weeks. The CFC agreed
that it would take over those areas. The movements were
again called upon to provide their locations to the CFC.


12. (C) The second important development was the decision to
send a JC team to work with the CFC to verify the locations
of the parties. The U.S. delegation raised concerns, which
were shared by the AU and MG Okonkwo about the ambiguous
verification mission. It will be chaired by JC President
Gen. Ali but no details have been shared with the parties or
the international partners. While the movements accepted
this mission in the meeting, AU Special Representative Sam
Ibok said that there will be considerable controversy over
the idea once it becomes more concrete.


13. (C) The GOS delegation, adeptly-led by Minister of State
Tidjani, cleared the way for acceptance of the Chairman's
conclusions, which were blocked when the Libyan delegation
insisted that a reference from the summit's communique that
called on the international community to refrain from
deploying non-African troops to Darfur remain in the
conclusions. The rebel movements insisted the reference be
deleted. Tidjani acquiesced, deferring to the AU, and the
reference was dropped.

- - - - - -
NEXT STEPS
- - - - - -


14. (C) The AU is aiming to restart the peace talks in Abuja
in mid-March if conditions on the ground permit, according to
Ibok. Representatives of SLA/M and JEM remain skeptical and
noted that on February 18 that Doma was under attack by
jandjaweed and GOS forces.


15. (C) On the movement front, SLM/A leader Mini Minawi
called P/E officer on February 19 to say that Daoussa Deby
was arranging for him to come to Chad and meet with President
Deby. (Comment: This is a major development, considering
Mini's deep distrust of President Deby and frequent
statements that he is afraid to N'Djamena. He asked for U.S.
assurances for his safe passage. End Comment.) Mini said
that he will be preceded by several groups of field
commanders and expects to be in Chad within about two weeks
time. He will travel from Libya to N'Djamena by air. Mini
also said SLM/A is planning a leadership conference in Darfur
after his meeting in Chad. When P/E officer asked him if
SLM/A would stand by the JC session's conclusions, he replied
that it would, but that he doubted the GOS would.


16. (C) The European Union told the international partners
that it is willing to support a meeting for the rebel
movements to organize themselves and clarify their leadership
issues. In addition, the E.U. would like Sudanese
Vice-President Taha and SPLM leader John Garang to speak to
the movements about the process of negotiating peace and
outline for them the key features of the Naivasha Agreement.
SLM/A's Adam Shogar has asked for such a meeting on several
occasions. He also said that once each movement has its
house in order then the two movements would like to meet
together to discuss a merger or at the minimum, a common
front. The E.U. proposal met a lukewarm response because the
U.N., France, and the AU claimed it would take too much time
to organize and delay the restarting of the talks.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


17. (C) We were pleased that the representatives of the
rebel movements agreed to participate in the meeting. Their
confidence grew as they were able to amend the agenda to
start off with the CFC report. This enabled the meeting to
avoid the usual downward spiral of finger-pointing and
denials about the situation on the ground. Even the Chad
mediation team, while not happy about the delinking of the JC
from the previous day's summit, praised the movement's


negotiating skills. Most of the participants left the
meeting more hopeful that the JC's tenor and concrete
outcomes will give some momentum to the peace process. The
GOS's seriousness about its commitments remains the key.


18. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL


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