Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NDJAMENA1615
2005-11-01 12:27:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

CHAD: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY

Tags:  PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL CD 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

011227Z Nov 05

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FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
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INFO AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 
AMEMBASSY ABUJA 
AMEMBASSY ACCRA 
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 
AMEMBASSY ASMARA 
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 
AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 
AMEMBASSY HARARE 
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 
AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY LUSAKA 
AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
AMCONSUL LAGOS
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001615 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, DRL, G, INR, S/P, R; LONDON AND
PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY

REF: A. STATE 191395


B. NDJAMENA 1134

C. (04) NDJAMENA 1725

Classified By: P/E Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001615

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, DRL, G, INR, S/P, R; LONDON AND
PARIS FOR AFRICAWATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM PREL CD
SUBJECT: CHAD: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION STRATEGY

REF: A. STATE 191395


B. NDJAMENA 1134

C. (04) NDJAMENA 1725

Classified By: P/E Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reasons 1.4 (b) and
(d).


1. (C) Summary: The United States has important interests
at stake and a potentially decisive role to play in promoting
democracy in Chad. Earlier this year, President Deby
succeeded in removing presidential term limits in a
constitutional (but questionable) process, and is now on the
path to remain President-for-life. Recent army defections,
emergence of activity by armed opponents, and dissension
within the family seem to confirm that if Deby continues in
power beyond his current mandate, he is setting the stage for
an unconstitutional and possible violent change in power.
Such an outcome could be damaging to our interests in the
Darfur peace process, humanitarian assistance to 200,000
Sudanese refugees, counter-terrorism efforts, and support for
transparent oil revenue management. Setting the stage for a
peaceful, democratic transition is the desired outcome for
the next six to eight months. We believe that encouraging
Deby to retire is critical and should be the centerpiece of
our diplomatic strategy. Specific actions and resources
that would bolster these efforts include a definitive
statement against removal of term limits, invitations to
visit Washington, coordination with France, the EU, and
like-minded African leaders, election support, and help with
a face-saving exit strategy. We should also work to improve
financial management in Chad, reform its military, and
strengthen its democratic institutions. Many Chadians are
looking to the United States for leadership in promoting
democratic change. There is no guarantee that even a
well-managed transition would avoid upheaval. But given the
potential for even more serious instability if we do not take
action, it is important to take steps to convince Deby to
manage Chad's next political transition. End Summary.


2. (SBU) The following assessment responds to ref A request
for a focused democracy promotion strategy. It identifies

key areas of democratic deficits (para 5),outlines desired
outcomes (para 6),presents a six-month strategy (paras
7-11),identifies specific needs (para 12),discusses major
impediments (paras 13-16),and considers consequences of a
reform agenda (para 17). The role of the international
community is addressed in paras 4, 9, and 11. The GOC's
support for democracy promotion is included in the discussion
of major impediments.

--------------
Backdrop
--------------


3. (C) In refs B and C, we outlined the consequences of the
removal of presidential term limits in Chad and Deby's likely
intent to remain in office for life. Despite his "victory"
in amending the Constitution, the regime was shaken by the
low voter turn-out, which revealed the ruling party's
inability to win the referendum. Recent military defections
and the military's refusal to attack the deserters have
weakened the President's position with the military and among
his closest family members. Deby now needs large amounts of
cash to use in negotiations with military deserters,
disgruntled family members, and other armed opposition groups
and to regain lost political ground. As a result, the
already-cash strapped government, recently ranked the most
corrupt in the world by Transparency International, announced
it is proceeding with the revision of the oil revenue
management law to increase the amount of money flowing
directly into Government coffers.


4. (C) Rumors about the President's poor health circulate
often. Talk about upcoming presidential elections are muted
as the opposition refuses to participate without the revision

of the electoral code and the electoral lists. Meanwhile,
military deserters, armed opposition groups in the north and
east, deserters in the west, and various armed elements along
Chad's southern border are increasing the regime's need for
arms to defend itself. The Government has publicly accused
neighboring Sudan of supporting Chadian rebels and privately
mentions Libya's dubious intentions as a key concern. The
potential scenarios for change, as outlined in Ref B, are
unpredictable and likely violent.

--------------
Overcoming Democratic Deficits
--------------


5. (C) Key areas of democratic deficits include weak
institutions such as the ruling party-dominated National
Assembly; personality and regionally-based opposition
parties; a barely functioning judicial system susceptible to
executive interference; a bloated, untrained, unpaid,
ethnic-based military; poorly educated population; high
levels of corruption; and lack of respect for human rights
and rule of law.

--------------
Desired Outcomes
--------------


6. (C) As we argued over a year ago (ref C),we are
convinced that our overarching strategy should focus on
persuading President Deby not to seek a third term and to
assist in the management of a peaceful, democratic
transition. The ruling Movement for Patriotic Salvation
(MPS) Congress, which will nominate its candidate for
President, may be held in December. We need to move quickly
to discourage the President from seeking the nomination and
instead select another MPS member to run or establish a
political transition committee to oversee Chad's next
elections. As outlined in greater detail in the following
paragraphs, over the next six to eight months, the desired
outcome would be:

-- convincing Deby not to run for a third term;

In the event that Deby takes himself out of the race, we
recommend:

-- promotion of political dialogue about the electoral
process and other issues of national concern to set the stage
for elections;

-- assistance with electoral support to revise the existing
electoral list and electoral law;

-- assistance to transform the Chadian military from a
clan-based to a genuinely national and professional force.

-------------- --------------
Strategy for Encouraging Deby Not to Seek Third Term
-------------- --------------


7. (C) We must act immediately to set in motion our
strategy to persuade Deby not to run for a third term. For
this strategy to succeed, the Department, at the highest
level, must make public statements against the removal of
term limits and/or seeking additional terms. Our support for
Constitutional changes as long as they are done legally has
ignored the undeniable reality that many democratic
institutions in African countries are tools of entrenched
rulers that manipulated them to stay in office for life and
provide little development to their populations. We should
not pretend that the "people", many of whom fear the
repercussions of opposing undemocratic reforms, accept such
change because they refuse to participate in a rigged process
and do not take to the streets in protest.


8. (C) Several other African countries are in the process
of or have already changed their constitutions. We need to
articulate a strong policy message in favor of alternating
power as a means of consolidating democratic change in
Africa. A speech by Secretary Rice, Deputy Secretary
Zoellick followed up with contact with African leaders,
including Deby by the Under Secretary for Democracy and
Global Issues, Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, and other high-level USG interlocutors could provide
Ambassadors and Embassy staff the necessary support needed to
pursue genuine democratic change in Chad and other countries
facing the same fate. An invitation to visit Washington is a
symbolic gesture that Deby has longed for. An offer to
receive him should he decide to step down would be an
incentive for him to make that decision. We can also remind
him that he would leave behind an important legacy if he can
arrange to retire peacefully. Appealing to his ego is a key
point of leverage.


9. (C) A second component of this strategy is developing a
consensus among allies and other diplomatic missions to
support our strategy. Recently relayed French concerns about
Chad's future prospects may be the beginning of a dialogue
with the major player here. A coordinated Washington-Paris
effort supported by our contacts on the ground would be
critical to the success of this strategy. It will also be
important to mobilize key African leaders, sitting and
retired, to make the case to Deby for stepping down. In a
larger context, we should lobby the African Union to make
public statements and develop positive and negative sanctions
to discourage potential Presidents-for-life.


10. (C) Thirdly, Deby, his family, and his tribe need an
exit strategy. Developing post-presidential pursuits for
Deby could sweeten the pot. However, he is under
considerable pressure from his immediate and extended family
to remain in power for their own protection and perks. Many
Zaghawa fear significant reprisals once they are no longer in
power. A face-saving exit, perhaps through tacit national
agreement on a Zaghawa successor acceptable to other ethnic
leaders may be a potential solution.


11. (C) We repeatedly hear those around Deby say that his
fear of reprisal is a key reason he would rather die in
office than be pursued. The Chadian political opposition has
repeatedly said that they would give Deby amnesty for his
crimes and that he could remain in Chad. However, the recent
indictment of former President Hissein Habre by a Belgian
court and reported statements by Habre's lawyer that Idriss
Deby is as culpable means that a new Chadian Government would
not be able to guarantee that Deby could escape international
prosecution in exchange for stepping down.

--------------
Needs for USG Support
--------------


12. (C) Should Deby decide to leave or otherwise depart the
scene prematurely, we must be prepared to support a genuine
political transition, albeit less-than-perfect and probably
less-than-democratic. Deby could decide to groom a ruling
party member, likely a Zaghawa, to run in his place and then
attempt to rig the process for his candidate to win. We
could help make the process as transparent as possible. An
alternative is to recognize that it will not be possible to
have sound elections before the expiration of the
presidential mandate and support the appointment of a
political transition committee. This committee could be made
up of the ruling party and its allies, political opposition
parties, armed opponents, military, technocrats, civil
society and religious groups that would be headed by someone
that agrees not to run for office. This group would oversee
the next elections and deal with other transitional issues.
There are various permutations of such a group floating
around between the opposition camps and the government. We

would need to be prepared to provide technical assistance to
support a revision of the electoral lists and electoral law,
election monitoring, political party assistance, and voter
education.

-------------- --------------
Removing Impediments: Improving Financial Management,...
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Emphasizing the transparent and accountable
expenditure of Chad's oil revenues as well as other revenues
is fundamental to ensuring stability of an incoming
government, which will need funds to function. Chad was
recently named the most corrupt country in the world by
Transparency International. We are concerned about the
temptation of looting of the Chadian Treasury and oil
revenues by an outgoing regime leaving empty coffers for any
incoming government. Chad is already on this path. Deby is
finding it necessary to make regular "withdrawals" to
negotiate with his armed opponents and to shore up his base
with his family and military. A U.S. Treasury advisor
recently arrived to assist in strengthening capacity for
transparent management of oil revenues. Additional support
for improving public financial management in concert with the
World Bank and other partners will be needed.

--------------
... Reforming Chad's Military,...
--------------


14. (C) Democratic change in Chad depends heavily on
military reform. We cannot ignore the importance of finding
ways and means to support the transformation of the Chadian
military into a downsized, professional, and national force.
If not, the ethnic-based military will remain an impediment
to democratic change. An immediate need is the regular
payment of salaries, which could provide an immediate
improvement in the security situation in Chad, not to mention
boost morale. We are providing training to one unit of the
Chadian army under the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism
Initiative and various IMET programs. Visits to Chad by
senior U.S. military officials could help deliver our message
of support for democratic change in Chad and relay to
military officials the costs of participating in an irregular
change in power. Earlier this year, the Chadian military
began to take steps to address its problems, conducting an
internal review of the Army which recommended a number of
major reforms, including downsizing, which would require the
de-mobilization of thousands of uneducated, untrained
soldiers. We would seek creative ways to fund the
de-mobilization and re-training of soldiers, such as the
creation of a separate Ministry of Veteran's Affairs to
provide services, educational opportunities, training, and
buy-outs to encourage soldiers to leave the military.
Without these types of initiatives, it will be impossible to
downsize and professionalize the military.

--------------
... And Building Democratic Institutions
--------------


15. (U) We are already providing support to build the
capacity of the judiciary and the National Assembly through
the use of Economic Support Funds. We would like to solicit
additional ESF funds or visitor exchanges to do additional
capacity-building. The fledgling Ministry for Moralization
and State Control and the Ministry for Human Rights are
desperate for financial, logistic, and training assistance.
These ministries are tasked with providing accountability
within the government and protecting of human rights.
Support for these ministries could help raise their public
profile, change negative behaviors, and erode the culture of
impunity and violence that has become a dominant
characteristic in the day-to-day lives of Chadians. We are
proposing to use TSCTI public diplomacy funding for programs

with these ministries. Excess USG furniture and equipment
donations would also assist these officials in carrying out
their duties.


16. (U) Likewise, human rights groups remain underfunded
and limited in their activities. Human rights associations
are full of talented and committed individuals, but lack
mobility, basic office equipment, and resources for programs
such as providing legal defense for victims of human rights
abuses. We will also seek opportunities through visitor
exchanges and perhaps, educational and training
opportunities, for human rights groups. The goal is not only
to help strengthen the connection between human rights groups
and the Chadian population, but also to enhance their
credibility with the government. Despite this summer's
arrest of journalists, Chad has a vibrant, free, independent
press, which we should continue to support. Our training
efforts to improve investigative reporting and enhance the
capacity of the Arabophone press could be funded through
additional ESF funds.

-------------- --------------
Consequences: Risks of Promoting Democratic Transition
-------------- --------------


17. (C) Convincing Deby not to run is not without risk for
us. Although Deby has said that he is tired and has not yet
officially stated that he is going to run for a third term,
we still could alienate Deby, the key player in any
transition scenario. The Ambassador's Independence Day
speech emboldened many in Chad hoping for democratic change,
but Deby reacted harshly. There is a risk that he would
similarly view U.S. efforts to convince him to leave power as
siding with his enemies. To minimize this risk, we need
strong backing from Washington and a coordinated message from
other members of the diplomatic community. We need to be
seen giving tangible assistance, not promises, to put Chad on
the right path forward. The country has never had a peaceful
handover of power in its post-independence history. Its
chances for doing so now -- and its future as a stable,
cooperative partner with us on Darfur, refugees,
counter-terrorism, and oil -- depend on creating the
conditions for a genuine democratic transition. We can make
a difference by our efforts toward encouraging a more
peaceful, democratic future for Chad.
WALL


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