Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NDJAMENA1412
2005-09-16 08:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ndjamena
Cable title:  

WEIGHING IN WITH THE DARFUR REBELS: SLM CONFERENCE

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


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 ------------------3A5609 160818Z /38 
FM AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2311
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
DARFUR COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY PARIS 
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 
USMISSION GENEVA
C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001412 

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI,
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL,
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: WEIGHING IN WITH THE DARFUR REBELS: SLM CONFERENCE
PLANS MOVE FORWARD

REF: STATE 168722

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001412

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI,
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL,
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/15/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF KAWC CD SU
SUBJECT: WEIGHING IN WITH THE DARFUR REBELS: SLM CONFERENCE
PLANS MOVE FORWARD

REF: STATE 168722

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador Wall met with members of Mini
Minawi's camp of the Sudan Liberation Movement on September
12 to discuss their views on the recently held Joint
Commission, their conference plans, and the Abuja talks. The
high-level group explained the importance the field
commanders are placing on the conference to establish a
negotiating mandate and better organize the movement's
leadership. The SLM members feel ignored by the African
Union and want international support for a two-week delay in
the talks. The Ambassador emphasized the importance of tying
the conference to a firm date to return to the negotiating
table and offered several alternatives scenarios for SLM to
accomplish its objectives and re-start the negotiations. For
their part, SLM members say they will remain flexible, but
Abdelwahid's exclusion of them from the negotiating team list
has only deepened their distrust and hardened their resolve
to move ahead with the conference. End Summary.


2. (SBU) On September 12, prior to receiving reftel,
Ambassador Wall, DCM, P/E Officer met with eight leaders from
the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM),including top members of
the negotiating team, to discuss their plans for the
conference and the Abuja negotiations. The group included
lead negotiator Abduljabar Dosa, Trai Ahmed Ali, Mohammed
Tijani, Abakar Abubashir, Abdelhasiz Moussa, Mahmoud Adam
Mahmoud, Suliman Omar Dahiya, and Mohammed Harin. Over 30
SLM members are already in N'Djamena and more are arriving
daily to participate in the conference planning.


3. (SBU) Ambassador Wall asked the group how their plans for
the conference and negotiations were progressing. Taking the
lead Abduljabar Dosa, explained that the SLM asked the
African Union (AU) for a postponement of the Abuja talks
until October 1. The field commanders are insisting on a

meeting to help the SLM avoid an irreparable split. The SLM
cannot negotiate effectively if there is no resolution to its
internal conflict, according to Dosa. Abakar Abubashir added
that when the SLM requested additional time, it was based on
the knowledge that it was important not to lose momentum. He
also questioned continued international pressure on the SLM
to get to the table while the Government of Sudan is
undertaking another series of attacks.


4. (SBU) Abubashir described the conference planning
workshops now underway in N'Djamena conference's execution.
The group is determining who is going and how will they get
there. They have also sent a budget request to the SLM's
friends. Continued interventions and distractions continue
to affect the conference time table. Abubashir noted that
changing plans will be difficult because the field commanders
are also working on their contributions to the conference.


5. (C) The Ambassador asked if given the short amount of
time, the field commanders might come to N'Djamena to discuss
their agenda with the SLM negotiators prior to their
departure for Abuja as an interim measure rather than trying
to rush into a full-blown conference. Dosa replied that
bringing the field commanders to N'Djamena also means moving
some forces with them and this cannot be done while the SLM
is under attack by the GOS. According to Dosa, it is easier
to move the politicos to the field.


6. (SBU) For the SLM, the conference is a pre-condition for
the next round of talks. Abubashir added that the ongoing
workshops are preparing the discussion papers for the
conference and other Dafurians are invited to begin the
Darfur-Darfur dialogue called for in the Declaration of
Principles. The movement needs to transform into a political
organization and behave democratically to ensure that any
peace agreement reached represents the aspirations of the
Dafurians. Trai Ahmed Ali pointed out that the field
commanders control a sizable piece of land and have forced
the government of Sudan to negotiate with them. More than 60
percent of the conferees will come from within Darfur. Those
inside Darfur distrust the motivations of those outside, they
are demanding to see their chairman inside Darfur. They
insist on giving their delegates to the peace talks a proper


mandate.


7. (SBU) Tijani Mohammed added that SLM cannot go back to
the Abjua talks in its current fragile state. The trying
experience in the discussions over the Declaration of
Principles (DOP) was a low point for the movement and exposed
its vulnerabilities to the GOS. Tijani said SLM has been
working on the conference since February and promised the
field commanders it would be held by October 31. SLM
requested a postponement of the Abuja talks in order to
finish the work underway. According to Tijani, Jan Pronk
publicly supported a postponement to the end of September.
However, according to Tijani, the African Union (AU) never
responded and did not issue an invitation to them for the
talks. Despite a meeting with Salim in N'Djamena last week,
the SLM members did not feel genuinely consulted by the AU.
In a separate conversation, the same group told P/E officer
that from their perspective Salim deliberately ignored the
needs of the largest military force on the ground as he
arbitrarily set the resumption date, first for August 24 and
then for September 15. They view Salim's "compromise" as
meeting the needs of the GOS, JEM, and Abdelwahid, among whom
a deal has allegedly been struck for government positions.
As a result, the politicos say that they are having
difficulty explaining the AU's positions to the field
commanders, who are threatening to re-start hostilities.


8. (C) Ambassador Wall asked if the group feared that the
conference would divide rather than unite the SLM. Abubashir
said that it is all right to be divided if the case is put
before all Darfurians and that is what the Darfurian people
decide is the best way to move forward. He added that the
international community's assistance could help the SLM avoid
the possibility of deeper division. He questioned whether
the SLM's current situation of fragility is good for the
international community's interests. Tijani commented that
the GOS and others (i.e. the Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) and the SLM Chairman Abdelwahid Nur) are capitalizing
on the discussions and sabotaging the movement's ability to
become stronger. P/E officer asked if all the non-Zaghawa
field commanders were involved in the conference planning.
Various members of the group responded that all the
commanders on the ground, not just Mini's, are involved.
(Note: Later, Ali told P/E officer that this is exactly
Abdelwahid's fears most. End Note.)


9. (C) Ambassador Wall told the SLM members that the U.S.
would welcome being able to consider a concrete proposal for
helping the SLM organize itself, but needs a clear timeline
for the conference which must be tied to a date to return to
the peace talks. In addition, the budget, dates, location,
and invitees to the conference would be useful. Tijani
agreed with the Ambassador that the SLM's plans are
ambitious, but noted the internal struggle over the DOP
awakened members and strengthened their commitment to
negotiations. Ali added that a two week postponement is not
life or death to the AU. A two-week delay is important to
organize and strengthen the representation for the people of
Darfur. He asked what are the material benefits of
re-starting the talks on September 15 versus October 1. In
addition, given the recent GOS attacks, including one on a
mosque at Tawilla, the conference has become more important
than the Abuja talks.


10. (C) Ambassador Wall proposed another alternative to the
group. This would include the AU's idea of holding workshops
on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security arrangements
in the coming two weeks; beginning the talks in early
October; and breaking for the Muslim holiday. This could
allow the SLM to have its conference the last week of
October. Serious negotiations would take place after the
conference. The SLM members said they would consider this,
but for them, support for postponement is the best sign of
the international community's understanding of the gravity of
the situation.

- - - - - - - - - - - -
CONFERENCE PREPARATIONS
- - - - - - - - - - - -


11. (C) P/E officer meets with the SLM conferees on a
daily basis and has observed their work on the conference.


Committees are writing discussion papers, making decisions on
structural issues, and sorting out travel arrangements. The
group has been holding day-long consultations focused on
different aspects of an organizational structure. Chad is
helping with logistics and has rented an additional house for
arriving SLM members. The SLM team expects the conference to
define a clear negotiating strategy, a coherent body with a
unified vision for the future, and the development of a
structure to facilitate the resolution of disputes within the
movement.


12. (C) Additional discussion papers include the return,
reintegration and rehabilitation of refugees and
internally-displaced persons; manifesto and constitution;
transformation of the movement into a political party; human
rights issues; development of Darfur's economic and social
infrastructure; role of civil society, women, and youth; and
Darfur's place in Sudan's macro-economic picture. Political
issues to be discussed include federalism, foreign relations
with neighboring countries, land tenure issues, relations
between farmers and herders, and the reconstruction of
Darfur's social fabric.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ABDELWAHID EXCLUDES MINI'S CAMP
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -


13. (C) On September 14, Mohammed Harin and Abubashir came
to the Embassy with a letter of protest regarding the
exclusion of 12 members of the SLM from the Abuja
negotiations by Abdelwahid. The group, all of whom are in
N'Djamena, were removed from the list after Vice Chairman
Khamis Abdullah last saw it. All of the various SLM factions
agreed in Abuja in July to maintain the same negotiating team
until their internal problems were resolved. Abdelwahid
allegedly waited until Khamis had traveled to edit the list
and send it to the AU. It is not clear how the AU will
respond to the list which excludes key players from the Abuja
negotiations. On September 11, Abdelwahid's advisor Dr.
Ahmed Abdulshafi, who was in N'Djamena, told P/E officer that
he was supposed to travel to Jebel Mara to visit Abdelwahid's
field commanders and make plans for the Chairman to travel to
Darfur after the next round of talks. However, because
Minister of Territorial Administration Gen. Mahamat Ali
Abdallah was traveling, he did not obtain the necessary
permission to cross the border.

- - - -
COMMENT
- - - -


14. (C) Abdelwahid's attempt to sideline Mini's camp has
only deepened the distrust between the two groups. The SLM
list given to the AU does not represent all of the SLM
factions. The irony is that Abdelwahid has now given Mini's
camp a good excuse to go ahead and hold their conference
regardless of the Abuja timeline. Abdelwahid's hamhandedness
will eventually backfire and undermine his credibility even
further within the movement. It may even give Vice Chairman
Khamis Abdullah, and the non-Zaghawa ethnic groups, reason to
ally with Mini's camp. He is already on thin ice with many
Fur, who are looking for an opportunity to replace him, but
have not yet done so for fear of Zaghawa domination. Should
this happen, it undermines Abdelwahid's claims the conference
will not be representative. Angered by Abdelwahid's
duplicity, the group in N'Djamena is resolved to continue
with its planning. They are remaining flexible, however,
especially in light of their own ambitious timetable and the
tremendous logistics effort the conference will require. In
our view, if the current plan holds, the conference may be
held the first or second week of October. It could be held a
week or two later if some members of Mini's camp go to Abuja.
Bahar Arabi arrives back in N'Djamena on September 19. He
is currently stranded in Nairobi. P/E officer is attempting
to reach Dr. Sharif Harir and Adam Shogar in the field.
WALL


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