DISCUSSING DARFUR WITH DEBY

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001209

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, INR/GGI,
PRM, USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS
FOR AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL,
ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA FOR REFCOORDS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF CD SU
SUBJECT: DISCUSSING DARFUR WITH DEBY


Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: President Idriss Deby outlined Chad's
perspective on the upcoming round of negotiations on Darfur
in a meeting on July 29 with Ambassador John Yates, the U.S.
Special Representative to the talks. Deby expressed his
concerns with the African Union's lack of consultation and
acceptance of the views of Chad, as the co-mediator, and the
proposals of other partners. He also shared his doubts about
how representative the movements' leadership was and
emphasized the importance of resolving divisions within the
movements prior to the next round of talks. Finally, Deby
stated the need to expand the mandate of the AU forces to
protect civilians. The meeting appeared to settle some of
Chad's angst over challenges to its role as co-mediator in
the peace process. The Chad mediation team is traveling to
Addis Ababa on August 3 for meetings with the AU.
Nonetheless, we urge a consultative visit to Chad by Dr.
Salim Salim similar to those undertaken by his predecessor
prior to the next round of talks. End Summary.


2. (C) On July 29, Ambassador Wall, Special Representative
for the Darfur Peace Talks Ambassador John Yates, and P/E
Officer met with President Idriss Deby to solicit Chad's
views on the Darfur peace process. Chad's mediation team,
General Mahamat Ali Abdullah and Allam-mi Ahmad, and Cabinet
Director Mahamat Ali Annadif and Presidential Secretary
Brahim Deby participated in the meeting.

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THE TROUBLE WITH THE AFRICAN UNION...
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3. (C) President Idriss Deby, well in command of the details
of the Darfur situation, stated that Chad will continue its
co-mediation role in the peace process and views the coming
discussions of political questions essential to the
resolution of the crisis. Deby noted the continued negative
evolution of the situation with the African Union. He said
that Chad's involvement in the resolution of the conflict
pre-dated the AU's and outlined the process through which
Chad became a co-mediator with the AU. Chad has the
advantage of knowing the key players and the terrain better
than the staff at the AU. However, the AU continues to
ignore Chad's written strategy proposals and does not listen
to advice, particularly about personalities and events on the
ground, according to Deby. He counseled that the AU must be
willing to take into account the views and proposals of other
partners.


4. (C) Deby gave as an example a five-point plan for the
resolution of the Darfur situation put forward by Sudanese
President Bashir in Tripoli. The plan called for autonomy
for Darfur, an wealth-sharing formula, participation by the
rebels in the government and in the management of the
country, reconstruction and development in Darfur, and the
return of refugees to Sudan in five years. Deby stated that
the plan was presented in front of five heads of state,
including those of Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and Chad. (Note:
He could not remember the fifth. End Note.) Chad's
frustration with the AU's inability to make concrete
decisions stems from the "incalculable consequences" that the
presence of the Sudanese refugees is taking on the country's
economy, environment, and stability, according to Deby. He
noted that the conflict in Darfur threatens to drag the whole
region into a war like the one in Africa's Great Lakes region.


5. (C) In an effort to prepare for the next round of
discussions, Chad's mediation team, Allam-mi and Ali, will
head to Addis Ababa on August 3 to consult with the AU. It
is not clear if Salim Salim will be there, according to
Allam-mi.

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DIVISIONS WITHIN AND BETWEEN THE MOVEMENTS
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6. (C) Deby discussed the divisions within the rebel
movements. He expressed his conviction that the rebel
leaders at the negotiating table do not represent their
movements on the ground. He questioned what Dr. Khalil

Ibrahim, Abdelwahid Nur, and Mini Minawi have done in the
field over the past two years and whom each of the three
actually represents now. Deby pointed out that they stand in
contrast to Dr. John Garang. Deby said "hotel rebels" do not
represent those on the ground, especially if they are afraid
to go to the field or enter into dialogue with the field
commanders.


7. (C) In addition, Deby asked how the peace process will
move forward when the two rebel movements have different
political objectives. The Justice and Equality Movement
(JEM) seeks power at the national level and would like to see
Bashir leave office. The Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM) is
calling for the development of Darfur, participation in
governance, and the coexistence of different communities.
Deby questioned whether this would mean negotiating with each
movement separately, i.e., one set of negotiations between
the GOS and SLM and one set between the GOS and JEM.


8. (C) Deby's last point concerned the role of Libya. He
acknowledged that as an AU member and a neighboring country,
Libya has a role in the talks. However, he expressed concern
about the members and leaders of the rebel movements
traveling to Tripoli without any of the international
partners present.

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MODALITIES OF UPCOMING TALKS
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9. (C) Ambassador Yates told Deby that the United States
recognizes and appreciates Chad's key role in the peace
process and its position as a co-mediator. He reiterated
Secretary Rice's hope that a political agreement could be

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finished by the end of the year. He noted the U.S. concern
that the establishment of the Government of National Unity in
Sudan not be upset by the absence of an agreement on Darfur.
Yates said that the Secretary's and the Deputy Secretary's
visits to Darfur underscore the priority the United States
places on obtaining peace in Darfur. Yates agreed that the
SLM has too many divisions. He told Deby that the United
States has contacts with the various rebel leaders and also
is urging the resolution to SLM's leadership issues.
Ambassador Yates outlined the AU's current ideas on ways in
which to accelerate the next round of talks. For example,
the AU is thinking about running concurrent negotiating
committees on power sharing, wealth sharing, and security
arrangements. In addition, the AU wants to limit the size of
the official delegations to a maximum of 25.


10. (C) Deby responded, noting that ten to fifteen
delegates per movement should be enough. Deby advised that a
leader of each delegation must be designated to make
decisions on behalf of the group. Deby complained that the
various rebel leaders, Abdelwahid, Mini, and Khalil attend
openings and then leave. More importantly, the negotiators
at the table must represent and be accepted by those in
Darfur, and various ethnic groups must be adequately
represented by the movements. Deby questioned whether Dr.
Khalil Ibrahim represents anyone in the field. He also
stated that the United States, the EU, France, and other
partners need to place the same pressure on the parties and
that the AU, Nigeria, and Chad act consistently to provide
coherence to the process in the future.


11. (C) Ambassador Yates agreed, explaining that this was
the underlying purpose of his trip to Addis Ababa, Khartoum,
and N'Djamena. Deby appreciated Yates's point that he had
chosen these capitals, not Tripoli or Asmara, for this round
on consultations. Yates cautioned, however, that he is
realistic about the pace of progress in the next round, given
that it took 30 days to negotiate three pages of text. Yates
noted that much work needs to be done before the next round,
the members of the movements must be prepared, and the AU
needs to prepare as much as possible in advance. Deby
agreed, expressing again his concern with the movements'
internal problems. Yates also expressed appreciation for
Chad's assistance in the Rwandan airlift. Deby stated that
it is critical to augment the AU forces on the ground. Deby
added that the AU protection force needs an expanded mandate
to include protection of civilians. He noted that right now,
the AU monitors are very expensive, given the number of

protection force members designated to protect the current
number of monitors and the cost of the deployment.

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COMMENT
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12. (C) Deby demonstrated a detailed understanding of
obstacles facing the Abuja peace process. He appeared
pleased that Ambassador Yates included Chad in consultations
on the upcoming round of negotiations. The travel of the
Chad mediators to Addis Ababa is a positive step toward
ironing out some of the problems that occurred in Abuja. We
note, however, that given the lack of an AU presence in Chad,
a visit by Dr. Salim Salim to N'Djamena for consultations is
important. His predecessor made several visits to Chad to
coordinate mediation efforts and take stock of the situation
on the ground. Deby's criticisms of Dr. Khalil Ibrahim and
JEM are not new and the representation of both movements at
the negotiating table is an issue that will continue to
plague the talks. This is an issue that the AU needs to
tackle directly.


13. (U) Ambassador Yates did not have an opportunity to
clear this cable prior to departure.


14. (U) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL


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