SCENARIOS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L NDJAMENA 001134

SIPDIS


DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, D, DRL, H, INR, PRM,
USAID/OTI AND USAID/W FOR DAFURRMT; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
AFRICAWATCHERS; GENEVA FOR CAMPBELL, ADDIS/NAIROBI/KAMPALA
FOR REFCOORDS; NSC FOR SENIOR DIRECTOR COURVILLE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/04/2014
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREF PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: SCENARIOS FOR POLITICAL CHANGE IN CHAD

REF: A. NDJAMENA 04 1992

B. NDJAMENA 909

Classified By: Political/Economic Officer Kathleen FitzGibbon for reaso
ns 1.4(b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Chad is currently experiencing another
period of heightened uncertainty. Deby has been able to
navigate through them in the past. (Reftels) Nonetheless,
the removal of presidential term limits through a
less-than-transparent public referendum has many observers
wondering what the next power transition might look like in
Chad. This cable looks at possible scenarios for regime
change over the near and long term. End Summary.

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NO CONFIDENCE
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2. (C) It came as no surprise that the Government
manipulated the results to demonstrate a large turn-out and
an overwhelming "yes" vote in favor of removing presidential
term limits. However, no one is fooled by the announced
numbers. Despite "victory", the regime was shaken by the low
turn-out, not that unpopularity will likely deter the
President and his Zaghawa clansmen from doing as they please.
Nonetheless, the referendum's announced outcome has sparked
speculation over President Deby's health and his next moves.
His family continues to weigh their political future as well.
The political opposition feels vindicated by the low voter
turn-out for the referendum, but their ability to mobilize
the Chadian public remains weak. Chadian rebels continue to
make noises from the east. The next key event is the
nomination of the ruling Movement for Patriotic Salvation's
(MPS) candidate at its party congress later this year. There
also may be changes within the cabinet and the leadership of
the ruling party, though not likely until the President
returns to Chad from his recent extended stay in France for
medical treatment.

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SCENARIOS FOR CHANGE
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3. (SBU) The announced results of the public referendum
means that Chadian leaders can rule without legal limits on
their "mandates". Now that this possibility has materialized
through the referendum, many observers are wondering whether
or not there can ever be a peaceful transition of power in
the country. Chad's post-independence history provides no
precedence for such a handover. We thought it prudent to
outline some of the possible political scenarios in Chad's
near and distant future and our opportunities to influence
the outcomes.

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PRESIDENT-FOR-LIFE
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4. (C) In this scenario, President Deby returns from Paris
after his medical treatment, likely reshuffles his cabinet,
and takes steps to make changes within the ruling MPS. Later
this year, he is nominated for another presidential term.
Security forces step up their efforts to maintain Deby in
power, press harassment continues, and government opponents
are harassed and jailed. The current political and economic
malaise grows as do ethnic tensions, particularly in the
east. President Deby proceeds with the communal elections in
October, the MPS party congress in November, and the
presidential and legislative elections from March to May

2006. He is re-elected in a less-than-transparent election.


5. (C) Most of the signs point in this direction, beginning
with the faulty electoral census and the rigging of the vote
count for the referendum to the continuing harassment of the
press over its sources of open letters criticizing the
regime. This path, like the others, is fraught with the
potential for instability. Deby's refusal to transfer power
will galvanize his opponents. We would need to decide on
whether or not to participate in the electoral process and,
if so, how to avoid appearing to bless the outcome of a

process that can be expected to be marred by irregularities.
The actions of other key external actors, such as the
positions of the French and the African Union, will have
significant influence over how this scenario progresses.

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PRESIDENT DIES WITH NO HEIR APPARENT
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6. (C) Deby's health is a never-ending source of
speculation. Some insiders say that the has been told not to
drink or smoke, but continues to do so, aggravating his
condition. As a result, the possibility that Deby dies or is
incapacitated without having adequately groomed an acceptable
successor or prepared the ruling party for such an
eventuality creates a power vacuum. In this scenario, the
potential for violence is high, most likely among the Zaghawa
themselves, but some fear that an interethnic fight could
emerge. The independent media and some other observers
believe that Deby's son Ibrahim is being groomed to succeed
his father. However, a member of the Deby family tells us
that Ibrahim is unacceptable and would be prevented from
assuming power by others.


7. (C) No one seems to have yet identified a player with
national stature behind whom others might coalesce. There
are some indications that the political opposition, the Army,
and even possibly, the French are concerned enough about this
scenario that they may be in the beginning stages of devising
a plan to manage a transition devoid of violence. The most
important internal actors remain Deby's immediate family, and
the Army's leadership. External actors, such as France, the
United States, and other AU leaders, will need to be ready to
push together for a constitutional transition. The
groundwork, however, including sending signals to ambitious
army officers or family members will need to be started in
advance.

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PRESIDENT DIES, CONSTITUTION CHANGED BY DECREE
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8. (C) During Deby's last medical vacation in Paris, he is
rumored to have issued a decree changing the presidential
succession, according to members of the security services.
The current Constitutional succession allows the President of
the National Assembly, a southerner, to oversee elections
within 45 to 90 days of the vacancy. This makes many Zaghawa
nervous, and indeed, it makes the current National Assembly
President even more nervous. He reportedly fears that if
Deby dies, he will be killed to make way for the National
Assembly's Vice President, a northerner, to manage the
transition. This scenario also invites violence between
northerners and southerners as some view the NASS VP to be
pushing an Islamic agenda. In addition, the decree could
designate someone outside the current succession plan,
creating a potential for conflict. The key players in this
scenario are Deby and those closest to him. Deby also would
have had to coopt the security services into respecting the
decreed successor. Outside actors, with the exception of
France, would likely be informed too late to make an impact.

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PRESIDENT DIES, CONSTITUTIONAL SUCCESSION FOLLOWED
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9. (C) In this scenario, the legal mechanisms for a
Constitutional transition are respected. However, key groups
maneuver to rig the election of the new President. It is
entirely possibly that a deal could be forged between ethnic
powerbrokers to ensure that no violence erupts, but it could
also degenerate into trouble if one group is given the
opportunity to manipulate the transition while excluding
others.


10. (C) In a second, but less likely scenario, opposition
parties and other ethnic groups are allowed to compete
freely. However, whether or not they would call for
prosecution of the Zaghawa for crimes committed during their
tenure in power or offer amnesty could be an important factor
in the level of competition allowed. The opposition must

back a single candidate to have a chance of winning the
election and/or the MPS must produce a strong candidate. The
acceptance of this outcome by others will be critical to the
transitions sustainability. Key players include the NASS
President, the MPS, the Zaghawa, and the opposition. The
emergence of this scenario could mean that the international
community must be prepared to react quickly to bolster a
positive outcome and support a free and fair electoral
process should one emerge.

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PRESIDENT OVERTHROWN OR DIES IN A COUP D'ETAT
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11. (C) The issues underlying last year's May 16 coup
attempt remain. Some have been exacerbated. First, it is
even more clear to others that Deby may want to be
President-for-life, which will make it difficult for another
Zaghawa to come to power. In addition, a deep rift between
Deby and his half-brother Daoussa has developed over
management of the Darfur crisis which includes other members
of the family. Deby and his son Ibrahim are working closely
with a marabou called Sheik Badradine to destroy the Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) and bring a Zaghawa, Mini Minawi,
the current Secretary General, to the top of the Sudan
Liberation Movement (SLM). Daoussa, General Mahamat Ali
Abdullah, and Timan Deby, the President's younger brother,
reportedly oppose this strategy and are trying to strengthen
the movement by helping it organize itself better to overcome
its leadership problems.


12. (C) Daoussa and the Erdimi brothers, according to a
family member, allegedly viewed the referendum as a vote of
no-confidence in Deby and may be looking for ways out of the
current situation. One assumption in this scenario, is that
the President has lost sufficient respect from within the
family and the Army to be vulnerable to a take-over.


13. (C) A putsch could be limited to the confines of the
palace and/or family, as was last year's attempt. However,
who leads the coup could be an important factor as to whether
or not it would stand or there would be counter-coup
attempts. Another question is whether or not a coup leader
would remain in power or hand it over to the National
Assembly President. Another variation of this scenario would
be if the President is overthrown but survives. He is either
arrested or escapes into exile. If Deby survives, the
international community may have to consider supporting
Deby's return to office.

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PRESIDENT DOES NOT RUN, MANAGES A PEACEFUL TRANSITION
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14. (C) This is a best case scenario for Chad's immediate
and long-term future. Deby decides because of his health or
for other reasons not to seek a third term. He could come
under other pressure, perhaps from the family, or the Army,
to cut a deal before being forced out of power. In a
scenario in which Deby decides not to run, the key factor for
whether or not there would be violence, is how he manages it.
He would most likely work within his immediate family, his
extended Zaghawa clan, and the Army to find an acceptable
candidate. He could even make overtures to the political
opposition, armed rebel groups, and other ethnic groups in an
effort to forge a consensus on Chad's new leadership, which
could include some opposition members of government.


15. (C) For this scenario to emerge, internal and external
actors would need to present Deby with an acceptable exit
strategy. A coordinated effort beginning now would have the
most likelihood of success. Options for his retirement could
include working for the United Nations or African Union in
some capacity. The French, the United States, and other
members of the international community would need to work
together to persuade Deby that by leaving power he can build
a strong legacy and not put Chad on the path to civil war.
In this scenario, we might have to accept a
less-than-democratic change of government (i.e. back someone
Deby's choice) or accept less-than-perfect election results
to ensure that a change in power occurs.

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KEY CALCULATIONS
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15. (C) There are probably many permutations of these
scenarios. We acknowledge that the Chadian military and
security forces. have an important, if not essential, role to
play in how a transition emerges because they will likely
determine the level of violence and instability that would
accompany a change of power.


16. (C) The role of public apathy, another important
factor, is difficult to measure. The level of public hatred
for the Zaghawa is reportedly very high. Chadians expressed
their disaffection with the current regime by not voting, but
the opposition has yet to produce a candidate attractive
enough for Chadians to rally behind. Our assessment is that
the Chadian public wants peaceful change through legal means,
but lacks the mechanism to produce it. The general mood
seems to be one of acquiescence to Deby's plan if the
alternative means forcing a change and provoking instability.
We often hear that Chadians look to the U.S. to push for
political change.

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COMMENT
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17. (C) Any of the above scenarios could emerge. We are
constantly looking for ways to play a positive role in
managing outcomes here. We have a great deal at stake in
what happens next in Chad. U.S. programs such as the
Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Initiative (TSTCI),
Anti-Terrorism Training (ATA),assistance for Sudanese
refugees, and support for the oil revenue management plan
could all be put at risk with an irregular change of power.
A disruptive transition could also hamper Darfur diplomacy
and have an adverse impact on other neighbors. To be
effective, however, we need to work closely with key internal
players and our international partners to maximize the
likelihood of a peaceful transition.



18. (C) Khartoum and Tripoli Minimize Considered.
WALL


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