Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NAIROBI4902
2005-11-29 01:29:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

A DEFINING MOMENT FOR KIBAKI,S PRESIDENCY

Tags:  KE KDEM PGOV PREL KCOR 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004902 

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015
TAGS: KE KDEM PGOV PREL KCOR
SUBJECT: A DEFINING MOMENT FOR KIBAKI,S PRESIDENCY

Classified By: AMB. WILLIAM M. BELLAMY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b,d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004902

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/27/2015
TAGS: KE KDEM PGOV PREL KCOR
SUBJECT: A DEFINING MOMENT FOR KIBAKI,S PRESIDENCY

Classified By: AMB. WILLIAM M. BELLAMY FOR REASONS 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. President Kibaki met with me and three
other chiefs of mission on November 25. The COMs praised the
government,s handling of the Constitutional Referendum and
Kibaki,s stoic leadership following the massive &no8 vote.
We urged that Kibaki seize this chance to remove corrupt and
non-performing ministers, bring in fresh talent and put his
economic and political reform program back on track. Kibaki
reacted warmly to the demarche but was vague with regard to
the future. If he makes the wrong move now by retaining the
corruption kingpins in his cabinet alongside advisers who
have badly served him politically, he may have a hard time
governing at all. End Summary.


2. (C) Chiefs of Mission from the US, UK, Sweden and Canada
called on President Kibaki at State House on November 25 to
discuss the Referendum defeat, Kibaki,s dissolution of his
cabinet and his future plans. After praising the fairness of
the Referendum voting, and Kibaki,s calm leadership in the
wake of his defeat, the like-minded group of diplomats urged
Kibaki to regard the referendum setback as an opportunity to
rid his cabinet of corrupt and non-performing ministers and
as a chance to re-launch his political and economic reform
agenda. The message from the Kenyan voters, we pointed out,
was not that they wanted snap elections (as the "ORANGE"
opposition movement is demanding) or a new President.
Rather, the message seems to be that they want a cleaner,
harder working, less divided government. Only the President
can deliver on that demand. We urged Kibaki to be as
inclusive as possible in forming a new cabinet.


3. (C) Kibaki agreed with our characterization of the
voters, message. He said his priority was to form a
government that &would get down to work.8 Too many months
had already been lost squabbling over political issues,
including a new constitution. Kibaki added that he wanted
his new cabinet to be broadly based, but was not sure that
ORANGE Democratic Movement opponents would be cooperative.
If &ORANGE8 ministers were included in the cabinet, the

risk is that they would prove as divisive and disruptive as
before, Kibaki said.


4. (C) Throughout the cordial 40-minute conversation, Kibaki
avoided any hint of specific personalities to be included in
the new government. He was confident, however, that &we
won,t have any shortage of talent to draw upon.8 Beyond
promising a &hard working8 government in which ministers
concentrated on their portfolios rather than on partisan
politics, he offered little in terms of future policy
directions.


5. (C) Comment. Other like-minded diplomats could have been
included in the demarche, but the group was kept small to
lend a degree of intimacy to the discussion. Kibaki was
accompanied only by policy adviser Stanley Murage and
personal assistant Hyslop Ipu.


6. (S/NF) In part, this demarche was motivated by sensitive
reporting available to the US and UK (which was not shared
with the other diplomats) that several prominent Kikuyu
politicians had told Kibaki that his referendum defeat was
due to the joint efforts of the UK and US governments and
Kenya,s national intelligence service (NSIS). (Note: At
least one newspaper report has quoted former Justice and
Constitutional Affairs Minister Murungi blaming NSIS for
"failing to provide political intelligence8 and calling for
the dismissal of NSIS director Boinett.)


7. (C) If Kibaki believes this talk, he displayed no sign of
it during our discussion. His overall performance, however,
was not completely reassuring. Despite his generalized
assurances about bringing new faces into the cabinet, he
repeatedly passed up opportunities to indicate that he would
dismiss ministers identified as corrupt (e.g. Transport
Minister Murungaru) or incompetent (e.g. Foreign Minister
Mwakwere) or as purveyors of the kind of bad, sectarian
political advice that led to the referendum debacle in the
first place (e.g. Justice and Constitutional Affairs Minister
Murungi).


8. (C) The choice facing Kibaki is stark. He can clean
house, and thus send a signal to voters that he,s heard them
loud and clear. This would restore a good measure of
Kibaki,s tarnished popularity and would position him to
resume progress along the political and economic reform
track. (He will need some help from the &ORANGE8 camp to
do this. If he reaches out and is rebuffed by "ORANGE"
politicians, he will still win points with the public for
being Presidential.) Alternatively, Kibaki could rebuff the
electorate by retaining the group of mostly Kikuyu insiders
who have served him and the country so badly in recent
months. Circling the wagons would keep rivals like Raila
Odinga out of power (for now) but would almost certainly lead
to increased official corruption and even less transparency
and efficiency in government than before. Under this
scenario, few Kenyans outside the Kikuyu heartland would
regard the Kibaki government as truly representative or
responsive to their interests.


9. (C) While the choice seems obvious, it may not be so
apparent to Kibaki. Given opportunities in the past three
years, he has often selected the security of tribe and
kinship over the uncertainties of outreach and coalition
building. If he does so again, he may find it hard to govern
at all. End Comment.
BELLAMY