Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NAIROBI4866
2005-11-25 05:47:00
SECRET
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SOMALI PIRACY -- ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Tags:  PGOV PTER PREL ASEC KPAO SO KE 
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 004866 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF
STATE PASS AID
DHS FOR ICE
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2025
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALI PIRACY -- ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
RE: CONOPS TO COMBAT PIRACY OFF THE SOMALIA COAST

SUMMARY
--------

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 004866

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF
STATE PASS AID
DHS FOR ICE
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/22/2025
TAGS: PGOV PTER PREL ASEC KPAO SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALI PIRACY -- ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS
RE: CONOPS TO COMBAT PIRACY OFF THE SOMALIA COAST

SUMMARY
--------------


1. (S) Country Team elements directly engaged in the issue
of piracy off the Somali coast met to discuss the impact of
possible interdiction operations in the Somali political,
clan, and CT context. We recommend options that mitigate
any impact on the current Somali political process or on-
going CT efforts. We believe this can be accomplished
through the use of appropriate existing authorities under
international law for the interdiction of piracy on the
high seas. We caution against plans that require
operations against land-based targets, or inside Somali
territorial waters. It would be most useful to conduct any
eventual operations with coalition partners, if possible.
Appropriate regional states and authorities should be
briefed prior to operations. END SUMMARY.


2. (S) DCM (then as CDA) chaired a meeting of key
intelligence, military, security and political officers of
the Country Team on 16 November 2005 to discuss the
dramatically increased incidence of hijacking and piracy
off the Somali coast. Participants were encouraged by
ongoing efforts from Coalition Forces Maritime Component
Command (CFMCC) to develop a Concept of Operations (CONOPS)
for the disruption and prevention of further acts of piracy
in the vicinity of the Somalia coast. While there appears
to be clear USG interest in taking action to disrupt and
eliminate piracy off the Horn of Africa, Post reiterates
some key points to all involved in the planning and
execution of potential courses of action. It is not the
intention of these recommendations to limit the
effectiveness of potential planned actions, but only to
ensure that all precautions are taken to protect USG
interests in the Horn of Africa.

POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT
--------------


3. (S) The political situation in Somalia can be described
as fragile, at best. The individuals and clans engaged
over the last three years in the creation of Transitional

Federal Institutions (TFIs) to bring central governance to
Somalia are now preparing for open warfare among
themselves. Neither the TFIs nor their individual members
can be considered as interlocutors on the subject of
interdiction or prevention of piracy. None are in control
of more than a portion of Somali national territory, and no
one individual or group is able to impose order on the
nearly 2,000 km-long Somali coastline.

PERCEPTIONS OF POTENTIAL
USG ACTIONS
--------------


4. (S) Post strongly urges that any possible plans of
Coalition and U.S. action be formulated with the clear
objective of maintaining the current USG position of
neutrality in relation to both the TFI stalemate and the
complex web of Somali clan alliances and antagonisms. In
this context, direct USG action against land targets
(camps, beached boats, people) is likely to be problematic.
Such action would be extremely difficult to target on
actual perpetrators, and could easily result in collateral
damage to members of the general population.


5. (S) The USG has sought to maintain a delicate balance in
our relations with all non-extremist factions and
individuals, focusing on a return of governance as the most
important outcome to support our CT efforts in the Horn of
Africa. All effort should be made to ensure that USG anti-
piracy actions do not in fact catalyze further conflict
among the parties to this tense stalemate. Direct action
against Somali territory, especially if civilian casualties
result from it, could spark a nationalistic backlash.
Possible negative consequences for us could include the
loss of cooperation within Somalia among individual
partners in our CT efforts, as well as increased activism
among, and legitimacy for, Islamist or Jihadist extremists.


6. (S) It is noteworthy that individual members of the
TFIs, including the titular "Transitional Federal
President", Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed, and "Prime Minister",
Ali Mohamed Ghedi, have issued public requests for
assistance against piracy in international waters off
Somalia's coast. Requests from individuals holding these
titles and positions could be seen as providing
justification for USG action on Somali territory. This is
not the case; in reality, such requests are inevitably seen
as one faction attempting to impose itself as the sole
representative of the TFIs. Accordingly, such a request by
one faction of the TFIs can and will be perceived by other
factions -- and possibly by Islamist and Jihadist
extremists -- as counter to their interests. To act on the
request would only serve to place the USG with one side or
the other in their conflicts. Lastly, we must also
consider potential retaliation for USG action that might be
taken against ships crews, among them nationals of USG
allies, currently held onboard pirated ships.
SEEK LEGITIMACY IN EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL NORMS
--------------


7. (S) Post encourages planning agencies and commands to
pursue an outcome of any USG action that can be perceived
by the people of Somalia and the international community as
an action taken against international piracy and not
against the Somali people. Existing international laws
should provide ample justification for intervention of
coalition forces in international waters against
perpetrators of piracy. We remind agencies and commands
that Somalia's status as the world's quintessential "failed
state" is defined as an absence of central governance, not
as a removal of international protections of territorial
sovereignty. We therefore recommend that every effort be
made to avoid action within Somali territorial waters, in
order to reduce accusations of a "U.S. versus Somalia"
policy. If action within Somalia's territory or
territorial waters is deemed indispensable to the success
of our mission, or to protect U.S. assets or personnel, we
strongly urge that the concerns in Para. 5 above be
factored into our planning and that such action be
considered on only a case-by-case basis.


8. (S) We think it would be useful to conduct such
operations with coalition partners if possible. This might
even include elements of the Kenyan Navy if they could be
operationalized. The political optics of an international
coalition to combat piracy are better than those of a U.S.
unilateral operation. (Our Kenyan interlocutors, for
example, would strongly support anti-piracy action in
Somalia, provided it is perceived as a
multinational/coalition operation.) We should plan to
brief other regional states and authorities prior to the
conduct of operations in the expectation that they too
would support or endorse action to combat piracy.

BELLAMY