Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NAIROBI4764
2005-11-16 10:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

COASTAL SECURITY KEY TO KENYAN COUNTER-TERRORISM

Tags:  PTER ASEC MARR PGOV PREL PINS KISL KE 
pdf how-to read a cable
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DE RUEHNR #4764/01 3201042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161042Z NOV 05
FM AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7903
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCJBBA/COMUSNAVCENT PRIORITY
RHRMAAE/SOCCENT FWD BAHRAIN PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA PRIORITY
RHRMDBA/MARCENT COORD ELEM BAHRAIN PRIORITY
RHMFISS/USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004764 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR PGOV PREL PINS KISL KE
SUBJECT: COASTAL SECURITY KEY TO KENYAN COUNTER-TERRORISM
EFFORTS

REF: NAIROBI 0873

Classified By: PolCouns Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004764

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025
TAGS: PTER ASEC MARR PGOV PREL PINS KISL KE
SUBJECT: COASTAL SECURITY KEY TO KENYAN COUNTER-TERRORISM
EFFORTS

REF: NAIROBI 0873

Classified By: PolCouns Michael J. Fitzpatrick, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Members of post,s Coastal Security
Working Group discussed the security situation and options
for engagement with law enforcement and local leaders during
a three-day visit to Lamu. The U.S. Navy Special Warfare
training program in Lamu is progressing well, and post is
looking into other options to build on their success and
further security along the coast up to the Somali border.
Efforts will need to encourge increased cooperation among the
Kenya Police, the Navy and the Wildlife Service to improve
effectiveness of coastal patrols. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Navy Training Program Producing Results
--------------


2. (C) POLOFF traveled to Lamu November 2-5 with CJTF-HOA
Civil Affairs (CA) team and Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA)
Deputy Program Manager to look at coastal security issues and
explore avenues for engagement. Post,s Coastal Security
Working Group (CSWG) views the waters from Lamu to the Somali
border at Kiunga as vital to our counter-terrorism efforts in
Kenya, and as such are looking at a multi-tracked approach to
enhancing Kenya,s capacity to patrol these waters. The most
robust effort presently remains Maritime Operations (MAROPS)
training conducted by U.S. Navy Special Warfare personnel out
of Manda Bay Navy Base. (NOTE: The 10th cycle of the MAROPS
course was completed on November 2nd. The course
incorporated students from the Kenyan Navy, Kenya Police,
Administrative Police and Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS); 15
students successfully completed the course. During the final
maritime interdiction operations, the students successfully
boarded 27 boats, confiscated two dhows and arrested eight
people smuggling endangered species. END NOTE.)


3. (C) POLOFF and ATA officer met with the Commander of the
U.S. Navy Special Warfare Unit contingent at Manda Bay. He

assessed their presence on the waters has contributed to
security by deterring possible arms smugglers, drug runners
or terrorists. Although the Kenyan Navy has not detected any
of this type of activity during their training or boardings,
their increased presence, backed by the U.S. Naval presence,
is known and felt throughout the area. (NOTE: The MAROPS
students have had at least two successful boardings over the
past six months, which led to the arrest of illegal
turtle-meat smugglers. These arrests were publicized in the
media. END NOTE). The commander noted that the addition of
the Kenya Police, Administrative Police and KWS to the
training has contributed to strengthening the necessary
inter-agency cooperation on coastal security. Because the
Kenya Navy does not have arrest authority, it is key to
incorporate the two police agencies and KWS into maritime
patrols.

--------------
Kiunga: Key to Securing Kenya
--------------


4. (C) The group attempted to travel to Kiunga by boat on
November 4, but was unsuccessful due to abnormally low tides.
Kiunga is completely isolated from the rest of Kenya, both
economically and socially. The road from Kiunga to Lamu is
un-drivable during the rainy season, and even newspapers are
hard to come by. There are two water routes from Lamu to
Kiunga, one through the channels, and one through open ocean
waters. From town, during high tides, the journey would take
approximately two hours by speedboat along the channels plus
one hour by road. The boat operators in Lamu do not feel
comfortable traveling through the open waters and readily
admit there is no security closer to the Somali border.
Emboffs were able to find a speedboat operator to take us as
far as Mkokoni, approximately a 40 minute drive from Kiunga.
Once we passed the outlying Pate Island, boat traffic reduced
drastically. In fact, we did not pass any other boats after
Kiwaihu Bay, approximately halfway between Lamu Town and
Kiunga. Just a few miles south of Mkokoni, extremely low
tides forced emboffs to turn back. (COMMENT: The ordeal of
finding a boat operator comfortable with taking us north of
Mkokoni highlighted the need for increased security presence
in these waters. Cost was not even the issue, as Lamu
residents readily admit they were nervous about banditry and
&bad guys8 in the northern-most tip of the Kenyan coast.
END COMMENT).


5. (C) Chairman of the Lamu chapter of the Supreme Council
of Kenyan Muslims (SUPKEM) and a private contractor working
closely with CA team, Aboud Abu Bakaar, spoke openly about
the insecurity in and around Kiunga. He said he did not tell
anyone of his plans when he traveled there in the past with
CA teams because of fears that someone would send word to
their &Somali associates8 in Kiunga, who could create
trouble for the Americans. He said the 12 kilometers between
Kiunga and the Somali border are completely unpatrolled, and
he would not advise moving through those areas without armed
security. The Somali community crosses the border virtually
unchecked; most have relatives that reside on the Kenya side
of the border. Abu Bakaar assessed that the majority of
terrorist-related activities that occur in Kenya are
supported by Somalis who come through Kiunga either by boat
or road and move freely into Lamu Town and beyond. (COMMENT:
There are just four official border crossing points along the
entire 862 kilometer Somali-Kenya border: Mandera, Liboi, El
Wak and Kiunga. POLOFF visited the Liboi border in June.
Somalis cross this border without trouble, choosing whether
or not to register at the immigration office in town, a
20-minute drive from the border. Abu Bakaar described the
exact same scenario for the Kiunga crossing. END COMMENT.)

--------------
Police Face Security Challenges
--------------


6. (C) POLOFF and ATA officer called on the new Officer
Commanding Police Divison (OCPD),John Kamau, in Lamu Town to
discuss security issues. Kamau replace Mohamed Yerow (reftel)
on September 26. Unlike his predecessor, Kamau openly admit
the security challenges he faces, particularly in Kiunga and
in the waters. Kamau said he believes the terrorist threat
in Kenya is both high and credible, worrying that, with the
upcoming anniversary of the November 2002 Kikambala bombing,
&these guys8 might want to remind us of their presence. He
said Lamu, in particular, is fertile ground for terrorists to
operate. He highlighted the challenge of border security,
saying he has no partner to work with on the Somali side of
the Kiunga border, as it is run by militia. He stressed the
need for a controllable road from Kiunga in order to be able
to increase inland patrols. As for the waters, drugs,
piracy, arms trafficking and terrorist movement are the main
issues. He believed terrorists use Kiunga as their major
transit point and Lamu for their planning.


7. (C) Complicating matters are the local Sheikhs, who
Kamau accused of working against the police by &pulling the
religious card8 whenever the Police (or the Kenya Navy,
backed by U.S. Navy) make progress in investigations, arrests
or detentions. As has happened in the past when the MAROPS
students successfully arrested turtle-meat smugglers, Kamau
said the Sheikhs attempt to distract Lamu residents from the
issues of terrorism by whipping up local sentiment and
accusing the Police (or &U.S. Marines8) of harassing
Muslims. Kamau admitted he will have trouble working closely
with the Sheikhs as he is not Muslim, but he has Muslim
police officers under his command who will continue to work
with the religious leaders.


8. (C) Kamau said his biggest need is boats to patrol the
waters. The Lamu Police have two boats, but one is completely
broken and the other is in bad shape. Kamau has to ask the
Kenya Airports Authority or KWS to loan him boats if he needs
to respond to a threat or situation in the water. Kamau said
that without working boats, it is impossible to do the job of
the police in Lamu. Although he admits the police will not
have the capacity to adequately patrol all the waters, it is
key to have their presence felt by at least putting a few
boats out in the water to be seen by all. He firmly believes
that deterrence is the key, and coastal patrols will
contribute greatly to this.


9. (C) Another of Kamau,s goals as new OCPD is to work
more closely with the other security elements in Lamu.
Currently, the police and military cannot communicate as they
do not have compatible radios. Kamau wants to build a
cohesive team with the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU),
Central Investigation Department (CID) and KWS, but he has
had trouble coordinating efforts with the Navy and Fisheries
Department. He appealed to us to help empower the police,
saying the Navy cannot effectively patrol the water on their
own, especially as the police are the ones with arrest
authority.

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) COMMENT: Two conclusions were glaringly clear from
this visit. FIRST: There is still vast amounts of work to be
done on coastal security; Kenyan inter-agency cooperation is
the key to success. The Manda Bay model of their most recent
MAROPS course, incorporating the Navy, Police and KWS into
one class, should be the example for future training. No one
agency can do it on their own, and each clearly sees coastal
security as a top priority. The new OCPD is serious about
combating terrorism and should be a good partner. Unlike his
predecessor, who sugar-coated the security situation and did
not address anything of real substance with POLOFF, Kamau is
well-versed, intelligent, and takes this position seriously.


11. (C) COMMENT (CONTINUED): SECOND: Kiunga is a vital
area for both coastal and border security. Poor,
disenfranchised and conservative, with a large Somali
community that moves freely across the border, residents in
Kiunga are susceptible to outsiders who could exploit their
isolation. We do not have a current foothold in Kiunga. The
CA teams are beginning to look at engagement in the area,
which will greatly enhance access in the near term, and
hopefully security in the longer term. Kiunga will present
new challenges for us, particularly because of its geographic
isolation, but the opportunities to further Post,s Muslim
outreach efforts and enhance security are considerable. END
COMMENT.
ROWE