Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NAIROBI4762
2005-11-16 08:55:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S NAIROBI MEETING WITH

Tags:  PREL PINS MARR KPKO SU SLM 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004762 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR KPKO SU SLM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S NAIROBI MEETING WITH
AU ENVOY SALIM (NAIROBI, SAFARI PARK HOTEL, NOVEMBER 8,
2005)

Classified By: D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 004762

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025
TAGS: PREL PINS MARR KPKO SU SLM
SUBJECT: DEPUTY SECRETARY ZOELLICK'S NAIROBI MEETING WITH
AU ENVOY SALIM (NAIROBI, SAFARI PARK HOTEL, NOVEMBER 8,
2005)

Classified By: D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla, Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Deputy Secretary Zoellick met with AU Special
Envoy Salim Salim at the start of a day of meetings intended
to address the rift within the Sudan Liberation Movement
(SLM). The Deputy Secretary and Mediator agreed that the
international community should act together to encourage the
SLM to achieve a common negotiating team. Salim anticipated
three potential scenarios: re-unification of the SLM,
agreement between the different factions to adopt a common
negotiating strategy, or establishment of two distinct
organizations. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) PARTICIPANTS:
USG:
Deputy Secretary Zoellick
A/S Jendayi Frazer
NSC Cindy Courville
NSC Mike Gerson
D Chief of Staff Chris Padilla
Amb. John Yates
D Special Assistant Taiya Smith
Embassy Notetaker Lisa Peterson

AFRICAN UNION:
Dr. Salim Salim, Special Envoy
Amb. Baba Gana Kingibe, Special Representative
Amb. Christophe Liundi, Assistant to Salim
(one additional support person not identified)


3. (C) Zoellick expressed concern about the divisions within
the SLM and ongoing violations of the cease-fire, which he
thought could be an indication of break-down in command and
control within the SLM. He emphasized that the SLM could not
win militarily, and its divisions were providing an
opportunity for the government to manipulate the peace talks.
Salim agreed, saying the government could attend the talks
in Abuja and appear cooperative because the SLM were creating
the major obstacles in the talks.


4. (C) Zoellick noted a recent sense that the balance of
power was shifting within the SLM, with Minni appearing more
successful. However, given the collective nature of the SLM
leadership, even Minni's position was somewhat fragile.
Salim was not surprised that Minni had been able to draw in a
large number of participants to his recent conference because
Abdulwahid had effectively driven away a number of his
commanders with his stubborn insistence that he remains the

chairman. In the interest of stability, it is important to
take both factions seriously. Kingibe cautioned against
attributing too much success to Minni's recent initiative.
Many of Darfur's smaller tribes, he said, have serious
reservations about Minni.


5. (C) Zoellick said the international community must work
together to push the SLM to unify, respect the cease-fire,
and issue a short written statement publicly committing
themselves to these actions. As a carrot, the U.S. would be
prepared to help with the negotiations if the SLM could
achieve these steps. If not, a stick would be loss of
international support and, potentially, targeting the rebels
with existing UN sanctions. Salim noted that the
international partners, working seriously together, could
make a difference to the success or failure of the peace
process. The Declaration of Principles had been successfully
negotiated in part because there was a common position among
the international players.


6. (C) Salim described three possible scenarios for
developments within the SLM: 1.) the SLM unites and re-enters
negotiations as a single entity; 2.) the SLM does not unite,
but is able to establish a common negotiating position; or
3.) two separate SLMs come to the next round of negotiations.
Whatever the outcome, Salim said those negotiating need to
be truly representative of the people of Darfur and be
capable of producing action on the ground.


7. (C) Kingibe said he thought the Khartoum government was
not psychologically prepared to understand the need to move
forward with the Darfur negotiations. He said government
forces are now working more brazenly with their allied
militias. He also expressed concern about the potential for
the current conflict to spill over into Chad. In response to
the placement of helicopter gunships at the airport at El
Geneina, the Chadian Government has moved its forces to
prevent any kind of move from Sudan that could lead to the
fall of Abeche. Each side, he said, suspects the other of
providing succor to its rebels.


8. (C) Kingibe noted a need to emphasize the AU Mission in
Sudan's (AMIS) right of free passage in Darfur. Minni has
repeatedly stated that he never agreed to an AMIS presence
and therefore is not obligated to respect the terms of its
deployment. This has contributed to maverick behavior on the
part of the rebels.


9. (C) Zoellick inquired about the AU's mandate in Darfur and
whether it needs to be expanded. He asked about the
possibility of NATO providing planning support, or linking up
the southern peacekeeping operation with the AU mission.
Kingibe thought the current mandate was sufficient, although
it could be amended to specifically include protection
responsibilities. Zoellick assured him that, if he felt a
stronger mandate were necessary, the U.S. would support such
a call. In terms of linking AMIS and UNMIS, Kingibe thought
it best to keep the two operations separate, establishing an
end state for the AMIS operation, providing for a degree of
interface between the two operations, and ultimately handing
the operation over to UNMIS.

ROWE