Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NAIROBI4462
2005-10-27 10:34:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

ARTICLE 98 AND ATTORNEY GENERAL WAKO

Tags:  PREL MASS PINS ECON SOCI PGOV KE 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004462 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2025
TAGS: PREL MASS PINS ECON SOCI PGOV KE
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 98 AND ATTORNEY GENERAL WAKO

REF: A. NAIROBI 2695


B. NAIROBI 2446

C. NAIROBI 2347

D. NAIROBI 1173

E. NAIROBI 0650

F. NEW YORK 2428

Classified By: William M. Bellamy, reasons 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004462

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/24/2025
TAGS: PREL MASS PINS ECON SOCI PGOV KE
SUBJECT: ARTICLE 98 AND ATTORNEY GENERAL WAKO

REF: A. NAIROBI 2695


B. NAIROBI 2446

C. NAIROBI 2347

D. NAIROBI 1173

E. NAIROBI 0650

F. NEW YORK 2428

Classified By: William M. Bellamy, reasons 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Despite intensive Embassy lobbying over the
past year (reftel A-E),and the cutoff of FMF, IMET and some
ESF funding pursuant to the ASPA and the Nethercutt
Amendment, the Kenyan government still resists signature of
an Article 98 agreement with the U.S. Academics,
journalists, foreign governments and many Kenyan members of
parliament regularly reinforce through speeches and public
statements the GOK,s &brave8 stand against USG
"arm-twisting.8 End Summary.


2. (C) While APSA sanctions penalize the Kenyan armed forces
by reducing Kenya,s CT capabilities and cutting back on
valuable bilateral interaction between our respective forces,
the Kenyan military is loathe to lobby its political
leadership. Within the GOK there is no/no constituency in
favor of an Article 98 agreement, and little concern over the
impact our sanctions are having on Kenya,s defense
capabilities. While influential Kenyan cabinet figures would
doubtless be interested in exploring some kind of quid pro
quo with regard to Article 98 ) lifting the travel warning
on Kenya, for example ) there is little we can, or should,
offer as inducements for signing an Article 98 agreement
beyond continuing to treat Kenya as a good and worthy ally.


3. (C) In a recent conversation with the Ambassador,
Presidential Permanent Secretary Ambassador Muthaura
confirmed that there had been no deliberation on the Article
98 issue within the GOK for some time. (Note: Parliament is
now out of session, and cabinet has suspended all business
until after the November 21 referendum. Little official
business will be conducted by the GOK over the next five
weeks. End Note.) In mid-August, Ambassador pressed Justice
and Constitutional Affairs Minister Murungi on Article 98,
and was told there was little chance the GOK would conclude a
non-surrender agreement with the U.S. Murungi asked,
however, whether the U.S. would be willing to accept a
combination of the existing SOFA, covering U.S. military
personnel in Kenya, and &oral assurances from the highest
level of the GOK that no USG persons would be surrendered to
the ICC.8 Murungi argued that this would give the U.S. what
it wanted, but allow the GOK to finesse possible criticism
from the many groups that are now applauding its &stand8
against the U.S.


4. (C) Embassy believes that Ambassador Bolton should meet
with Attorney General Wako (reftel F),but without illusions
as to his ability to sway the internal debate. Wako will be
aware of the state of play within the GOK, and may provide
some additional insights into the GOK,s resistance, but he
does not have the standing, or the inclination to break the
current stalemate, despite the fact that Nethercott
restrictions will soon sharply limit current U.S.
capacity-building support to Kenya's Department of Public
Prosecutions, which falls in Wako's baliwick. Wako can be
counted on, however, to carry back a strong message from the
highest levels of the USG. This would be a welcome addition
to the pressure the Embassy has applied these past months.
BELLAMY