Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NAIROBI4384
2005-10-24 02:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KIBAKI

Tags:  PREL PGOV CVIS KCOR KE 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004384 

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF/E, CA/VO, AND INL/C/CP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CVIS KCOR KE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KIBAKI

Classified By: Ambassador William Bellamy for reason 1 (c) and (d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L NAIROBI 004384

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR AF/E, CA/VO, AND INL/C/CP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV CVIS KCOR KE
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT KIBAKI

Classified By: Ambassador William Bellamy for reason 1 (c) and (d)


1. (C) I met alone with President Kibaki for 40 minutes
October 19. The meeting was prompted by the decision in
Washington earlier this week to find Transport Minister
Christopher Murungaru ineligible for entry into the U.S.
under Presidential Proclamation 7750. Advised of this
decision early October 19, Presidential Permanent Secretary
Ambassasdor Francis Muthaura insisted that I talk to the
President immediately. As soon as President Kibaki flew in
that afternoon from Western Kenya, Muthaura summoned me to
State House.


2. (C) After an initial chat about the rigors of campaigning
during the referendum, I explained to Kibaki the decision on
Murungaru. I noted that we had no plans for a public
announcement or statement but would respond briefly and
factually if asked whether Murungaru has been excluded from
the U.S.


3. (C) Kibaki was glum. The U.S. decision was "most
serious" he conceded. The U.S. must have had good reasons
for taking this action. What specifically, he asked, were
those reasons? Beyond the Presidential Proclamation's
general assertions on corrupt activity, what were the charges
against Murungaru? Kibaki said that were he to make a
decision "on this man" he would need something more specific
on which to base it. Could the U.S. "help him a little" on
this, he asked.


4. (C) I told the President that much of what we knew came
from sensitive sources, or persons who would not want their
identities revealed. However, much of this same information
was widely available within his own Administration. (Kibaki
disagreed, insisting that he did not have access to such
information.) I noted that privacy rules preclude us from
providing specifics about visa decisions, even for
individuals of Murungaru's stature. I then recalled our
one-on-one conversation last January. At that time I had
given him the names of five GOK officials and private
businessmen involved in grand-scale corruption, including
Murungaru. As I had then, I again urged the President to
examine the Anglo-Leasing scandal and other scandals related
to it. This exercise would certainly yield answers to the
President's questions. I also noted that I had suggested
last January an audit of Murungaru's personal finances. This
exercise would also answer many of the President's concerns.


5. (C) Kibaki was unmoved by my suggestion that a little
digging in his own back garden would unearth all the evidence
he needed. He returned two or three times to his appeal for
more specific information and hard data on Murungaru. He
needed it, he said, not to confront Murungaru but just to be
clear in his own mind so that he could take the necessary
decisions. I said I would check if additional information
could be made available, but I cautioned that we would not be
able to discuss the specifics behind our decision on
Murungaru's exclusion.


6. (C) We parted on a cordial note.


7. (C) Ambassador Muthaura and Presidential Senior Adviser
Stanley Murage lingered outside the President's office during
the meeting. When I debriefed them, they appeared
disappointed at the President's indecisiveness. Later, out
of earshot of Muthaura, Murage confided that "the President
has plenty of evidence, he's just not acting."


8. (C) Muthaura and Murage appreciated the Embassy's low-key
handling of this affair.


9. (C) Comment. Action against Murungaru, who is widely
perceived as the most obviously corrupt and corrupting of GOK
ministers, would be a politically savvy move by Kibaki. It
would win accolades at home across the political spectrum.
At a time when the Kibaki government is being battered by
donors, international organizations and NGOs for its poor
governance performance, sacking Murungaru would add a little
lustre to Kenya's tarnished credentials. Yet, clearly,
Kibaki is reluctant to act.


10. (C) It may be, as some suggest, that Kibaki simply can't
bring himself to act against an old ally and fellow Kikuyu
insider. Or it may be that Kibaki, who abhors
unpleasantness, just can't stomach the idea of a one-on-one
showdown with tough guy Murungaru. The worst-case scenario,
and unfortunately not an implausible one, is that Murungaru's
deep pockets are needed to win the current referendum
campaign and, beyond that, to provide clandestine financing
for the political realignments Kibaki's inner circle hopes to
engineer in the run up to the 2007 elections. End Comment.
BELLAMY