Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05NAIROBI3173
2005-08-04 14:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Nairobi
Cable title:  

SUDAN: A/S NEWMAN AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE

Tags:  PGOV PREL KE SU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003173 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL KE SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: A/S NEWMAN AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
WINTER MEET GEN. SUMBEIYWO

Classified By: AF A/S Constance Newman

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 NAIROBI 003173

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/04/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL KE SU
SUBJECT: SUDAN: A/S NEWMAN AND SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE
WINTER MEET GEN. SUMBEIYWO

Classified By: AF A/S Constance Newman


1. (C) SUMMARY. AF A/S Newman and Special Representative
Winter met Gen. Sumbeiywo on August 4 in Nairobi to discuss
the way forward in Sudan following the death of John Garang.
Newman, Winter and Sumbeiywo compared views on the challenges
facing new SPLM Chairman Salva Kiir and his capacity to meet
those challenges. Sumbeiywo thinks that Kiir faces some
political challenges of a type he has not been accustomed to
dealing with. Sumbeiywo also gave his take on relations
between Kiir and other top SPLM officials. Finally, they
agreed that ideally, after Garang's funeral Kiir should
travel to Khartoum to be sworn in as First Vice President and
hold a few meetings of the Presidency before appointing a
deputy for the GOSS who can manage affairs in the South while
the GNU is formed. END SUMMARY.


2. (SBU) A/S Newman praised Sumbeiywo's role in the process
and said his involvement was more important than ever. She
reiterated the U.S. commitment to do whatever it can to
ensure that implementation of the CPA stays on track. Newman
noted that the rest of the money promised to Sumbeiywo to
support his involvement had been approved and would be
disbursed shortly. Winter concurred that Subeiywo has a key
role to play and asked for his views on the situation. He
said he was a bit more worried about the future after events
in the past couple of days, including Kiir's comment that he
expected implementation to "start over." (reported Septel)


3. (C) Sumbeiywo reassured Newman and Winter that Kiir likely
only meant that the SPLM and GOS would have to react to the
new situation and start the process from that point.
Sumbeiywo is optimistic about implementation, but noted that
everyone should remember that Kiir is a very different person
than Garang. Sumbeiywo believes Kiir commitment to unity may
be less strong than Garang's, but that his overriding
interest is allowing self-determination for the South. He
related previous conversations with Kiir that led him to
believe Kiir is more willing to decentralize decision making
in the SPLM. Sumbeiywo commented that Garang only trusted
Nhial Deng and Pagan Amum, but Kiir would likely change the
circle and delegate more decisions.


4. (C) Sumbeiywo expressed concern about Kiir's ability to
operate in the Khartoum political environment. He said that
Kiir has "enormous military capacity" but that he needs
people with political savvy to advise him. Sumbeiywo isn't
sure who Kiir really listens too except for former President
of Kenya Moi and Bishop Taban of Yei. He noted that Garang
had structures that connected him to political figures
throughout Sudan and it wasn't clear if Kiir would inherit
those structures. Kiir also lacks the contacts with regional
heads of state that Garang had, according to Sumbeiywo.
Sumbeiywo predicted that Kiir would have a "rough time" in
Khartoum.


5. (C) How Kiir deals with the Khartoum political environment
will, in part, depend on how he takes advice from other SPLM
leaders. Nhial Deng was Garang's chief operative in Khartoum,
but Sumbeiywo said there is bad blood between Deng and Kiir.
Sumbeiywo proceeded to provide his take on Kiir's
relationship with a number of SPLM officials.

-- Pagan Amum: There is bad blood between Kiir and Amum. Amum
is seen as a Garang loyalist, but will likely have a role in
the future because he is too talented to be excluded.

-- Kuol Manyang: A total Garang man. Salva has complained
about him in the past, but Manyang is likely to be loyal to
Kiir.

-- Lam Akol: Described as a "lightweight."

-- Oyai Deng: A hard liner and more of a field operative than
a politician.

-- Edward Lino: A Garang man. Can be difficult, but his
skills are needed.

-- James Wani Igga: A lightweight but deals well with Kiir.


6. (C) Newman, Winter and Sumbeiywo agreed that Kiir needs to
go to Khartoum soon after the funeral to be sworn in as First
Vice President. Sumbeiywo believes Kiir will not name a
deputy for the GOSS until after he is sworn in as First Vice
President. He believes that Kiir should spend a little time
in Khartoum establishing his role in the GNU Presidency
before returning south to name a deputy. Once a deputy is in
place to manage things in the South Kiir can return north to
form the GNU, after which the GOSS can be created. Sumbeiywo
said he has heard that Kiir might name Riek Machar the Vice
President of the GOSS which would appease the Nuers, but
cause other problems because Machar may not follow orders.

7. (C) Sumbeiywo is uncertain of Kiir's ability to influence
the situation in Darfur, given the weakness in his
relationship with regional leaders. However, all agreed that
Kiir understands the gravity of the situation and the
relationship between Darfur and the implementation of the
CPA.


8. Khartoum minimize considered.
BELLAMY