SOMALIA -- CENTER OF GRAVITY NOW IN SOMALIA FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NAIROBI 002618

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF
STATE PASS AID
LONDON, PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/24/2025
TAGS: PGOV PREL SO KE
SUBJECT: SOMALIA -- CENTER OF GRAVITY NOW IN SOMALIA FOR
TRANSITIONAL FEDERAL INSTITUTIONS

REF: A. NAIROBI 2488

B. NAIROBI 2516

Classified By: LISA J. PETERSON, ACTING POLITICAL COUNSELOR, REASONS 1.
4 (B) AND (D)

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SUMMARY
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1. (C) Despite Yemeni efforts to mediate between the
Transitional Federal President and the Speaker of the
Assembly, talks in Sanaa on key issues separating two main
camps in the Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs) appear
to have ended in acrimony. Prime Minister Ghedi has declared
his government to be based in Jowhar -- and the controlling
warlord has said nothing to disabuse the PM of this idea.
The Somali rumor mill is rife with dooms-day scenarios in
which President Yusuf takes military action in order to wrest
from the hands of his opponents the presidency -- which no
one is trying to take from him. Members of the Assembly are
streaming into Somalia, with some dispersing to their home
regions -- either heeding the President's call to bring
reconciliation to the district level, or avoiding what they
might see as an unhealthy security situation in the capital
-- and others going to Mogadishu to join the Speaker and
other colleagues in a session of the Parliament, scheduled
for June 25. The idea that the President, with Ethiopian
help, is setting in place the final pieces of a military
strategy has taken on such currency as to be the driving
force behind the actions of many political and civil society
players in Somalia. END SUMMARY.

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PRIME MINISTER TO JOWHAR ...
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2. (SBU) As reported ref (B),President Yusuf departed
Nairobi June 13 for the G-77 meeting in Qatar. The next
Somali notable to leave the Kenyan capital was Prime Minister
Ali Mohammed Ghedi, who boarded a plane June 18 bound for his
family home town of Jowhar, currently under control of his
relative, the Hawiye Abgal-clan warlord Muhammad Omar Habeb
(AKA "Muhammad Dheere"). Despite Dheere's announcement June
14 that Jowhar was unsuitable as a temporary seat for the
TFG, press reports were soon quoting the Prime Minister that
he has led his government to its new home. Reuters quoted
Ghedi June 21 as saying "My government has finally moved to
Somalia. Jowhar is our base until Mogadishu is pacified."


3. (SBU) The PM got additional press coverage when he laid a
foundation stone in an expansion project at Jowhar airstrip
-- an act of irony, given the fact that President Yusuf had
stressed the inadequacy of the airstrip there when he
declined to land there in the evening of June 13. Reports
of Ghedi's speech at the occasion said the PM had stressed
that Jowhar airport needed a quick upgrade so that
international leaders and foreign delegates, whom he and
President Yusuf would be hosting soon, could use it. This
was apparently in keeping with the PM's conversation, prior
to his departure from Nairobi, with UN Special Representative
of the Secretary General (SRSG) Ambassador Francois Fall.
Amb. Fall told Somalia Watcher that, at a meeting June 16,
the PM had informed him that henceforth, all gatherings of
the consultative body the two men co-chair, the Somalia
Coordination and Monitoring Committee (CMC),would have to be
held in Somalia, and that the international community members
of the committee should prepare for such a meeting in July,
to be convened in Jowhar.

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PRESIDENT, SPEAKER TO SANAA
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4. (SBU) Meanwhile, President Yusuf traveled O/A June 20
from Doha to the Yemeni capital Sanaa. Transitional Federal
Assembly Speaker Sharif Hassan Sheikh Aden joined him there
for talks mediated by the good offices of Yemeni President
Ali Abdallah Saleh. The press and the Nairobi rumor mill
reported that four issues were on the table between the two
men: A series of appointments and sackings of Ministers and
local government officials by decree of the Prime Minister;
several motions on which sub-quorum gatherings of MPs had
debated and voted since the last ill-fated parliamentary
plenary on March 17; the seat of the government in Somalia;
and the make-up of any future peace support mission that
might deploy to assist the TFG with security. Despite rumors
on June 22 of a preliminary agreement, every indication of an
energetic effort on the part of the Yemeni hosts, and at
least one face-to-face discussion between the Somali
President and Speaker, all indications on June 23 were that
the talks had broken down in acrimony. Somalia Watcher
received calls late that night stating that the Speaker and
his delegation were en route to Mogadishu, where a session of
Parliament would be convened June 25, while the President was
rumored to be departing Sanaa June 24 for Jowhar, with
expected stops en route in Bosasso and Garoowe in his home
region of Puntland.

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TAKING HIS PRESIDENCY BY FORCE?
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5. (C) However, the more enthusiastic of the rumor mongers
have Yusuf landing in Bosasso, and heading for Garoowe, but
from there crossing Ethiopian territory to the town Ferfer,
roughly due north of Beletweyne, on the Ethiopia-Somali
border. He would link up there with some 800 Puntland
militiamen that have reportedly been posted in the town since
early June. With a force in hand, Yusuf would then head for
Huddur, in Bakol District, link up with Rahanweyne militias
there, and execute the military campaign to wrest his
(uncontested) presidency from the Hawiye warlords squatting
on Mogadishu (see reftel B for discussion of this supposed
strategy).


6. (C) Facts on the ground, and reports from various
neighboring countries, might be interpreted as supporting
these rumors. For example, the UN's security chief for
Somalia informed the international community members of the
CMC (I-CMC members) that the Puntland militiamen referred to
para 5 had in fact been pre-positioned in Ferfer -- as a
presidential security force. According to the UN, the force
in Ferfer was to have been divided, with roughly half to have
transferred to Jowhar for the President's close protection.
Agence France Press (AFP) reports indicated that "well armed
forces from Puntland (...) arrived in Jowhar" on June 20,
"(...) armed with over 10 'technicals". AFP quoted Mohammed
Dheere as confirming that the force would guard the
President's and ministers' residences.


7. (C) While personal protection in Jowhar seems a
reasonable precaution for the President to take, the UN's
information on the disposition of the other half of the
Ferfer force -- that it is to move to Bakol District to join
with the Rahanweyne militias -- is less easy to explain.
Jowhar warlord Dheere is also quoted in the press as saying
that part of the Puntlander force would depart for Huddur to
reinforce an already existing force there. Rumor buffs
point to increasing press reports from Ethiopia, claiming
that rebels of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF)
were gathering in Galguduud District in Somalia, in
preparation for attacks on Ethiopian troops. Such reports
have been used as justification for Ethiopian military action
in their Ogaden region -- and cross-border, into Somalia.
Taken together, these elements -- Puntland militias combining
with Yusuf-loyal Rahanweyne forces, and a pretext for
Ethiopian intervention in protection of valid security
interests -- give plenty of fodder for the theorists that say
Yusuf plans to mount a military operation with Ethiopian
assistance to take control of Mogadishu -- in essence,
mounting a coup d'etat against himself.

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PARLIAMENT SCATTERED ALL OVER
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8. (SBU) The UNDP Chief in Nairobi, Max Gaylard, briefed
I-CMC members on June 21 on his agency's attempts to assist
the return of ministers/MPs and former Somali National
Reconciliation Conference (SNRC) delegates from Nairobi to
Somalia. He characterized the operation as "relatively
smooth for the delegates, but problematic -- chaos, actually
-- for the MPs." Gaylard reported that Prime Minister Ghedi
had on June 16 submitted a list of all the MPs remaining in
Nairobi, with a prescribed destination in what Ghedi had
determined to be the home district in Somalia for each MP.
MPs, however, presented themselves to the UNDP offices,
refusing to abide by the PM's prescriptions, and threatening
harm to UNDP staff if they were forced to go anywhere not of
their own choosing, with most of these stating they intended
to join the Speaker of the Assembly and other ministers/MPs
in Mogadishu. Gaylard stated that the PM backed down on June
18 on the specifics of his list "as he climbed the stairs of
his aircraft." Since then, UNDP has been canvassing the MPs
to determine their preferred destination in Somalia, with
flights having already begun that morning. Press reports
filed from Nairobi's Jomo Kenyatta International Airport told
of a delegation of 22 MPs en route to the Puntland towns of
Garoowe and Gaalkacyo. Gaylard committed to I-CMC members
that he would provide a complete list of MPs transported into
Somalia, and their destinations, as soon as the operation is
completed.

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PUBLIC STATEMENT WELL RECEIVED
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9. (C) Somali Watcher on June 22 met with former Somali Army
Colonel and current senior Al-Islah figure Mr. Abdirahman
Moalim Abdullahi (AKA "Badiyow"),at his request, to discuss
the current situation in Mogadishu and Somalia. Badiyow, a
Somali Canadian who is currently resident in Montreal, had
spent the previous 45 days in Mogadishu, and claimed to have
been deeply involved in the civil society efforts to change
the security equation in the capital. Badiyow enthused over
the June 21 public statement issued in Nairobi, saying it was
constructive to see a clear endorsement of the legitimizing
power of the Somali people. (Badiyow was also extremely
complimentary of the Secretary's recent speeches in the
Middle East, expressing appreciation for language that he
characterized as an "apology for an historical bias toward
dictator-enforced stability, and away from popularly-based
democracy.")

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FUNDING NEEDED -- BUT THERE ARE
NO SAFE DELIVERY MECHANISMS
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10. (C) Badiyow lamented that there was a real problem with
the provision of financial assistance to any part of the
Somali experiment -- whether that would be in support of
Mogadishu's civil society, or President Yusuf's
district-level reconciliation, or the warlord's cantonment of
militias. "No matter what the goal would be, or how
desperately it is needed, money would only fuel conflict," he
opined. He critiqued European Commission funding, on the
verge of disbursement through UNDP channels, for
district-level reconciliation as the most dangerous effort in
the making. "Who will have control of the money in the
villages and towns? It will have to be the MPs, but these MPs
are not the choice of the people -- the warlords who
controlled the outcome of the SNRC selected them. So when
these MPs show up with cash in hand, and a potentially
hostile population, there will be no reconciliation -- only
the buying of protection." Badiyow stressed that, from his
point of view, even the efforts of his colleagues in civil
society should be left without outside resources, despite the
desperate calls for assistance. His logic: That the process
of pushing the warlords into peace had drawn its power from
the fact that it was entirely home-grown, and that whoever
might receive funds from an outside source would be seen as
in that source's pocket. "Let civil society keep pushing
this forward with our own funds, and those we squeeze from
the businessmen." His one exception was the need for
infrastructure in the militia cantonment camps, but even
here, he acknowledged that funds to improve the situation for
the "demobilized" boys would most likely end up in the
pockets of the warlords.

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COMMENTS:
CENTER OF GRAVITY SHIFTING
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11. (C) With the steady stream of Somali TFI members
continuing into Somalia during the week of June 18-24, the
number of those heading into the country they purport to
represent and propose to govern is mounting. Mogadishu
appears to be acting as a magnet -- for some MPs, attracting
them toward the capital and the Speaker, and for others,
especially those originating from Puntland, repelling them
toward their home regions.

12. (C) June 25 may prove telling in where the center of
gravity has shifted. The Speaker of the Assembly announced
on June 12 (reported reftel A) that the next meeting of the
Parliament, at its "temporary headquarters in Mogadishu",
would convene on that day. He had set forth an agenda
without obvious political overtones -- establishing
parliamentary committees and electing committee chairmen,
approving the annual budget of the government, confirming
numerous independent commissions. Should the session go
forward, whatever business might be discussed will be less
important than the tally of who shows up, in what numbers.


13. (C) We have reported in some detail on the rumors
surrounding apparently verifiable movements of militias, on
press reports regarding "events" with implications for
Somalia's neighbor to the west, and on the apocalyptic
scenarios put forth to explain the alignment of various
elements that could signal a resumption of outright civil war
in Somalia. As noted in reftel B, this is less a reflection
of any credence we give to these rumors, than an indication
of the kinds of worries that seem to be uppermost in the
minds of Somalis, and upon which they base their plans and
actions. Although Al-Islah's Badiyow referred to President
Yusuf as "a fine planner, but someone who rarely gets around
to implementing his plans," it seems that Somalis of all
stripes put such confidence in the many theories of what
might be going on in the President's head that he does not
need to do much of anything for uncertainty to be the
principal condition in Somalia. END COMMENTS.
BELLAMY