Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05MUSCAT670
2005-04-24 12:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

EXBS: PORT SALALAH RIPE TARGET FOR PROGRAMMING

Tags:  EWWT PARM ETRD PREL PTER ASEC MU 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000670 

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI (TROBERTS),NP/ECC (TGROEN)
AMMAN FOR JIRVINE
STATE PASS USTR FOR J.BUNTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015
TAGS: EWWT PARM ETRD PREL PTER ASEC MU
SUBJECT: EXBS: PORT SALALAH RIPE TARGET FOR PROGRAMMING

REF: A. MUSCAT 506


B. MUSCAT 569

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4 (d)

-------
Summary
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C O N F I D E N T I A L MUSCAT 000670

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARPI (TROBERTS),NP/ECC (TGROEN)
AMMAN FOR JIRVINE
STATE PASS USTR FOR J.BUNTIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2015
TAGS: EWWT PARM ETRD PREL PTER ASEC MU
SUBJECT: EXBS: PORT SALALAH RIPE TARGET FOR PROGRAMMING

REF: A. MUSCAT 506


B. MUSCAT 569

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4 (d)

--------------
Summary
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1. (C) With over 30,000 containers on site at any given time
and scant screening capabilities, Port Salalah could
conceivably be a vulnerable spot in weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) import/export or transshipment. Including
the port in the Container Security Initiative and expanding
our EXBS programming there could be an effective use of USG
resources. End summary.


2. (SBU) During a regional trip to southern Oman April 15-17,
PolOff met with Salalah Port Services (SPS) to discuss
customs procedures and operations at the port in light of
Oman's bid for participation in the Container Security
Initiative (CSI) and prospective FTA-related export growth.

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In Need of Help Now...
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3. (C) Officials at SPS appear to maintain a detached
relationship with the local customs officials, unaware both
of customs' ability to detect weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and their ability to respond to potential threats.
Moreover, although Royal Oman Police Customs is responsible
for container search and clearance, it appears evident that
they lack the manpower, equipment, and training to adequately
screen for potential threats to the substantial cargo traffic
that moves daily through the port (ref B). SPS, as the port
authority and WMD first-responder, should be targeted for
future Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS)
programming.

--------------
...And More So In Future
--------------


4. (SBU) Some senior officials at SPS suggest that container
screening would be better suited at the container's port of
origin rather than a transit point such as Salalah. That is
not practical, however, given Oman's proximity to countries
lacking such capability, as well as to countries of
proliferation concern that may abet illicit cargo
trafficking. As Port Salalah evolves with the expected
signing of a U.S. free trade agreement, and growth from the
nascent Salalah Free Zone (SFZ) and the nearby Raysut
Industrial Estate, it will become increasingly an
import/export center as well as transshipment point.
Strengthening Oman's border and maritime security by
including Port Salalah in the Container Security Initiative
(CSI) and expanding our EXBS programming there would
therefore have a significant impact both locally and
regionally.


5. (SBU) On a positive note, SPS welcomed April 16 the
arrival of a new state-of-the art tugboat from the
Philippines. The new tug, costing over USD 5 million,
provides enhanced safety with its additional firefighting
capabilities.
BALTIMORE