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IdentifierCreatedClassificationOrigin
05MUSCAT193 2005-02-02 12:56:00 SECRET Embassy Muscat
Cable title:  

EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 02/02/2005

Tags:   AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER KMSG KHLS KVPR CASC MU EAC 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  S E C R E T MUSCAT 000193 

SIPDIS

DEPT. FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/DSS/CC, DS/DSS/OSAC,
DS/SPC/MSG, CA/OCS, NEA/EX, NEA/ARPI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/02/2015
TAGS: AEMR ASEC AMGT PTER KMSG KHLS KVPR CASC MU EAC
SUBJECT: EMBASSY MUSCAT EAC - 02/02/2005

REF: A. SECSTATE 18628


B. MUSCAT 161

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission William R. Stewart.
Reason: 1.4(g).

-------
Summary
-------



1. (SBU) The Ambassador chaired a meeting of the Emergency
Action Committee February 2 to review the Embassy's security
posture prior to the local weekend. Members of the EAC noted
no substantive changes in the local security environment
since the last meeting. Accordingly, the EAC agreed that the
Embassy's already heightened security posture and FPCON
remain appropriate. End Summary.



--------------------------


Security Environment


--------------------------





2. (SBU) On February 2, the Ambassador chaired a meeting of
the Emergency Action Committee ("EAC") to review the
Embassy's security posture prior to the local weekend. The
meeting opened with a discussion of the local security
situation, which the EAC continued to characterize as stable.
The EAC noted no new threat reporting specific to Oman.



--------------------------


Procedural Security


--------------------------





3. (S) RSO led a review of reftel A, regarding updated
procedures for abandoning Post One when required to do so as
a defensive measure. MSG confirmed that the reftel checklist
will be made readily available to Post One, effective
immediately. RSO added that the checklist will also be
incorporated into future REACT and Embassy-wide drills, such
as an upcoming combined internal defense/emergency
destruction drill.



4. (C) ARSO presented a proposal for revising the
Chancery's vehicle screening procedures. The revised
procedures, approved by the EAC, will include the
pre-screening of vehicles (ID checks and physical/visual
inspection) prior to their entry into the motorpool's sally
port. It was noted that the new procedures will also serve
to increase visual deterrence.



--------------------------


Sustained Vigilance


--------------------------





5. (SBU) Prior to concluding the meeting, the Ambassador
asked all members of the EAC to continue reinforcing to both
their staffs and family members the need for security
awareness. On a related note, RSO emphasized that all
suspicious activity or security-related incidents, as
insignificant as they may appear, should be reported to Post
One immediately.



--------------------------


EAC Conclusion


--------------------------





6. (SBU) The EAC concluded that there have been no
substantive changes in previously reported assessments of the
local security environment since the last meeting held on
January 29 (reftel B), and that the Embassy's FPCON and
already heightened security posture remain appropriate.
Nonetheless, the EAC remains acutely aware of the need to
monitor both the regional and local security and threat
environments, and is prepared to take the necessary
countermeasures should changes to either occur. AMB, DCM,
RSO, ARSO, P/E, CONS, MGT, MSG, DAO, OMC (USDR), and ECA
(USCENTAF) participated in the meeting, which was followed by
a meeting of the Visas Viper Committee.
BALTIMORE