GEN ABIZAID'S DECEMBER 26 MEETING WITH SULTAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MUSCAT 001934

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

USCENTCOM FOR POLAD, CCJ2 AND CCJ5-E
SECDEF FOR OSD
STATE FOR NEA, PM, NEA/ARPI, NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/27/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR PTER PGOV XF IR IZ MU
SUBJECT: GEN ABIZAID'S DECEMBER 26 MEETING WITH SULTAN
QABOOS

REF: A. MUSCAT 1917

B. MUSCAT 547

Classified By: Ambassador Richard L. Baltimore III.
Reason: 1.4 (b, d).

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Summary
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1. (C) In a convivial 80-minute exchange on December 26,
Sultan Qaboos shared with USCENTCOM CDR Gen Abizaid his
thoughts on Iraq, Iran, the war on terror and the state of
bilateral relations. Agreeing with Gen Abizaid on many
points, the Sultan argued for a less intrusive Arab role in
Iraq's transition, saying too many Arab states are not
"neutral," and that in any case Iraqis must resolve their own
problems. On Iran, the Sultan expressed concern over
President Ahmadinejad's erratic behavior while remaining
optimistic that cooler heads there would eventually prevail.
The Sultan assessed Al Qaeda as being in a weaker position
now than two years ago, in part thanks to counter-terrorism
successes by Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, but warned that
governments must remain vigilant. He voiced concern about
the difficulty of maintaining Oman's maritime security, and
gratitude for the friendship of the U.S. Gen Abizaid's
invitations for Oman to post a liaison officer in Tampa, and
suggestions for more Omani assistance to Iraq, were
acknowledged without response. End summary.


2. (SBU) On December 26, USCENTCOM CDR General Abizaid paid a
call on Sultan Qaboos at the Bait Bahjat al-Andhar royal farm
near Sohar. The Sultan was joined in the 80-minute meeting
by Chief of Staff of the Sultan's Armed Forces, LTG Ahmed
al-Nabhani. General Abizaid was accompanied by the
Ambassador and senior CENTCOM and Embassy staff members. The
party was flown to Sohar aboard two of the Sultan's
helicopters.

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Iran
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3. (C) Recalling points he made recently to Vice President
Cheney (ref A),the Sultan reiterated that Iranian politics
is passing through a "gray area" as new President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad continues to shape his own team and political
identity. Repeatedly expressing his hope that "wisdom" will
prevail and that "wise men" around the erratic Iranian leader
will prevent the country from "sailing into deep water," the
Sultan predicted that the political picture in Tehran will
come into greater focus in 3-4 months. Though the Iranian
Revolution took place over 25 years ago, the Sultan said it
appears the revolutionary spirit has been resuscitated - at
least in the person of Ahmadinejad. When Gen Abizaid
remarked that Iranian meddling in Southern Iraq served an
unclear purpose, and that Ahmadinejad appealed to base
populism, the Sultan said the art of hiding one's intentions
has long been practiced in Iran. As for populism, the Sultan
sees signs that even working class Iranians are growing
frustrated with unfulfilled electoral promises.
Ahmadinejad's campaign rhetoric about redistributing oil
wealth to the people was folly from the start. The Sultan
noted that government's true role is to provide services, not
dole out cash, for without money a government cannot govern.

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Iraq - The Qaboos Doctrine
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4. (C) Responding to Gen Abizaid's point about the 11 million
Iraqis who voted in December for a new future, the Sultan
wondered what kind of future the voters had in mind. While
Gen Abizaid observed that there were more Iraqis seeking to
hold the country together then tear it apart, the Sultan
worried about those for whom that statement did not apply.
He recognized Iraq's manifest best interest in preserving its
territorial integrity, but warned that selfishness is a
pernicious human trait that grows quickly out of control once
it takes hold. He hoped the Iraqi Kurds, for instance, who
have long harbored nationalist aspirations, would defer the
goal of statehood to a distant future. The Sultan sought Gen
Abizaid's views on how Iraq might descend into a civil war
that could draw in neighbors, responding that he could see
Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia getting involved, but not Syria
or Jordan. He fretted over sectarian divides in Iraq, noting
that India has far greater diversity yet somehow manages to
work. Though Iran has a long history of involvement in
southern Iraq, the Iraqi Shia have no allegiance to Iran.


5. (C) The Sultan solicited Gen Abizaid's ideas on how the
region could help Iraq. The General replied that the Arab
states must fully support Iraq's unity and territorial
integrity, and wield their influence with domestic Iraqi
groups toward this end. The Sultan responded that the Arab
League did dispatch a delegation to Iraq prior to the
election, and found that its presence was far from
universally welcomed. Moreover, he said not all Arab states
are "neutral parties." Without naming names, he said some
Arab rulers find it outrageous that a Kurd could become
Iraq's president. He also doubted that all Arab League
members were as desirous as Oman to see Iraq strong and
prosperous again. Dubious that many Arab states could in
fact play a truly helpful role in Iraq, the Sultan counseled
against Arabs "rushing in" for fear of being seen as
interfering. He argued instead for a much more subtle
involvement that will give Iraqis space to sort through their
own issues without a lot of unsolicited advice from
neighbors. Arab states, he said, should respond to specific
Iraqi requests; otherwise, they should butt out. "Patience
is key."


6. (C) The Sultan traded questions about Iraqi government
stability, its corruption problems, and how to build up Iraqi
security and military forces. In reply to Gen Abizaid's
description of the U.S. force reductions envisioned for 2006
and plans to put Iraqi forces more in a leading role, the
Sultan inquired about the quality of those Iraqi forces. He
acknowledged that building their sheer numbers right now must
be the priority, as upgrading quality and instilling a proper
culture is a more long-term venture. He sees the Iraqi
police forces as being more critical to law and order--and
fighting corruption--than the Iraqi army. Gen Abizaid
replied that any assistance Arab police academies could offer
in terms of training and exchanges would be most appreciated.

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GWOT, Al Qaeda and Maritime Security
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7. (C) Gen Abizaid and the Sultan agreed that Al Qaeda's (AQ)
presence and popularity in the region appeared to be on the
wane. The Sultan attributed this to the public's increasing
awareness that AQ targets civilians in contravention to
Islam, to Saudi Arabia's success in bringing AQ violence
there "under control," and to Pakistan's ability to extend
government influence into the tribal areas. He nevertheless
warned against underestimating those elements that remain.
Though AQ is much reduced from a few years ago, the Sultan
said it must be closely monitored for as long as it has "a
voice." The two agreed that stanching financial flows to AQ
was key, particularly as the network can function with even
minimal funding. The Sultan surmised that many young Arabs
volunteer as suicide bombers as a means to redeem themselves
of sin - a desire ruthlessly exploited by AQ brainwashers.
He noted the parallels to how Ayatollah Khomeini had
distributed "keys to paradise" to induce Army volunteers to
clear minefields with their bodies during Iran's war with
Iraq. Gen Abizaid described how AQ's network in Syria was
most effective in channeling volunteers for Iraq, though he
noted that both Baghdad and Damascus were doing a better job
of interdicting that flow.


8. (C) The Sultan expressed his partnership with the West in
fighting the war on terror, while voicing concern over Oman's
maritime security. He revealed that a boatload of smuggled
illegal immigrants came ashore astride one of his residences
very recently in the middle of the night. They were quickly
rounded up and consisted of nothing more sinister than
economic migrants, but the Sultan said one never knows when
more nefarious individuals might seek entry by similar means.
Oman's maritime boundaries, the Sultan lamented, are very
difficult to defend. Gen Abizaid noted that success on other
fronts in the GWOT may spur AQ elements increasingly to seek
refuge in Yemen and the Horn of Africa. The Sultan retorted
that the Yemeni government doesn't "govern" all of its
territories but rather, at most, only "manages" its regions.
He does not envy the Yemeni government's formidable task, and
said the GCC states try to do what they can to assist their
neighbor. As for Somalia, the Sultan agreed that it cannot
be allowed to simply fester, but rejected with gusto any
notion of sending Omani peacekeepers to that land.

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Bilateral Relations
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9. (C) Gen Abizaid echoed Vice President Cheney's deep
appreciation for the close U.S.-Omani relationship. The
Sultan said he has had the pleasure of many meetings with Mr.
Cheney over the years and considers him a good friend. He
recounted the visit of his father, Sultan Said, to the U.S.
in 1938, and periodic calls on his father in the 1950's by
the U.S. Consul in Aden, but that otherwise, the bilateral
relationship only began to truly blossom after the U.S.
established its Embassy in Muscat in the 1970's. Gen Abizaid
thanked the Sultan for his recent generous land grant to The
American International School in Muscat, which the Sultan
modestly accepted. Gen Abizaid invited the Sultan to send an
Omani Liaison Officer to Coalition Headquarters in Tampa,
which would give Oman the benefit of valuable information
sharing. The Sultan thanked the General for the offer, but
did not volunteer a response.


10. (C) The Sultan praised Gen Abizaid for his balanced
approach to strategic concerns in the region, expressing
satisfaction that Oman's shared interests are being properly
weighed. A heavy hand, especially in these times, he warned,
could backfire for the U.S. Oman, he recalled, had come
under criticism from GCC neighbors when it sought Western
help to defeat the Communist-supported Dhofar rebellion in
the 1970's. The Sultan argued at the time that, "if the
rebels could have friends, then why can't we?" Though the
Cold War is over, Oman still faces challenges for which it is
grateful to have a friend such as the United States. The
Sultan said he shared Gen Abizaid's positive outlook for the
region, agreeing that there is no question that life is
better now than it was two years ago. He said Oman would
never hesitate to speak openly to its friend if it felt
things were off track.


11. (U) CENTCOM has cleared this message.
BALTIMORE